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* ABSTRACT * 
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The essence of this thesis is a critique of the structure and form 
of the military chaplaincy in south Africa in terms of theological 
presuppositions that can generally be associated with Karl Barth's 
understanding of ministry. It focuses on the military chaplaincy 
of the English-speaking churches of South Africa: the period 
selected is the past ten years. 
After surveyirtg the rather scarce literature on the military 
chaplaincy in South Africa and several Western countries, the 
author briefly outlines those aspects of the th~ology of. ministry 
of Karl Barth pertinent to this thesis. In addition, the author 
explains his own position on war and conscientious objection, 
which is generally speaking in keeping with what may be referred 
to as the Barthian perspective on ministry. 
The author then examines the South African Chaplains' Service. He 
finds several aspects incompatible with the theology of ministry 
outlined in Chapter 2: rank, uniform, military appointment of 
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senior staff, command influence of the military over chaplains, 
the hierarchical structure of the Chaplains' Service, in-house 
training of chaplains, security clearance and secrecy. He argues 
that the real test of the freedom of the military chaplaincy is 
whether chaplains are free to convey the church's message of 
peace. The author concludes that the English-speaking churches 
can not yet be assured of the freedom of their chaplain~, and 
shows that the "complete freedom" to which most of the Permanent 
Force chaplains lay claim is illusory. 
Material for this section was drawn from three important sources 
among others: 
1) Documents published by the South African Chaplains' 
Service and the South African Defence Force 
2) Open-ended interviews by the author with some 36 
chaplains 
3) Correspondence by the author with some 11 chaplains. 
Since the military chaplaincy is a highly controversial topic in 
the English-speaking churches in south Africa, and since the 




coloured by denominational, 
I 
and other factors, lthe author 
made an attempt to exclude bias by writing up the interv'iews, and 
sending them back to the interviewees for their comments and 
corrections, before using them in the analysis. ~hi~ method is 
essentially the Harvard Business School case study procedure. 
However, it should be noted that only a small part of the thesis 
is dependent on the use of this interview method. By far the 
larger part of the work consists of theological reflection on the 
J 
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ministry offered by the military chaplaincy, with the use of 
published documents. 
In conclusion the author recommends that the chaplaincy be 
demilitarized, and suggests several steps toward the achievement 
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* PREFACE * 
*********** 
The military chaplaincy has for several years been a,matter of 
I 
' 
A great many arguments have been advanced both for and 
and synods. 
I . . h against t e 
intense controversy in South African church assemblies 
current style of ministry to military personnel. Consequently I 
have been compelled, in this thesis, to deal with as many of these 
hotly contested points as possiole. As a result this thesis is 
rather bulkier than most, and contains several lengthy but 
unavoidable digressions. Whereas references have been embedded 
in the text, these longer discussions are numbered sequentially 
! 
' 
and are placed at the end of the work. Some important• sections 
I 
like those on the war in South Africa, the Geneva Conventions, and 
the rights and duties of the chaplain in terms of national and 
international law, have been relegated to appendices, so as not to 
interrupt the flow of the argument. 
My interest in the military chaplaincy began in the 1970s when I , 
became a consientious objector. This experience has obviously 
influenced my perception of the argument pursued in this thesis. 
It is this personal involvement which perhaps justifies a short 
and, some would say, academically extraneous, autobiographical 
comrnen t. I recall with affection the many hours I spent in the 
offic.e of ds. Dawid Botha, the unit chaplain of the Detention 
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Barracks in Voortrekkerhoogte, where I was held for a year 
starting in December 1979. He tried his utmost to convince me to 
return to the army. Other chaplains were, in turn, strongly 
~ 
supportive of my stand, and were on occasion silenced by the army. 
Ironically the 1983 legislation on conscientious objection {which 
grants community service to certain categories of "religious 
objector", but forbids most forms of conscientious objection on 
pain of six years' jail) was formulated by none other than the 
present Chaplain-General. My interest duly whetted, I commenced 
the present study in 1983. 
It should be mentioned that this study is not an attack on 
military chaplains in their capacity as pastors. It is readily 
granted, as Harper says in his fine article, that 
"The chaplain is still sought out by servicemen as 
representative of an abiding order of deeply hunan and 
personal values in a life that too often becomes inhuman and 
impersonal. In the midst of relationships necessarily 
authoritarian, here is one relationship in which a man can 
acknowledge nis loves and hates,-his doubts and fears, his 
resentments and conflicts of loyalties without being called 
on the carpet for insubordination" (1981:38). 
Rather this study is intended to be a carefully considered and 
balanced investigation of one specific area of the chaplain's 
~ 
work. This area will be defined with more precision in the text, 
but may crudely be designated as the prophetic task of the church 
with respect to its ministry to military personnel. 
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1. Obstacles to research 
The obstacles faced in researching this subject were considerable. 
Among the main difficulties were: the non-cooperation of the South 
African Chaplains' Service, doubts about documentation, and the 
fear of reprisals against chaplains and against myself by the 
South African Defence-Force. 
First, it proved impossible to enlist the cooperation of ithe South 
i 
African Chaplains' Service. Given that this thesis presents a 
case for relieving chaplains of their military status, this is 
hardly surprising, since the Permanent Force chaplains I in ~978 
declared their unanimous belief that military status is essential 
for their ministry (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement: Stuart, 
Nov. 1983) • Permission to examine South African Chaplains' 
Service archives was denied on the grounds that the author was not 
a serving member of the South African Defence Force (Letter from 
Brig·. J.F. Pretorius, 29.12.1983). This closed attitude is to 
I 
be contrasted with the openness of, for example, 'the MCSA 
Connexional Committee, which willingly granted the use of its 
minutes for research purposes. After a certain date, some 
chaplains referred my letters to the Chaplain-General or simply 
did not answer them (e.g. Letter from Rev. J. Daines, 17.5.1984: 
my (registered) letters to Brig. J.F. Potgieter, 22.3.1984 and 
22.6.1984). An example is that of Rev. Dennis van der Spuy, who 
replied, 
"I regret to inform you that I cannot answer your letter 
personally, since Maj Gen C.P. Naude has requested that all 
correspondence with you be dealt with by his office I 
would caution that you deal through correct channels ••• " 
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(Letter, 16.7.1984). 
Communication with senior officials of the South African 
Chaplains' Service was often fruitless. Som~ replies were 
contentless: others, evasive. Consider, for example, an exchange 
which began on 4 October 1983 when I asked the Chaplain-General, 
" ••• May a chaplain represent fully his church's views on 
ethical matters? In particular, may chaplains of the 
Methodist, Anglican and Catholic churches instruct troops 
about their churches' call for the withdrawal of the South 
African military from South West Africa?" 
He replied, 
"It is expected from each chaplain to proclaim the gospel 
(sic} of Jesus Christ and to take care of the spiritual 
needs of his Church members, and nothing more" (31.10~1983). 
This cryptic reply came nowhere near a factual answer to my 
' ' ' 
question. Two further letters of 21.3.1984 and 22.6.1984, 
enquiring about an "Information Brochure" published by,the South 
African Chaplains' Service, received an evasive answer. The 
Chaplain-General replied, 
"The problem with the production of a brochure is that by 
the time it is produced and disseminated it is already out 
of date and it is for this reason that I am not at all happy 
about circulating documents outside of our own organisation 
that are only relevant for a short period of time ••• 
"Chaplains and members of my staff receive requests for 
information from you from time to time and I would 
appreciate this ceasing forthwith, for while the information 
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is accurate at the time it is given it may give an - entirely 
false picture or impression if used at another time or in 
another context" (Letter, 16.7.1984). 
If it is true that the South African Chaplains' Service is 
changing at such a velocity that it is impossible for outsiders to 
have knowledge of the working of the organization, how does the 
Chaplain-General expect the churches to satisfy themselves that 
this is a valid form of ministry? 
Second, several problems arose in connection 







Service are restricted. On 12 January 1983 I wrote to i Rev. J. 
Daines, asking for some documents which he had quoted in a paper 
distributed at the 1982 Provincial Synod of the Church of the 
Province of South Africa. His reply was instructive: 
"As a man under authority and working with classified 
documents I am afraid I cannot supply them 
that you contact the appropriate 
25.1.1983). 




Accordingly I wrote to the Chaplain-General for one of these, the 
"South African Defence Force Order on Religion", on 28 January 
1983, but was refused it (Letter from Col. A.W. van den Aardweg, 
16.2.1983). Presumably the same confidentiality applies to the 
"Handbook for Chaplains", since it contains the "South African 
Defence Force Order on Religion" 1/21/78. This discussion should 
not be understood as a personal criticism of the chaplains 
involved. · It is intended to indicate the problems I faced as a 
researcher -- problems which arise out of the chaplaincy as an 
integral .part of the military institution. 
j 
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Two documents represent tantalizing views about the military 
chaplaincy. The first, which I shall refer to as Document A, is 
"Die siening van bevs tov die kpln in die ops gebied" ("The 
attitude of officers commanding to the chaplain in the operational 
area", 6 pages, mimeo). The second, which I shall refer to as 
Document s, is "Die rol van die Leer kapelaan in revolusion~re 
oorlogvoering" ("The role of the Army chaplain in revolutionary 
warfare", 7 pages, mimeo). Both were obtained 
However, neither carries the author's name 
from chaplains. 
or off ic~al South 
African Chaplains' Service authorization. can 
I 
these documents be 
used for analysis of the chaplaincy or can they not? No doubt 
the officials would deny that they have any standing, if only 
because of some of the theological enormities which tney contain. 
For instance, Document A urges that chaplains implant a 
"counter-ideology" in the hearts of sbldiers to help them to fight 
"Communism" more effectively. The writer goes on, 
I l "I would almost assert that just as SWAPO uses its po~itical I 
commissars, so we should use our chaplains within reasonable 
limits" (p 5~ my translation). I 
Document B asserts that the church is the strongest 
anti-revolutionary force in South African society. The chaplain, 
as the proclaimer of "higher values", should promote the morale of 
soldiers by ridding them of doubt about the justice of the cause 
and tne aim of the war (pp 5,3). 
could it be that Document A represents the kind of behaviour 
expected of chaplains in tne operational area? Could it be that 
Document B represents the kind of instruction given in chaplains' 
courses, which often include a section on the role of the Army 
chaplain in revolutionary warfare? The thought pat terns of 
I 
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Document B seem fairly widespread within the military chaplaincy~ 
for instance, they are mentioned in the book "The Chaplain's Wife" 
(pp 164f). 
However, after careful consideration and discussion with my 
supervisor, I decided to exclude both these documents and several 
other similar sources from the analysis. Their use would 
considerably strengthen my arguments, but would lay the entire 
work open to the criticism of being "unscientific". The; analysis 
! 
presented in Chapter 3 is therefore a deliberate understaiement. 
' I 
Third, there was the problem of fear of reprisals by the 
I 
South 
African , Defence Force. As far as South African Defence Force 
ideology is concerned, the analysis would be strengthened by 
quotations from "Guide to Psychological Action" (Directorate 
Operations, Army Headquarters, August 1976), and the "Burgersake 
Ag terg rondreeks", Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 (SA Leerhoofkwartier, 1977 and 
1978). However, these are restricted documents and it was felt 
that the litigation and prison sentences that could follow would 
I 
not be worth the advantages of "objectivity". The penalty for 
I 
disclosing the contents of any document to an unauthorized person 
to the prejudice of the Defence Force, is a maximum of 5 years' 
prison (Clause 8f of the First Schedule, Defence Act No. 44 of 
1957). In addition to this, some chaplains were afraid to relate 
to me all of their experiences. Others allowed me to use only 
those parts of their interviews which they deemed "common .,cf 
knowledge"~ a few wanted very little or nothing quoted. It is of 
note tna t Bekker, in his research on the police chaplaincy, 
encountered similar difficulties. Chaplains were afraid to talk, 
he said, because this could be damaging for the police and for the 
country. He urged that the chaplains make a "drastic effort" to 
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inform the church about their work, since secrecy of this kind 
gives the chaplaincy a "very poor image" (1981:70f; my 
translation). However, I had no alternative but to make the best 
of these limitations. A few chaplains are referred to as Chaplain 
A, Chaplain B etc., for their own protection; my supervisor and 
the examiners have been supplied with their names. Unfortunately, 
several devastating accounts about torture of "enemies", and t 
reprisals against chaplains who complained about these and other 
aspects, could not be used. The hesitancy of these chapf ains was 
' 
quite understand~bly based on fears of legal action; ~ome also 
added that they feared they· would be deprived of their 




I would face 
even more severe dilemmas of conscience. Once again, to exclude 
this testimony is to play down the acute problems that beset an 
official military chaplaincy. 
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CHAPTER l: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
At its 1974 National Conference, the South African Council of 
Churches issued a strongly worded statement on conscientious 
c·bjection (documented in Church and conscience: lf f). In it the 
Council challenged its member churches to consider whether 
Christians should become conscientious objectors, in view of its 
conviction that the war South Africa was fighting found its origin 
in inJUStice and discrimination. The statement was greeted with 
anger and derision by the press (English and Afrikaans alike) and 
the government (CIIR,1982:30f). However, its significance lay in 
the fact that, perhaps for the first time, the churches in South 
Africa were jolted into questioning the good conscience and 
complacency with which they had traditionally justified war, as 
E!xemplified in, for example, their unreflective deployment of 
chaplains as full members of the military (see, e.g., CIIR, 
1982:31-33, 46ff: see also the section on the ethics of war in 
i~hapter 2) • 
The statement by the National Confetence of the SACC had wide 
1:-ami f ica tions. The first was that legislation was passed 
forbidding all encouragement of conscientious objection, on pain y 
c>f. a sentence of six years or R5000 or both (Section 121 ( c) of the 
J)efence Act No. 44 of 1957). Another was that in due course 
I 
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young men started to refuse to obey their SADF call-ups. A third 
was that the member churches of the SACC began critically to 
I 
reappraise the form of their ministry to military personnel (1). 
In fact this concern sprang from a clause of the 1974 Statement, 
in which ithe Conference 
In 
0 questions the basis upon which chaplains are seconded to 
the military forces lest their presenc& 
support for the defence of our unjust and 
society0 • 





accordance with this, the MCSA, PCSA and the catholic Church 
sought, in 1977 and 1978, to renegotiate the structure bf their 
I 
I 
ministry to military personnel. They attempted both to provide 
ministry to the guerrilla forces and to reduce the degree of 
identification of their chaplains with the military-by restoring 
to them their civilian status and dress (cf. CIIR, l982:68ff). 
The effort failed for two reasons. First, the military insisted 
that tne then current practice of appointing chaplains as 
commissioned 
--)' 
officers was the only practicable means of seeing to 
the spiritual needs of soldiers. Second, the churches were 
divided. Many people, and especially chaplains, felt that the 
main problem was not over-identification with the military~ it was 
the churches' failure to support the chaplains in their important, 
but difficult, task of ministering to sol~iers. They felt that 
the churches' renegotiation efforts, far from safeguarding the 
integrity of their ministry, were placing their ministry in 
question and jeopardizing the churches' entire relationship with 
the armed forces (e.g. Letter from Rev. J. de Metz, Seek (Jan. 
1979)). The final word on the matter was had by the Permanent 
Force chaplains of the English-speaking churches, who issued a 
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statement in 1978, explaining their strong conviction that full 
military status for chaplains should be retained (Permanent Force 
I 
Chaplains' Statement, 1.3.1978). 
The issue surfaced intermittently at church conferences in the 
ensuing years (cf. nsynod clash on church role in armyn, Argus 
28.6.1979). Then at its National Conference in 1984, the SACC 
adopted a statement in which it urged each member 
naemilitarize its chaplains by relieving them of the 
church to 
I -symbols of 
military status like rank and uniformn, and to nbring its 
chaplains under church authority, thereby releasing them from 
. d . I . This new etermination to military influencen (see Appendix E). 
demilitarize the chaplaincy arose from two sources: first, the 
churches' growing conviction that the SADF should withdraw from 
Namibia (cf. Report, and Statement), and second, from an 
increasingly influential anti-militarism lobby within the churches 
and the universities (e.g. see the magazine "Obje~tor" of the 
Conscientious Objectors Support Group, which was first published 
in 1983). 
Controversy about the manner in which ministry to mili~ary 
personnel is conducted is not as unprecedented or inappropriate as 
conservatives in the churches seem to have thought. In the 
United States, concern about the military chaplaincy is almost as 
old as the institution itself. For instance, a Founding Father 
and early Presidertt, James M~dison, opposed military chaplaincy on 
grounds of church-state independence (Williams, in Cox, 1971: 30). 
A study by the United Church of Christ in the United States 
defined the issue succintly. It said, 
nthe special nature of the chaplaincy is not to be found in 
its purpose, the coming of shalom, which is tne purpose it 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION -26 
shares with the whole ~inistry of the church, but rather in 
the peculiar perils and promi~es inherent in exercisin~ the 
. I " 
ministry in the midst of the military enterprisen (MMP:6)~ 
It might be said that it is the npeculiar perils and.promisesn 
inherent in military chaplaincy that make it a Subject for 
continual inquiry and r~formulation, in South Africa .as elsewhere. 
The npromise", as seen by the ucc, was 
nthe opportunity to support, guide, and care for those who 
have conscientiously chosen to exercise their vocation 
within the militaryn (MMP:7). 
The "perils", in turn were those 
nmoral and spiritual perils [which] pervade . . I . ins ti t.utions 
I 
where people live in circumstances that are exc~ptional, 
authoritarian, and contJ;olled by the state ••• the dang,er of 
idolatry when the goals of the nation are identified with # 
the purpose of God, of apostasy when the loyalties of the 
officer displace the duties of the clergy, of false witness 
when the Christian presenc~-in the military comes to ~ignify 
the church's blessing of - violence and indulgence of all 
wars" (MMP:7). 
This study takes as its point of departure the recent South 
Aftican debate about the military chaplaincy. In the light of 
these "promises and perils", it attempts to conduct a theolo"gical 
and ethical examination into the manner in which certain South 
African churches are presently running their ministry to military 
personnel. Such an inquiry is long overdue, since the critici~ms 
voiced b~ the SACC in 1974 and the ill-fated re~egotiation talks 
of 1977/8 nad been informed neither by research on chaplaincies 
The term "English-speaking" churches is normally taken to mean 
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those churches which originated in Britain and which are full 
members of the SACC (see, e.g. de Gruchy, 1979:85). However, for 
the purposes of this thesis it is loosely employed to include the 
Catholic Church and the Baptist Union as well. It is readily 
conceded that the term is inaccurate, because most of the members 
of these churches speak African languages. However, this set of 
chur6hes may be broadly distinguished from the "Afrikaans" 
churches and their black counterparts on the one hand, and from 
' 
the Pentecostal churches on the other. Furthermore, the term 
"English-speaking" churches is used by the military chaplains 
themselves. In the absence of any better term, t~is one, 
· · h 1. h h h · d I together with its synonym t e Eng is c urc es, is use • j 
The third limitation is that this study·concerns itself, in the 
main, with theological and ethical questions relating to the form 
of the churches' ministry to military personnel. It must be 
conceded that the military chaplaincy could have been investigated 
from several other standpoints, e.g. from a constitutional and 
legal point of view, or from a historical point of view. 
Furthermore, this study is not intended to be a comprehensive 
inquiry in the sense of dealing with every aspect of the 
chaplain's work, i.e. no attempt is made at a general portrayal of 
the work of the chaplain as is done, for example, by Meyer (1979) 
and Bekker (1981). Instead, psychological and pastoral aspects 
of ministry are dealt with only as they impinge on the theological 
and social-ethical aim of this study. 
3. LITERATURE SURVEY 
If military chaplaincy is based on the profound theological truth 
that the ministry of the church knows no boundaries, but reaches 
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out at all times to all people and all institutions, criticism of 
the military form of chaplaincy may perhaps be said to arise from 
the equally profound truth that the church should minister in 
integrity, which means offering ultimate allegiance not to the 
state or the military but to God. When surveying the literature 
on the military chaplaincy, one is struck by the continued 
effort, on the part of both opponents of military chaplaincy and 
9f chaplains themselves and their supporters, to measure this 
extraordinary form of ministry in terms of the sometimes 'competing 
principles of effectiveness and integrity in ministry. I now try 
very briefly to show how recent literature on the subject of the 
military chaplaincy addresses these two principles. The survey 
covers literature from the United States, West Germany, Britain, 
France and South Africa, in that order. 
3.1. United States 
The military chaplaincy in the United States is typical of 
chaplaincies in the West. Chaplains are paid and housed by the 
government; they wear uniform and have rank; they are subject, as 
officers, to military discipline; and they generally take on the 
task as a career. They are theologically trained, like other 
ministers of their churches, at church seminaries or universities, 
and tneir chapiaincy work is under regular review by church 
boards. In the opinion of its protagonists, it is a system of 
careful checks and oalances to preserve the chaplain's 
independence. 
However, Burchard's sociological study in 1953 suggested that 
chaplains experience "role conflict", arising from their dual role * 
as military officers and ministers of the Gospel. 
! 
Moreover, this 
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conflict tends to be resolved in favour of the military role 
(1953:352}. Twenty years later, a similar investigation by 
Abercrombie showed the opposite: that chaplains saw their clerical 
and military role-values as almost identical (1973:67). 
Abercrombie attributed Burchard's findings to his assumption, 
stemming from his pacifist commitment, that role conflict must 
necessarily be present in the Christian minister associated with 
warfare. Unsubstantiated statements by Burchard tend to confirm 
Abercrombie' s view, e.g.: " the fact that (the chaplain} is 
responsible to his commanding officer rather than to God •• " 
(Burchard, 1953:165). Abercrombie concluded that one cannot 
profitably study "role conflict" among chaplains at all (1973:67). 
His chief finding, then, was that chaplains for America's wars 
could be recruited from the mainstream of American Christianity; 
it would not be necessary for the Army to socialize them or alter 
their values (1973:53). He believed, furthermore, in the 
possibility of a "prophetic chaplaincy" which could "bring to the 
army a message that came from outside the.military 
attitude-complex" (1973:222}. However, Abercrombie's form of 
"prophecy" seems 
environment; it could 
confined to problems 
not question the 
within 
raison 





Appelquist's work of 1969 included a series of church statements 
suggesting that, in the 1960s, several American churches were 
aware of the "inherent dangers" in institutional chaplaincies of 
all Kinds, since they "may be tempted to find subtle forms of 
establishment". Nevertheless, these churches were confident 
that, with careful vigilarce, the chaplaincy would continue to be 
a viable form of ministry (1969:21-24}. 
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The My Lai incident ended-this period of complacency. Since the 
incident had reached the ears of the American public through the 
efforts of a few conscience-stricken Gis, it spawned many critical 
attacks on the chaplains, alleging that they had remained silent 
in the face of a.trocity (Cox, 1971; Ecumenical Witness Conference; 
A Proposal) • Church commissions were appointed to inquire how the 
chaplaincy could be restructured to ensure greater critical 
independence for chaplains~ In 1973 a United Church of Christ 
study called for a sweeping demilitarization of the chaplaincy 
(MMP: 92ff,121,123}. However, its recommendations were not 
adopted; another study 
eventually the decision 
was commissioned the following year, and 
was taken to retain the military 
chaplaincy, as "a principal model of ministry to military 
personnel" (OCLL:3). A Protestant Episcopal Church study 
recommended, in 1976, that the validity of this ministry be 
recognized despite the "inherent tensions it generates" (EC:l). A 
letter from the Episcopal Bishop for the Armed Forces admitted 
that the military chaplaincy is an "imperfect vehicle", but 
insisted that it "provides a solid basis for ministry"·; thus no 
significant changes were made as a result of the study {Letter 
from the Rt. Rev. Charles L. Burgreen to P.G. Moll, 29.12.1983). 
The 1976 General Conference of the Utiited Methodist Church decided 
to take "immediate steps" to demilitarize its chaplaincy. Its 
thorough study, however, recommended that a civilian chaplaincy 
not be established, but also recommended against the assumption 
that the issue was settled forever (MC-UMC:l,2). The 1980 
Conference of the United Methodist Church reaffirmed the status 
quo (Letter from Rev. R. Mcclean to P.G. Moll, 3.10.1983). In 
1982 a proposal for a demilitarized chaplaincy was submitted to 
the Catholic Archdiocese of Denver, but thus far nothing has been 
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heard of its progress ("Military Chaplaincy Proposal"). 
Two main convictions seem to underlie the decision of the United 
Churcn of Christ, the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the United 
Methodist Church to retain military chaplaincy in its current 
form. The first was that military chaplaincy was seen as a 
workable form of ministry, whereas demilitarized chaplaincy 
presented practical difficulties like finance which were felt to 
be too large (e.g. Letter from Rev. R.H. Naylor, of the ucc, to P. 
G. Mo 11, 7 • 10. 19 8 3·) • The second was that the church had a 
fundamental confidence in the United States Armed Forces and felt 
that they, despite some excesses, were the honourable guardians of 
a lifestyle and values the churches held dear. Provided 
sufficient vigilance was maintained, they felt the military 
chaplaincy need not issue in compromise (for further references, 
see previous paragraph). 
Meanwhile, chaplains had been formulating their own responses to 
the charge of their being state lackeys. A fine example of 
earlier work is Harper (1957, 1981). The equivalent of a 
"chaplains' bill of rights" was formulated in 1970 (Chaplaincy 
-
IV:4 (1981)). Thorough histories of the chaplaincy were written 
by Venzke (1975) and others. The triumphalistic tone of the 
latter was avoided by Hutcheson (1973 and 1975), who, unlike 
Abercrombie, accepted that "role c6nflict" is inevitable, but 
insisted that it might be a creative element in the chaplain's 
task (1975:20). However, in his description of the military 
chaplain as ministering in a •total institution", he misuses 
Erving Goffman's concept, as I attempt to show in Chapter 2. 
Finally, the chaplains organized ethics workshops (Stover, 1976). 
Since the 1970s, a challenge to the chaplaincy has come from a 
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different quarter: the courts. This follows a lengthy debate 
about the legal and constitutional aspects of the military 
chaplaincy. For instante, Figinski (1964: as quoted in "The 
constitutionality suit":SO) argues that it is constitutionally 
legitimate, but Rimlinger (1974) reasons otherwise. The debate 
remained on a purely theoretical level until 1980 when t~ Harvard 
Law School students filed a suit charging that the chaplaincy 
violates the constitutional separation of church and state. The 
Secretary of Defense introduced a motion to dismiss the complaint 
("The constitutionality suit":29-61). However, Federal Judge 
McLaughlin upheld the constitutionality of the military 
chaplaincy, arguing that, by affording soldiers opportunities for 
worship, it preserves the religious neutrality of the government 
(The Christian Century 22.2.1984). 
3.2. Europe 
3.2.l. West Germany 
A problem was encountered in locating West German literature on 
the chaplaincy, due to poor South African library facilities and 
the great expense of obtaining documents from overseas. 
available literature the following picture emerges. 
With the 
Of all the forms of ministry to military personnel in the West, 
the West German model comes the closest to being termed 
"church-based". The importance of this lies in the fact that the 
military chaplaincy is most often faulted for being under military 
control: though the chaplains' military status may facilitate 
their work in certain r~spects, critics insist that membership of 
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the military entails military influence and results in a loss of 
integrity. The West German model of chaplaincy was adopted in 
order to avoid a repeat of the Third Reich experience when 
chaplains were so distanced from the church as to come under the 
control of the Wehrmacht (Stueber, 1975:177; Weymann, 1970:126; 
Bastian, 1971:407f; cf. Potgieter, 1971:291). Perhaps the most. 
recent history of the controversy surrounding the reintroduction 
of the military chaplaincy in 1957 is that of Kruse (1982), who is 
a military chaplain and the Scientific Director of the 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Institut der Bundeswehr in Munich. 
The West German model embodies several elements which stress the 
primacy of church control over the chaplaincy. Chaplains are 
given temporary appointments only; 
church work for six or eight years, 
they are freed fr6m regular 
to work in the military 
setting. They have no rank, are not subject to the Military 
Discipline Code, and do not wear the regular military uniform. 
They have as their head a Military Bishop, who, also a civilian, 
runs the chaplains• service as a "Nebenberuf", viz. in addition to 
his normal duties. 
However, there are other elements in the arrangement which show 
that the chaplaincy is not as independent of the state as is 
suygested by documents like "Military chaplaincy service". 
Between the Military Bishop and tne chaplains are several 
administrators whose appointment to the armed forces is permanent, 
and who have military status ranging from colonel to major-general 
(Potgieter, 1971:294). On manoeuvres chaplains wear protective 
overalls (Letter from Militaerdekan K. Weymann to P.G. Moll, 
20.11.1983). All chaplains are saluted (Potgieter, 1971:295). 
They have offices provided by the military and have military 
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vehicles with driv.ers {Potgieter, 1971:295f). Finally, they are 
paid by the government, supposedly because it is the extraordinary 
state-imposed separation from normal life that has occasioned the 
need for an extraordinary form of ministry in the first place 
{Stueber, 1975: "Military chaplaincy service"). Perhaps the 
arrangement had best be termed a 0 semi-civilian" or 
•semi-church-based" chaplaincy. 
Interestingly, there are some military chaplains who are critical 
of Germany's contribution to th~ arms race, and who feel that the 
chaplaincy should play no part in the "moral armament" of soldiers 
(Sueddeutsche Zeitung 4.4.1983). However, this attitude is by no 
means universal. Most chaplains are supportive of the Bundeswehr 
I 
and German military strategy {e.g. Kruse, 1982:490; 
"Militaerpfarrer zerbrach fast seelisch an Kollegen in Mayen", 
Frankfurter Rundschau 13.7.1983). Members of the peace movement 
in Germany are sharply critical of the moral support which they 
give to the military machine {Interview with Pfarrer Hermann 
schaeufele, Stuttgart, July 1983). 
Theological works edited by people involved in the military 
chaplaincy, e.g. Gramm and Blaschke (1980) and Hessler (1975), 
indicate an awareness of the ambiguity of the chaplain's positiQn. 
They contain articles and addresses by chaplains, about their 
re la ti on , to the military and to the state, about tneir 
participation in "character-building" {"Innere Fuehrung") in the 
Bundeswehr, and about the history of the chaplaincy. They 
attempt to show that this form of ministry is effective, while not 
ignoring the accusation of pacifists that any intimate association 
with the Bundeswehr undermines the integrity of ministry. In 
these works, and in church press items like "Military chaplaincy 
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service", stress is laid on the fact that the chaplaincy is run 
solely by the church. References are even made to the "tradition 
of disobedience" to immoral commands inaugurated by the attempted 
removal of Hitler of 20 July 1944 (Sixt, 1980). They therefore 
insist that the chaplaincy is not beholden to the state. Kruse's 
monograph, in similar vein, presents the case that the chaplaincy 
is a "cooperative partnership" of church and state, and that the 
mere fact of involvement of both does not imply that religion is 
being instrumentalized for military purposes (1982:160,163). 
Critical works, 1concentrating on the problem of integrity in 
ministry, have been written from political and theological 
viewpoints. Bamberg (1970) tries to show that the chaplaincy 
encourages accommodation to the status quo and depicts foreign 
policy as a struggle of light with darkness~ but, as Huber 
remarks, his selection of sources is one-sided (1973:226; 
similarly Kruse, 1982:60). From a theological point of view, 
Weymann criticizes the hierarchical structure of the chaplaincy 
(1970:126ff). In a more thorough fashion, Huber tries to 
identify the aims which the military chaplaincy has set for 
itself, and to find out whether these are capable of realization 
within the present chaplaincy structure (1973:229). He concludes 
that the present structure lends itself to instrumentalization for 
military purposes (1973:263). 
3.2.2. Britain and France 
I was able to obtain only very little British and French 
literature. Probably the paucity of literature and its difficulty 
of access is a reflection of the fact that, unlike the situation 
in the USA and West Germany, the wars these countries have 
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recently fought have not been seriously questioned by a large 
constituency within the churches. Nevertheless one of the 
best-known critical works on the military chaplaincy i's that by 
Gordon Zahn, on the Royal Air Force service (1969). Like Burchard 
and Abercrombie, Zahn is a sociologist, and also addressed the 
phenomenon of "role tension", preferring this term to Burchard's 
"role conflict". He found that when role tension was present and 
recognized by the chaplains, tension was most 1 ikely to be 
resolved in favour of the military dimension of the role 
(1969:32,175,200,259f). As a pacifist in the International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, he was critical of the chaplains' 
role in morale-building (1969:224), in marked contrast to the 
Deputy Chaplain-General of the British Forces, whose booJ, written 
I 
at the heig'ht of World War II, was explicitly .. ,:~~-:.:.:aimed at helping 
chaplains to build up the morale of the troops on the base of 
religion (Brumwell, 1943:55-71). Finally, Wilkinson's thoughtful 
article takes as its point of departure that "the very existence 
of military chaplains is a paradox" (1981:249). He concludes 
tnat most forms of ministry embody paradox of some kind; military 
chaplains should continually ask themselves at what point a 
paradox becomes a scandal (1981:250). 
The most notable French work obtained was that of Cucne et al. It 
deserves mention because, unlike the above-mentioned studies, it 
investigated the attitudes of soldiers, rather tnan those of 
chaplains, with respect to the military chaplaincy (Cuche:2). 
They found that the military chaplaincy was seen as a source of 
companionship and friendship: through exchange and reflection, 
chaplains were able to deepen the spiritual lives of soldiers 
{Cuche:9). At the same time, many soldiers wanted chaplains to 
oe more independent and critical of the army (Cucne:l6ff). cudhe 
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and his colleagues concluded with a -call for a demilitarized 
chaplaincy (Cuche:22f). 
Marean and Treffay (1962) argued that the chaplaincy should be 
more committed to the spiritual problems of youth and less 
old-fashioned, especially in areas like sexuality (1962:32f). 
Chaplains should be more concerned, they said, about· the moral 
problems of war: indeed, "The war in Algeria should be at the 
centre of our concerns" (1962:47). Beside these two works, only 
a few articles (Donadille: Un aumonier catholique: Rossiniere: and 
Vassaux) and reports of meetings of the chaplaincy service were 
available (e.g. L'Aumonier Protestant). 
3.3. South Africa 
The best-known work on the military chaplaincy in South Africa is 
tne 1971 doctoral dissertation of Brig. (ds) J.F. Potgieter, who 
is one of the senior administrators of the SAChS. In 1983 he was 
the Director Chaplains Ministry (South African Baptist, Oct. 1983, 
p 4). In this work he deals chiefly with the history of the 
chaplaincy in South Africa. As a result, the study materials on 
the history of the chaplaincy given in chaplains' courses are 
culled from his thesis. In addition to the history of the 
chaplaincy, he documents much information on the structure of the 
military chaplaincies of the western world. His lack of critical 
theological analysis, however, becomes most clear when dealing 
with the structure of the military chaplaincy in South Africa. He 
passes too quickly over the theological problem that its structure 
cannot be reconciled with traditional ~eformed teaching on church 
and state, and excuses the fact that the chaplaincy is under the ~t 
direct autnority of the state by arguing simply that this 
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"extraordinary arrangement" is "unavoidable" (1971:342}. Little 
awareness, if any, is shown of the moral dilemmas faced by 
chaplains, much less of those dilemmas faced by chaplains in the 
south African context. The chaplain's task is, among other 
things, that of "morale-builder of the unit" (1971:372} • 
.Meyer (1979} deals with the pastoral problems encountered by 
military chaplains, stressing the great importance of this form of 
ministry (1979:74f}. He refers to the lack of published works 
about the place of youth in the military. More aware than 
'potgieter of the moral problems of ministry in a military context, 
he rejects rank and uniform for chaplains (1979:43,45}. However, 
he does not relate the structure and task of the chaplaincy to the 
ethics of war in the South African context. Thus the two chief 
wo r.ks on the military chaplaincy in South Africa tend to 
concentrate on the problem of its "effectiveness" in ministry at 
the expense of inquiring into its theological integrity as a form 
of ministry. 
Harrington (1973} investigates the attitudes of I national 
servicemen to church attendance, in the light of R.K~ 
f 
. . . I A rikaans-speaking: 
Merton's 
functional analysis. He finds that national 
servicemen are still deeply religious, but that church attendance 
is dropping. This he ascribes to certain "dysfunctional" 
elements, e.g. that church liturgy is too old-fashioned. Though 
not specifically on the military chapla~ncy, this work is another 
example of the concentration of the literature on the 
"effectiveness" of ministry as distinct from its impact on social 
ethics. Viewed from another angle, the literature tends to 
concentrate on the expansion of the ministry of the church, 
without self-critically pausing to inquire into the moral aspects 
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o'f its ministry. 
van Wyk (1984) has written a general theological work on the 
church and peace. Unfortunately it suffers from lack of 
incorporation of significant works on the subject written in the 
past decade, because the book was completed as a doctoral 
dissertation in 1974, but published almost unchanged in 1984. His 
chief conclusions are the rather unsurprising ones that both 
"total war" and "absolute pacifism" are unacceptable in .terms of 
I 
' Christian social ethics. His book includes a chapter on the 
military chaplaincy in which he points out that the Gereformeerde 
Kerk has for some time felt that the military chaplaincy 
represents a sacrifice of prophetic freedom. van Wyk is of the 
opinion that the message of the chaplain is nothing but that of 
shalom. Therefore the present "path of compromise" should be 
avoided, because 
"The church of Jesus Christ may never become so i~plicated 
and identified with one single human institution that its 
unique message can no longer be heard or understood, on ;t. 
I 
account of being drowned out by human voices" (1984:210: my , . 
translation). 
Beside these works, the following sources might be mentioned: (a) 
d.ocurnents issued by the SAChS, like the "Handbook for chaplains": 
(o) short articles, mostly by Afrikaans chaplains, published in 
"Paratus": (c) reports on the debate about the military chaplaincy 
in church newspapers: (d) a few writings in English: Oestreicher 
(1977), CIIR (1982) ,·Stuart (Nov. 1983), Spectrum (1983), and 
Storey (1977): and (e) a related work on the police chaplaincy by 
Bekker (1981). No extended treatment has been given the subject 
by a writer from the English-speaking churches, nor has the 
/ 
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chaplaincy been examined in the light of those churches' changing 
perceptions of the function of the military in South Africa. 
4. NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
It is apparent from the literature survey that a variety of 
methods have been used to investigate the military chaplaincy. 
Those studies of a more 
questionnaires enquiring into 
sociological 
attitudes and 
kind used lengthy 
beliefs daurchard, 
1953; Zahn, 1969; Abercrombie, 1973; and cuche). ;Some were 
archival (Potgieter, 1971: Venzke, 1975: Kruse, 1982). Some made 
use of interviews (Burchard, 1953; Potgieter, 1971; Meyer, 1979). 
Some consisted of analyses of materials published by chaplains and 
by the armed forces (Bamberg, 1970; Berger, in Cox, 1971; Huber, 
1973). Others consist largely of theological reflection (Harper, 
1957 and 1981; Weymann, 1970; Cox, 1971; Hutcheson, 1973 and 1975; 
Huber, 1973; MMP; EC; MC-UMC; "Military Chaplaincy Proposal"). 
For the purposes of this study it would have been ideal to run a 
full-length questionnaire, in order to obtain the maximum amount 
of information about the ministry 
I 
that is presently 
I 
being 
conducted by the military chaplains. However, this course of 
action seemed unwise. It was nbted that Zahn's study was cut 
short after a certain number of questionnaires had been completed, 
when the British Chaplain-General foroad any further chaplains 
from participating. It was speculated that a questionnaire study 
in south Africa could be obstructed in a similar way because 
churcn-military relationships are more strained, and because tne 
SADF is presently on a war footing. It was feared that some 
chaplains would not be willing to write down their answers to 
prooing questions like those of Burchard, Zahn and Abercromoie. 
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Hence the idea of obtaining information by a questionnaire was 
discarded. This turned out to have been a wise decision. As has 
been indicated in the preface, it was not possible to gain the 
cooperation of the SAChS officials in Pretoria, and, at a certain 
point, chaplains were requested not to correspond with the author 
personally but to refer all his letters to the Chaplain-General 
(cf. Letters to P.G. Moll from Rev. D. van der Spuy, 16.7.1984, 
and from ds. c. Naude, 16.7.1984). 
It would also have been ideal for this study to have access to 
archival material. A negative answer was received from the 
SAChS, however, on the grounds that the author is not a serving 
member of the SADF (Letter from Brig. J.F. Potgieter to P.G. Moll, 
29.12.1983). A negative answer was also received from the United 
Board Free Churches (Letter from Rev. A.W. van den Aardweg to P.G. 
Mo 11, l 4 • 2 • 1 9 8 4) • By contrast, the minutes of the Connexional 
Committee of tne Methodist Church were available, but these extend 
back only as far as 1980. Accordingly, an archival and 
historical study had to oe ruled out. Regrettably, this means 
I 
that the present study suffers from an unavoidable, lack of 
historical perspective. 
Hence the author was left with three main avenues of inquiry: 
(a) Theological and ethical reflection, which was aided by 
materials ootained from overseas, at great effort and expense. 
(o) Analysis of materials published by the SAChS and the SADF, 
some of wnich was freely available and some of which, like the 
8 Handbook tor Chaplainsn, became available only after many patient 
inquiries. As has been indicated in the preface, prudent 
decisions had to be taken regarding which of these could be used 
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and which not, both for reasons of scientific objectivity and for 
reasons of legality. 
(c} In-depth interviews with such chaplains as were willing. Most 
chaplains approached were willing to be interviewed, although some 
refused. The problems of understatement and self-censorship in 
the interviews have~ been explained in the preface. The author 
took careful notes of the interviews, wrote them up, and mailed 
them back to the interviewees for checking and comment. Only 
I . 
after the corrected versions were returned were they used in the 
i 
analysis. Many hours were spent in discussion with Dr. C. 
! 
Villa-Vicencio in the attempt to eliminate all subjectivity and 
I 
bias in the interpretation of the interviews. This method is 
essentially the case study procedure used by the Harvard Business 
School, and which has been successfully employed to distinguish 
opinion from fact in the area of human rights (Evans and Evans, 
1983:v,vi). 
All but three of the chaplains mailed back the corrected interview 
write-ups. One declined to do so because his ideas hadi changed, 
and also for "reasons that I'd rather not put on paper". Two 
wrote back angry letters, accusing the author of deliberate 
misrepresentation. Both, incidentally, were Permanent Force 
chaplains: the significance of this will become clear 
. I 
in Chapter 
3. These views contrasted strongly with the maJority, however, 
who felt that their opinions had been faithfully reported. One 
representative comment was, "You have given a very accurate and 
honest account of our interview and [I] am quite happy for you to 
use it as it stands" (Letter from Rev. Bill Blakeway to P.G. Moll, 
16.5.1984). 
A list of all the chaplains interviewed is given in Appendix F. 
J 
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5. PRESENTATION 
This chapter continues with a brief historical overview of the 
concept of the chaplaincy in the West and the development of the 
military chaplaincy in South Africa. The study proper commences 
with an explanation of the theological assumptions which underlie 
the inquiry (Chapter 2). It proceeds to an analysis of the 
conditions of ministry of the SACns, focusing on the effect of the 
military status of the chaplains upon ministry (Chapter 3). In 
Chap~er 4, an attempt is made to draw out the implications, for 
the chaplains' military status and their task, of the stance that 




are made for changes to the structure of the military chaplaincy, 
and these are followed by speculation as to how and to what extent 
these recommendations could be effected. Chapter 5 consists of 
appendices on the ethics of war in South Africa, the Geneva 
Conventions, military obedience in terms of national and 
international law, the SACC statement on the military chaplaincy 
in 1984, and lists of chaplains consulted. After the appendices 
come all the footnotes. Finally, a consolidated bibliography is 
presented, which lists the works consulted alphabetically, by the 
author's name where possible, or, failing this, by the name of tne 
sponsoring organization or the publication title. 
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6. HISTORICAL SURVEY 
6.1. The title "chaplain" 
Po tg ieter suggests the following def ini ti on of a chaplain: 
"a member of the clergy whor outside the parish context, 
performs religious exercises and religious functions in and 
around a chapel" {1971:1; my translation). 
One might question whether the reference to a chapel is essential, 
since the work of chaplains in war zones and in many present-day 
hospitals is obviously not dependent on the existence of a chapel. 
Yet this concise definition includes most of the important charac-
teristics of chaplains as they are presently known: they are, by 
and large, ministers or priests; they work outside of the local 
parish context; they 
religious exercises. 
have a religious function 
The definition is also general 
and perform 
enough to 
encompass, not only military chaplains, but a11 institutional 
chaplains. 
wanting, it 
If there is any area in which this definition is 
is its failure to specify the chaplaincy's 
moral/ethical purposes and effects, and to indicate the ethical 
dilemmas that beset this extraordinary form of ministry. 
It is generally accepted that the word "chaplain" finds its origin 
in the La tin word "ca pa" , meaning a cloak. It refers to the 
cloak of St. Martin of Tours which was preserved as a relic by the 
French and which accompanied the tent where Mass was celebrated by 
military chaplains (Potgieter, 1971:1-3). Gradually the term 
"chaplain" came to refer to priests who served private chapels of 
dignitaries or institutions like parliament, prisons, universities 
I 
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or the armed forces (Potgieter, 1971:5). 
Potgieter then supplies the following definition of the military 
chaplain: 
"a member of the clergy of a particular denomination who is 
responsible for the spiritual care of members of the armed 
forces (and their dependants) both at the base and in the 
field" (1971:11: my translation). 
This definition accords with the generally accepted notion of 
military chaplaincy, but for its failure to mention the 
church-state accommodation/ conflict inherent in it. 
6.2. The origin of the chaplaincy in the West 
The office of the military chaplain originates in the ancient 
religious practice of providing moral support for the belligerents 
in time of war (Potgieter, 1971:20). With the official 
recognition of the Christian religion by Constantine, Christianity 
became committed to the sanction of war and became reconciled to 
the calling of the soldier (1971:55: Hornus, l980:179ff). The 
first chaplains of Christendom were appointed during this time 
(Potgieter, 1971:65f). Apparently chaplains were not uncommon in 
the fifth century, as is evident from pronouncements by the 
Councils of Rome (402) and Tours (461) which forbad priests to 
bear arms {Potgieter, 1971:67. Also see Hornus, l980:190ff, who 
argues similarly, but points out that the canons attributed ·to the 
Council of Rome were really those of Damasus). The significance 
of the Council of Ratisbon (742 A.O.) lies in the fact that this 
was the first council to specify the nunbers and the tasks of 
military chaplains. Among their main tasks were to carry the 
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crusades it appears tnat the ancient rule against the 
arms by priests was lifted (Potgieter, 1971:70). 
During this period, religion and war went hand-in-hand, as the 
Church itself summoned all and sundry to battle against the 
infidel. Military orders were founded, and it became common for 
bisnops to be accompanied by large entourages which included 
soldiers (see also Brumwell, 1943:9f). Potgieter points out that 
even during this period of militarization of 






Potgieter points out that from the seventeenth century, the 
institution of the chaplaincy became a regular and integrated part 
of the armed forces of Europe (1971: 79ff~ cf. Brumwell, 
1943:12ff). During this period, the office of the principal 
chaplain became common in England and France (Brumwell, l943:13f). 
Chaplains were first appointed in the USA at the start of the 
Revolution in 1775 (Williams, in Cox, 1971:16ff). 
Chaplaincies were vastly increased in size during World war I and 
II, and nave, in the twentieth century, become an integral part of 
the armed forces of the west. Two reasons for this development 
may be advanced. The first is that the size of standing armies, 
and tne extent and efficiency of conscription, have increased 
tremendously in the twentieth century (e.g. see Sivard, 1982:26, 
and Williams, in Cox, 1971:47,SOff). The second is that military 
commanders are aware of the prestige and psychological strength ¥· 
tnat religion can give to the armed forces (see the lengthy 
treatment of this in Chapter 3). 
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6.3. The origin of the chaplaincy in South Africa 
The paucity of research on the military chaplaincy in Soutn Africa 
means that, for matters of 
heavily dependent on the 
historical 
only major 
detail, the writer was 
work. available!, that of 
Potgieter (1971). With permission to consult Defence arcnives 
denied {Letter from Brig. J. F. Potgieter to P.G. Moll, 
29.12.1983), cross-checking could not be done. Hence the remarks 
offered on the period 1912 to the present are necessarily of a 
tentative nature. 
Potgieter locates. the origin of the South African military 
chaplaincy in the "sieketroosters" who accompanied Dutch East 
India Company ships passing the cape on their way to the Far East 
(1971:103ff). In due course, fully-fledged congregations were 
founded~ as early as 1703, tne Kerk.raad of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in Cape Town considered the militia of the Castle as a 
distinct group requiring ministry (1971:110). 
With the first British occupation of 1795, estaolished military 
chaplains first made their appearance (1971:115f). During the 
nineteenth century, Anglican chaplains were regularly appointed to 
minister to British troops stationed in South Africa {1971:119ff). 
During this time much chaplaincy work of other denominations was 
performed by civilian ministers operating in a part-time capacity 
{Potgieter, 1971:132,136). Full-time military chaplains also 
accompanied the British troops who were brought out to South 
Africa at various times: the Basuto war, the first annexation of 
the Transvaal, and the Anglo-Boer war (Potgieter, 1971:133ff). 
After the war, imperial troops remained in Pretoria until 1915, 
and we re accompanied by British chaplains until their departure 
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(1971:138). 
As far as the Afrikaans churches were concerned, an important 
advance occurred during the Basuto War of. - 1865, when the 
President of the Free State took the initiative of. sending 
ministers of religion with the "burghers" (1971:144). In the war 
~gainst the Sekukhuni in 1896, the president of the Transvaal 
Republic himself conducted services for troops ( 19 7 l : 144) • 
Ministers accompanied the troops in the war of 1880/1. But the 
office of the "Veldprediker" -- as these chaplains were called --
is Dest known for its appearance in the Anglo-Boer war 
( 1899-1902) • ··.Ministers accompanied the troops of the Republics ~n 
battle, in prisoner-of-w~r camps and in concentration camps 
(1971:147ff). Interestingly; the father of the famous Beyers 
Naude, Jozua· Francois Naude, served as a "Veld~rediker" under 
\ 
General Christiaan Frederick Beyers, whence the -~ name of his 
son.. At the end of the war, .. Naude was one of the six Boer 
' d~legates to the Vereeniging peace talks who refused to sign the 
t~eaty (~andall, 1982:2). 
I 
,\ 
Following Union, the Onion Defence Force was formed. During 
World War I both part~time and full-time chapl~ins were appointed. 
All the major denomina~ions were catered for (Po tg ie ter, 
1971:183). It appears that in 1915 the first Principal or Senior 
chaplain was appoi!lted. to coordinate the work; he was accordingly 
promoted to the ra-nk of Major (1971:184). Most other. chaplains 
were a-ppointed to the rank of captain •. They were subject to the 
Military Discipline Ccide an~ wor~ normal military uniform with a 
Maltese Cross to distinguish themselves as ministers. The.y were 
., 
not permitted to bear arms (1971:185). ·Not enough posts were 
, available, however, and both the NGK and the Anglican church 
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financed their own chaplains in addition (1971:186). The 
chaplains accompanied their units to South West Africa, East 
Africa, the Middle East and France. 
Potgieter observes that political factors made it difficult to 
persuade ministers of the Afrikaans churches to volunteer their 
services: 
"The fact that there was division in the ranks of the white 
population of the Union with respect to the participation of 
i 
the union in the war, occasions no surprise. It was the 
I 
cultural natural outworking of reigning political and 
factors" (1971:188: my translation). 
It will become apparent later in this work that division about the 
purposes of the current war is in a similar way giving rise to 
doubts about the role of the chaplain. 
Nearly all of the war-time chaplains returned to civilian 
employment after demobilization of the Active Citizen Force in 
1918. In 1920 two full-time A.C.F. chaplains were appointed, 
Rev. Alfred Roberts (for the English churches), and Rev. John 
Neethling Murray (for the Afrikaans churches) (1971:197). At the 
same time, provision was made for part-time chaplains (1971:198). 
The two full-time chaplains were commissioned officers with 
captain's rank, although this was for protocol, and not for 
executive, purposes (1971:207). Rev. A.G.D. Coertse made .special 
efforts in 1931 to obtain better service conditions for these 
chaplains. He argued that they should be appointed as Permanent 
Force members, referring to the fact that chaplains to the 
Imperial troops were on permanent staff. He argued, further, 
that the current (Citizen Force) rank of capt~in was 
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insufficiently respected: the chaplains were "outsiders", and 
their position .was inferior. They had neither pension nor 
medical benefits and enjoyed no promotion (1971:205). 
As a result of Coertse's efforts, the first two Permanent Force 
appointments were made in 1935, for a period of three years. In 
1938 these posts were made permanent. At this time there were 
only three Permanent Force chaplains (1971:205f). 
! 
During World war II, the chaplaincy was greatly expa~ded, to a 
total of 517 chaplains, of whom 306 held full-time posts and 211 
part-time posts (1971:223). Ordinary chaplains had the rank of 
captain, senior chaplains the rank of major, and principal 
chaplains the rank of lieutant-colonel (1971:217). one.principal 
chaplain was appointed for each of the following groupings: 
Afrikaans churches, the Anglican Church, the Free Churches, the 
Roman Catholic Church, and people of the Jewish religion 
{1971:216f). They were appointed on a temporary basis on the 
understanding that they would be demobilized at the end of the 
war. They were permitted to dispense with rank insignia at the 
battle front, in order to protect themselves from inferiority 
compared with other officers and to help them move on the same 
level as troops (1971:221). English chaplains wore a clerical 
collar. All chaplains were non-combatant, and neither bore nor 
handled weapons (1971:221). Part-time chaplains had neither rank 
nor uniform (1971:221). The chaplains accompanied troops in East 
Africa, the Middle East, France, Italy, Germany, and England. 
After demobilization, ten Permanent Force posts were created. An 
important milestone was reached with the establishment of a Corps 
of Chaplains in 1946 (1971:225). In 1949, Rev. C.F. 
Miles-Cadman was appointed to the new post of Deputy 
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Chaplain-General. His task was that of liaison with the Chief of 
General Staff. The post was, however, not continued after his 
I 
death in 1954 (1971:227). In 1955, it was decided to alter the 
dress of the chaplains in such a way that chaplains would be 
easily distinguished as clergy. Afrikaans chaplains would wear a 
white shirt with a black tie, while English chaplains would wear 
normal clerical dress. Unfortunately, the only available source, 
Potgieter, leaves the matter there, hanging tantalizingly in the 
air. To what extent was this decision motivated by the same sort 
I 
of concerns about identification with the military as surfaced in 
the 1970's'? We will probably never know. Rev. Stanley Pitts, 
who was a member of the UBFC at the time, could not remember 
anything about this (telephone call, 5.8.1984). As has been 
mentioned above, the author was denied perusal of the UBFC 
minutes. Potgieter closes the section undramatically by 
remarking that not all aspects of the new arrangement worked out 
well in practice (1971:228). 
' In 1957 1 a conference of chaplains made two further· decisions 
regarding dress. First, it was decided to revert to army browns 
(1971:229). Second, it was decided to dispense with the insignia 
of rank; instead, chaplains would have the status of colonel and, 
for purposes of identification, carry a cross of gold on their 
shoulder. The intention of this decision was "to permit the 
chaplain to mix freely with men of any rank, higher or lower, 
without any obstacle such as the rank structure" (1971:229; my 
translation). In fact the latter decision was the repetition of a 
request by the principal chaplains in 1946, that rank .be dispensed 
with "because it can hinder the execution of the chaplain's 
duties" (1971:234; my translation). However, only the first of 
these decisions was carried out (1971:230). 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION -53 
In preparation for the introduction of universal conscription for 
all white ·males in 1967, changes were made to the structure of the 
military chaplaincy. The Division of Physical and Spiritual 
Welfare was formed in 1966. Under the Director of this Division, 
fell a Senior Staff Officer Chaplains and Welfare, with rank of 
colonel. A chaplain was appointed to this post (1971:238). A 
chaplains' conference in 1966 requested further changes. It 
asked that all chaplains have equal status, viz. that of colonel: 
that chaplains cease to carry normal rank, sUbstituting this with 
' 
distinctive chaplaincy insignia: and that "chaplain" itself become 
' a rank "which indicates ("aandui") the place of the chaplain in 
the rank structure" (1971:234: my translation). Requests were 
made soon after for another reorganization. This was to form a 
separate division of chaplains, as Potgieter says, "so that the 
church would gain its proper place in the Defence Force, grounded k 
on the principle that the church should never be subject to a 
sub div is ion" (1971:233: my translation). This curious request 
begs the question of how the church can be subject to any part of 
the De fence Force at all: by what rule can one say that the church 
cannot be subject to a subdivision but may be subject to the 
highest authority in the Defence Force? (cf. also Potgieter's 
discussion of this, pp 321,340-344). Nevertheless, in 1968 the 
corps of Chaplains was designated as an independent section under 
the Chief of Personnel, and its director now held the rank of 
brigadier. At the same time the chaplains' requests regarding 
rank were acceded to. Finally, in 1970, the Chaplains' Corps was 
instituted as an independent department under the direct authority 
of the Commandant-General. The head of the corps was renamed the 
Chaplain-General (1971:237). By 1970 the number of chaplains had 
grown to 60, which represents significant progress, considering 
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that there were only two full-time chaplains after World war I and 
twelve after world War II (1971:237). 
The next major change came in 1977, when the first National 
Service chaplains were trained and appointed with rank of t~-pip 
lieutenant ("National Service Chaplains"). This was in response 
to the growing numbers of National Servicemen following the 
' lengthening of National Service from one to two years in 1977 
(effective January 1978). 
As of 1983, there were 126 full-time chaplains, all of wnom were 
ordained ministers in their respective denominations. In 
addition, between 1300 and 1400 clergy served either as part-time 
or Citizen Force chaplains (South African Baptist (Oct. 1983):4). 
Some comments on the historical developnent of the chaplaincy in 
South Africa might be appropriate. First, the churches seem to 
have had little direct involvement in the decisions about the 
status of their chaplains. Second, the past seven decades nave 
witnessed a continual effort by the chaplains themselves to secure 
more favourable conditions of service. Whereas the first 
full-time Active Citizen Force chaplains after world War I nad the 
rank of captain, now all Permanent Force and Citizen Force 
chaplains have the (protocol) rank of colonel. Third, changes in 
the structure of the chaplaincy, the style of dress, and the 
nature of the rank carried by chaplains have come largely at the 
instance of the chaplains themselves. They were neither imposed 
by the military nor directly requested by the churches. Fourth, 
chaplains have recognized since World war II that rank can 
interfere with pastoral work. Hence the appointment of National 
Service chaplains in 1977 with the rank of two-pip lieutenant 
seems to contradict the very principles to which Potgieter says 
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the chaplaincy has traditionally adhered. 




Before proceeding to an analysis of the military chaplaincy, I 
attempt, in this chapter, to make explicit the theological 
assumptions upon which this inquiry rests. This is done in 
commi~ent to critical scholarship, and is intended to be of 
assistance to the reader, who will undoubtedly be concerned to 
identify my presuppositions at the start of the inquiry •. 
This thesis is in no way intended to be a treatise in systematic 
theology. However, the subject of the military chaplaincy raises 
a number of complex theological issues. For instance, it raises 
I 
the issue of church and state, because it represents an 
It jaises tne 
I 
extraordinary form of church-state accommodation. 
issues of evangelism and pastoral care, because it is often argued 
that the military chaplaincy provides one of the few vehicles for 
these forms of ministry, given that all young South African males 
are subject to conscription. It raises the issue of the outward 
form and visibility of the church, since the military chaplaincy 
possesses a hierarchical structure which resembles military 
structures more closely than it does traditional church 
structures. It raises the issue of the response of the church to 
war, on two levels: first, because the existence of the military 
chaplaincy could be regarded as implying that the church deems 
participation in war ny Christians to be ethically responsible~ 
and second, because the existence of the military chaplaincy could 
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also be taken by many to presume that the church either ,supports, 
;t< 
or at least does not oppose, the war in which the SADF is engaged. 
It could be argued that the essence of all these points is that 
the military chaplaincy raises the issue of ministry, viz. by whom 
is ministry performed, under whose authority, and in what context? 
More pointedly, does ministry arise out of the self-understanding 
of the church, or can it arise out of the psychological needs of 
young soldiers under stress or out of the military•s need for 
religious involvement, iL not legitimation? 
It is clear that there are many far-reaching and difficult 
theological issues which underlie the concept of the military 
chaplaincy. At tempting to give a thorough theological treatment 
of all• these issues would, given the small compass of a Master's 
thesis, preclude examination of the particularities of the 
military chaplaincy of the churches in South Africa. Some 
narrowing of the theological focus is therefore called for. After 
all, the present task is to' examine a specific kind o~ ministry 






English-speaxing churches) in a set period of time (the past 
decade), and in a definite politico-military context (that of the 
SADF, both domestically and in Namibia). 
In the attempt to narrow the theological focus, it was decided to 
locate the study within the Reformed tradition, and specifically 
to adopt the theological approach of Karl Barth. This was no 
arbitrary decision. My own theological understanding has been 
strongly influenced by my reading of Barth. Mo re importantly, 
though, Barth is probably the best known, most prolific and, some 
would argue, most formative theologian of the twentieth century. 
Writing at a time of deep social conflict not dissimilar from that 
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reigning today, he forged a theology of ministry which is widely 
accepted among many Reformed writers, and more especially among 
many English-speaking Protestant ministers in South Africa today. 
His thought is also in many ways representative of ecumenical 
thought on the subJect since World War II. , As the exposition 
unfolds, reference is made to other Reformed writers like Berkhof, 
Torrance, Weber and Browning. Some material from other traditions 
is included for the sake of clarity and contrast -- for instance, 
reference is made to the US "evangelical" Henry, the Lutheran 
Thielicke and the Catholic Kufng. It is worth stressing that this 
exposition does not represent an attempt to be innovative, nor to 
present a finely honed dogma tic treatise. Quite deliberately, it 
comprises fairly "middle-of-the-road" assumptions which would be 
acceptable to a wide spectrum of Christians who do not necessarily 
have high levels of theological education. My ~im is to present 
an argument with which, hopefully, many parish ministers could 
identify. Finally, this exposition is not intended to be 
definitive or final. It is a tentative theological statement, 
compiled in the knowledge that there are other theological 
approaches which would not necessarily reach the same conclusions 
regarding the military chaplaincy. 
1. Barth's theology of ministry 
The exposition commences with a brief outline of the Barthian 
conception ot the locus of ministry. 
Crucial to Barth's conception of ministry is his notion of the 
place of theology in the life of the church. Theology, for 
Barth, is the "scientific test to which the Christian Church puts 
herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her" 
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{CD I/1:1). For Barth, theology is inseparable from the life of 
the Cnurch; it constitutes the critical self-examination of the 
church concerning its statements about God. Further, .Barth 
argues, the church "measures her language abo~t God by her 
existence as a Church" (CD i/1:2). Theology exists only because 
there is talk of God in the church. Theology follows, guides and 
accompanies the church's utterance concerning God (CD I/1:2). 
Thus for Barth neither the revelation of the Word of God, nor the 
understanding and exposition of the word of God, nor theological 
reflection on the Word of God can be sundered from ecclesiology. 
Barth reinforces the point by stressing 
I . 
that the individual 
Christian is not free to adopt any current religious idea, and 
urge, this upon the community. Rather, he or she should, in 
dialogue with God and fellow-Christians,. reflect on the Word of 
God and be guided and stimulated by others. Preaching can only be 
adapted to the circumstances and edifying to the community if it 
is surroundea and stimulated by the questions and answers of the 
community (CD III/4:498f). 
What is true of the community's reflection is also true of the 
community's ministry. This, too, is undertaken by the community 
of God as a whole, not by private individuals or groups within the 
church. The ministry of God's prophetic Word is entrusted to the 
community which is the body of Ch r i s t , i . e • Ch r is t ' s 
earthly-historical form of existence (CD IV/3:681). It is the 
community that Christ sends out into the world. The task of the 
community is to confess Jesus Christ. Thus when Barth speaks of 
ministry, he does not refer to the private activity of an 
individual but to the ministry of the community (CD IV/3:830). 
Nor could it be otherwise. Ministry is the attestation of the 
Word of God (CD IV/3:830), and the Word of God, to Barth's mind, 
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is heard, reflected upon, and acted upon by the community. 
At the risk of anticipating my conclusions, it might be pointed 
out that all the subsequent discussion about the military 
chaplaincy in South Africa will return continually to this central 
assertion: that ministry arises in the context of the church, and 
is subject neither to the tutelage of the state, nor to the 
interests of particular groups, nor to the whims of the 




deideologising effects of ecumenical contact become 
Denominational exclusivi~, he contends, can oecome 
i . 
functional to 





partisanship and group interests. Ecumenical encounter, because 
it makes churches aware of the values and ideologies inherent in 
their own proclamation of the. Gospel, can become a deabsolutising 
and therefore a deideologising force (Villa-Vicencio, June 1983). 
This point is of importance for the military chaplaincy because, 
as we shall see in Chapter 3, the structure of the SAChS is such 
I * that many chaplains have more contact with the military than with 
their churches~ as a result they are isolated from the 
deideologising processes of the church, and more prone to 
identifying with the ideological forms prevalent in the military. 
The touchstone of this work, then, is the Barthian assertion that 
ministry, which is tne attestation -0f the Word of God, is 
entrusted to Christ's body the church. 
As has been indicated above, however, the military chaplaincy 
raises several other related issues as well. I therefore outline 
the Bartnian position on the six most immediate of these: church 
and state, the church's prophetic task, the exemplary role of the 
church, ministry as service, mission and evangelism, and pastoral 
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care. Finally, I deal with the ethics of war and make some 
applications in the South African situation. 
Since so much of the discussion about the military chaplaincy 
revolves around the question of church and state {see the 
literature review), I proceed to discuss this issue first. 
Barth reasons ·that the church accepts the necessity for the state, 
both in order to restrain sin and in order to be an instrument of 
divine grace, according to Rom.13:4,6 (CC+CC:l54ff). Therefore, 
the church prays for the state {RR:l29) and subordinates itself to 
it (CC+CC:l58). Yet this does not mean that the church offers 
the "blindest possible obedience" to the state {CC+CC:l59). 
Rather it means accepting joint responsibility with the state for 
the preservation of the civil community, coupled with 
participation in the human search for the best form of political 
organization. Leaving aside the thorny question of whether the 
church should proceed to distinguish between the "just state" and 
the "unjust state" (this has Deen criticized Dy Yoder as an 
"unBarthian" element in his ethics, being a conces~ion to a 
natural law epistemology, cf. Yoder, 1970:130), it may De said 
that the church should oe a continual reminder to the state of 
Christ's Lordship~ in view of this the church's obedience to the 
state (any state) is limited. Nevertheless, the main service of 
the church to the state consists of occupying its own realm as 
church, oy proclaiming the Gospel of justification and the coming 
Kingdom (RR:146). The church's decisive contrioution to the 
state is its witness to it by being an example of what humanity 
can oe when renewed oy the Spirit. This, very briefly, is the 
essence of Barth's exposition of the external relations of the 
church with the state. 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -62 
Regarding the relation of the state to the internal affairs of the 
church, Barth posits that the internal regulation of the church 
should be effected by it alone, on the basis of a hearing of the 
voice of Jesus Christ (CD IV/2:682). He insists that "there can 
be no question of its subjection to the rules which are valid 
for the constitution and action of other societies" (CD IV/2:681). 
Only as a free church will the community allow itself to be 
integrated into the order instituted by the state: but freedom 
means that the church enacts its own internal law "without even 
the slightest interference on the part of the national authority" 
(CD IV/2:690). The state, Barth reasons, cannot :exercise 
jurisdiction within the church, because it misunderstands the 
·"' 
church, taking it to be one social grouping among others. The 
state is not itself a church: it does not exercise faith, hope and 
love, nor does it repent and receive salvation. Even if many 
leaders of the state claim to be Christians, the churcn dare not 
assume that the state will understand the churcn's faith and 
confession in the same way that the church does. The church 
cannot therefore adopt the state's view of itself. Indeed, Barth 
is of the opinion that 
"the root of almost all the errors which have arisen in this 
question is to be found in the fact that [the Church] nas 
more or less consistently done so: that it has understood 
itself in terms of the world's misunderstanding' (CD 
IV/2:687). 
Barth distinguishes carefully between those aspects of state regu-
lation to which the church should, in general, submit and those to 
which the church can under no circumstances submit, in the 
following way. The state enacts a "ius circa sacra• which 
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determines its relationship with the church: to this the church 
adapts itself willingly, as it does not expect to be shielded from 
the jurisdiction of the state, or to be given special treatment 
above other social groupings. However, it adapts only inasmuch as 
the "ius circa sacra" is not an attempt to shape the church's will 
and rule its inner life. Therefore the church should be vigilant 
to see that the "circa sacra" does not become an "in sacra" in an 
attempt to control its preaching, doctrine and theology (CD 
IV/ 2:689). 
A drawback in Barth's view is that it may convey :a false 
! 
impression of objectivity if it is taken simplistically and 
literally. In real life it may be difficult to distinguish 
Detween a "ius circa sacra" and a "ius in sacra". Some would see 
certain state actions as unwarranted interference, while others 
would see the same actions as the state's legitimate dealing 
within the sphere of its jurisdiction. It seems that the church 
should take each case on its own merits and examine it, complex 
though it may be, in the context of the relationship of church and 
state as a whole. 
second, it is apparent from Barth's writings that one corollary of 
this church-state stance is that the church has a task of prophecy 
or "Christian social critic ism" (CD IV/3: 892) vis-a-vis the state. 
As the church ministers to the needs of individuals through its 
diaconate, it is unable to close its eyes to the fact that 
disorders in society frequently give rise to these needs (CD 
IV/3:892: cf. Torrance, 1979:727, and Berkhof, 1979:371,418). 
Therefore the church "may raise its voice and with its 
proclamation of the Gospel summon the world to reflect on social 
injustice and its consequences and to alter the conditions and 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -64 
relationships in question" (CD IV/3:892). In fact, Barth 
insists, 
"the diaconate and the Christian community become dumb dogs, 
and their service a service of the ruling powers, if they 
are afraid to tackle at their social roots the evils by 
which they are confronted" (CD IV/3:893). 
For Barth, this prophetic action is an integral part of the total 
witness and ministry of the church, since it- concerns the, Kingdom 
of God. Prophetic witness is 
"an action based on perception into the meaning of the 
! 
current events, relationships and forms both of its own, 
I 
history and that of the world around in their positive and 
negative connection to the imminent Kingdom of God attested 
by it and therefore in their significance for the concrete 
form of this witness" (CD IV/3:895). 
Similarly, Berkhof argues that loving the neighbour and the enemy 
in an act of mercy may require that the church assume a prophetic 
task of confronting the authorities with the will of God and 
challenging them to promote Justice, freedom and peace (1979:418). 
The church cannot avoid being a "critical societal watchdog" 
(1979:371). 
Barth contends further that on many issues the church is unable to 
maintain a position of neutrality without engaging in "false 
prophecy": it may have to choose decisively for one side against 
another (CD III/4:5llf). The church nas a charge, over against 
the state, to "call good good, and evil evil" (CPPD:56}. To oe 
sure, the church is required to do nothing more than witness to 
the "pure Gospel". But, as Barth points out, the pure Gospel may 
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mean taking sides and eschewing neutrality: 
"The timeless or supra-temporal Gospel which is neutral and 
avoids contemporary events is certainly not the pure Gospel, 
and if its testimony is designed to · be evangelical in an 
abstract sense it is not only not prophetic but is actually 
false prophecy. For if anything is false prophecy, it is 
the proclamation of a community which for safety's sake 
tries to withdraw into an inner line and to devote itself to 
neutrality" (CD III/4:512)·. 
Other writers agree that to pretend to say nothing in an attempt 
to be apolitical, is an illusion, for to remain silent in a time 
of social conflict is to support the status quo, by default if 
nothing else. For instance, van Wyk notes pithily: 
"A church that makes no pronouncement about society and 
politics, is doing exactly that" (1984:238, my translation: 
cf. Moltrnann, 1977:18). 
Henry argues similarly that the theological existence of the 
church involves an inescapable political dimension (1979:530). 
Moltrnann goes so far as to say that the assertion of the sole 
Lordship of Christ cannot but issue in political conflict 
(1977:15). 
However, the church's ministry of prophecy cannot remain only on 
the verbal level. Sometimes the most important "statement" that 
the church can make is the symbolic witness implicit in its own 
form and practice. On this its credioility rests. To the 
church's sorrow this implied witness might not tend to confirm its 
convictions: the church cannot avoid the uncomfortable fact that 
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"what the church is rather than what it says will be best 
understood by the world and the State" (CC+CC:l87). 
Third, this discussion leads us to consider the role of the church 
as the exemplar for humanity in general. The Christian church, 
as the body of Jesus Christ and therefore the earthly-historical 
form of His existence, is.the "provisional representation of the 
h urna n i t y s an c t i fie d in Him " ( CD IV I 2 : 7 19 ) • The church cannot 
give the world a direct portrayal of Jesus Christ, or of the 
peace, freedom and joy of the Kingdom of God~ there is no,question 
' ' 
of its setting up the Kingdom of God on earth (CD IV/2:725). 
However, through its form, upbuilding and constitution, it can 
show that "there is already on earth an order which is based on 
that great alteration of the human situation" (CD IV/2:721). In 
this way, the church contributes to the improvement of human law, 
towards achieving "more serious order, more certain peace, more 
genuine freedom, and a more solid maintenance and fashioning of 
human life, and human life in society" (CD IV/2:723). 
What, then, are the values which the church attempts to represent, 
in however provisional a fashion? Barth's answer is that the 
life of the Christian community is characterized by service. 
Service, he contends, "is not JUSt one of the determinations of 
the being of the community. It is its being in all its 
functions" (CD IV/2:692). In the fellowship of the community 
there is "total common and reciprocal responsibility", which is 
acnieved by the "total self-giving of each to all" (CD IV/2:724): 
every member of the community, irrespective of his or ner estate, 
endowment, background or nature, is "treated absolutely as a 
brother". The church reminds the state that "man is its true 
theme and subject-matter" (CD IV/2:724). Furthermore, the church 
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is a model in that it conducts its affairs on the basis of mutual 
trust "neither in its estaolishrnent nor its execution is it 
supporte~ by any alien power" (CD IV/2:723). 
Even thougn the community is to be characterized by service, it is 
not to become so impressed into the economy of human affairs that 
it loses its "alien character" (CD IV/3:744). The community 
"does not really belong": it refuses to "maintain itself by 
adaptation to the world" and is thus seen to be "alien and 
disruptive" (CD IV/3:744). In its weakness as a pilgrim community 
maintaining a "marginal exi.stence", it becomes the vehicle of 
God's strength (CD IV/3:745f). 
Other writers also stress this exemplary role of the church. 
Berknof describes the church as the "experimental garden of a new 
humanity" ( 1979: 415) , because it witnesses to the world about the 
new life in Christ which manifests itself in love and 
reconciliation, in new attitudes about materialism, work and 
possessions, and in demonstration of the fruit of the Spirit (cf. 
Gal. 5:22f: Mt. 5: Eph. 4:30-32: Phil. 4:8). Henry has a similar 
concept of the church as the "alternative society". For him the 
body of Christ is a tangible community consisting not merely of 
invisible relationships but one in which 





reality" into being so that it might "live in ultimate loyalty not 
to worldly powers but to the risen Lord in a corporate life of 
truth, righteousness and mercy" (1979:529). The role of the 
church is "to witness to the world by a new way of life through 
voluntary subjection to the Lord the coming King" (1979:531). 
Henry stresses that to be persuasive tne cnurch should 
"convincingly embody what it preaches" (1979:541). 
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Fourth, the exemplary role of the church prompts consideration of 
the nature of the ministry which the church offers. Fdr Barth, 
I 
I 
ministry is characterized by service, and should be perf~rmed by 
all members of the Christian community (CD IV/4:72). Not all 
Christians have to serve in the same function, but the service of 
the individual is indispensable to that of the whole: "Exalted 
into fellowship with Jesus Christ, each Christian as such is set 
in the lowliness of His service" (CD IV/2:693). Barth argues 
that "Law and order in the 
priesthood of a few, 
I -
community are never the particular 
I 
I 
but the universal priesthood: of all 
believers" (CD IV/2:694: cf. CD IV/4:38,201). Accordingly, Barth 
is careful in his use of the word "office": he cautions that it 
should be used only "on the understanding that in the Christian 
' I 
community either all are office-bearers or none: and if all, then 
only as servants" (CD IV/2:694). He sharpens his argument 
against "practical c lericalisrn" yet further: "The unity and 
universality of the Church's ministry will always be, not a 
beautiful ideal, but the absolute law of the community" (CD 
IV/2:695), which excludes all possibility of "autono~y or a 
struggle for power and prestige"- (CD IV/2:695). Indeed, he 
insists that those who perform functions in the church do so 
"not in the form of a hierarchy, only in the form of service 
in special offices, which neither know of precedence among 
themselves, nor signify a precedence in their holders over 
tne community members not in office, because in principle 
there is no other mediator, because the mediators have found 
their fulfilment in the Mediator of the New Testament" (CD 
I/2:105: cf. also CD IV/2:691). 
Other Reformed writers echo these sentiments. Weber points out 
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that in the body of Christ the role of the "little" has been 
exchanged with that of the "great" (cf. Mt. 18:1-5, 19:1Jff, Mk. 
9:35). Therefore, he argues, relationships of authority are 
different in the body of Christ from the way they are in the world 
(1983:567). Furthermore, the leadership of the church arises 
through Christ's gracious presence in the community by the Holy 
Spirit, which grants the wealth of charismata and ministries 
listed in I Cor. 12 and Rom. 12 (Weber, 1983:580ff). Thus the 
order of the church does not derive from abstract prin~iples of 
order, but from Christ's gift of offices to its members 
{1983:567f). Service excludes a ruling, autocratic office as well 
as all authoritarianism and hypostasization (Berkouwer, 1976:223). 
Office-bearers, too, must give account (Heb. 13:17), hence their 
relation to others in the body of Christ is one of mutual 
submission (Berkouwer, 1976:225). Moltmann even prefers the term 
"assignment" to "ministry", because of underton~s of hierarchy and 
bureaucracy in the latter (1977:302). If service flows from 
compassion and mutual submission, then the person exercising 
ministry in the church should not use worldly power to enhance its 
success, for this "betrays the essential nature of service as 
service" (Torrance, 1979:728). Similarly, Thielicke insists th~t 
worldly prominence and conformity to those who rule are not 
characteristics of service (1982:237). He reasons that no-one 
exercising ministry has an "exclusive hierarchical position" in 
relation to the community (1982:231). He argues that since all 
have neen entrusted with the responsibility of ministry, no-one 
should thrust himself forward and undertake tasks without the 
church's consent and selection; since ministry is entrusted to the 
church as a whole, it should be done representatively. 
Officebearers do not choose themselves but are chosen (Thielicke, 
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1982:232f). Likewise, .Berkhof says that those who are chosen to 
administer the church "must have the confidence and the mandate of 
the congregation" (1979:379). It is of note that Kueng, from a 
Catholic perspective, also argues that since the Spirit grants 
charisms to all, there should be no division between the pastor 
and the people; rather pastors should maintain fellowship and 
collegiality, not only among themselves, but also with the people 
(1978:432,436). 
It is of interest to mention in this regard that for Campbell the 
notion of ministry as service entails vulnerability on the part of 
the pastor. He tries to show how Christ as the Wounded Healer 
restores the broken relationships between God, humanity and the 
universe (1981:47ff). The images of the Suffering Servant (Is. 
53:4ff) and the sacrificial Son of Man (Mt. 20:28) are ones of 
healing, since the power of God is discovered among weakness. The 
pastor who has not shielded himself or herself from pain is able 
to heal by conveying both an awareness and a transcendence of 
loss. Campbell suggests that "the authority with which we offer 
help to others derives from our own acquaintance with grief" 
(1981:50). 
The fifth area of theological importance for this study of the 
military chaplaincy is that of mission and evangelism. In 
Barth's opinion, the church does not exist for itself; it exists 
tor the Gospel (CD II/4:506). The church's ministry of witness is 
addressed both to those who are still in darkness, and wno need to 
be summoned to the knowledge and obedience of the Gospel, and to 
those inside tne church, since all Christians need to be nourished 
and comforted daily (CD IV/3:832). Barth stresses that this 
"outward reach" of the church is integral to its ministry: if its 
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work is not to become a work of "sterile inbreeding", it must 
accept the priority of its sending into the world (CD IV/3:833). 
) 
This aspect of the witness of the church has been sharpened by 
some. Wesley, for instance, uttered a profound theological ·truth 
in nis aphorism, "The whole world is my parish". Tnis does not 
mean "the whole world save for a few ugly areas where death and 
destruction and suffering are the paramount realities" (McAfee 
Brown, in Cox, 1971: 141). Rule 11 of "Rules of a Helper" urges 
all Christians to "go always, not only to those who want you, but 
to those who want you most" (LD:379). While recognizing the 
dangers of compromised ministry, Thomas points out that we are to 
follow Christ in ministering to all people caught in all kinds of 
dilemmas, and he rejects pious theologies of withdrawal, because 
"there is no theology of withdrawal that can be rationalized in 
the ministry of Jesus" (MC-UMC:9,13f). 
However, it is crucial to bear in mind that Barth does not slide 
into an individualistic understanding at this point. Witness, 
for Barth, remains the witness of the community, and is comoined 
with the church's important tasks of pastoral care, the diaconate, 
and prophetic action. Barth neither hierarchizes nor prioritizes 
these tasks in such a way as to suggest that evangelism and 
biolical teaching are more important tnan the diaconate and 
prophetic action. On the contrary, he asserts that in the 
diaconate 
"the community has a unique chance unequivocally to 
accomplish and manifest its witness as a ministry of 
witness. Tnis is what makes the diaconate formally so 
important and indispensaole as a basic form of witness" (CD 
IV/3:891). 
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Indeed, it would be ridiculous to prioritize in this way, for, as 
he comments rhetorically, 
"Is there any preaching, evangelisation or cure of souls 
which is not necessarily an act of diaconate, or which does 
not directly or indirectly include such an act? Is there 
any form of diaconate which is not implicitly or explicitly 
preaching, evangelisation and cure of souls?" (CD IV/3:890). 
The sixth area which should De discussed -is .that of pastoral care. 
This is of particular relevance because, as will be seen in 
Chapter 3 1 many of the chaplains justify their role in the SADF by 
stressing that as pastors they must minister to men's ,needs, which 
task, they feel, is facilitated by their possessing military 
status. From a Barthian perspective, however, pastoral care 
cannot be divorced from the total ministry of the church. Thus 
while it would not De incorrect to underscore the diaconal aspect 
of pastoral care, its prophetic aspect snould not be omitted. Let 
us discuss these aspects in turn. 
(a) First I try to show that pastoral care includes a diaconal 
aspect responsive to people's needs. As the servant of others 
and the servant of God, the pastor has a special concern to 
alleviate physical and spiritual pain, to Dring healing to human 
relationships, and to 
This role of the pastor 
respond to the needs of the whole person. 
is often modelled upon the biolical 
symbolism of the shepherd, who cares faithfully for the sheep, or 
upon the biblical account of Jesus' ministry of healing. This 
healing, helping and loving role of the pastor links up with the 
assertion that ministry has the character of service, which means 
self-giving out of love and compassion. This role also links up 
with the assertion that the church offers ministry to all. The 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -73 
pastor dare not be selective in his or her caring, but should 
demonstrate concern for people within and without the church, and 
especially for "those who want you most" (LD:379). 
What sort of needs are the prior concern of the pastor? Views 
diverge widely as to what needs are paramount. I shall propose, 
following John Cobb, that the aim of pastoral care is to achieve 
"human wholeness", broadly defined (1977:11). This concept 
repudiates all notions of a bifurcation of body and soul. 
Implicit in it is the assumption that the distinctive aim of the 
church for individual human beings can be summed up as health and 
strength of spirit, which in turn enables people to take 
responsibility for their lives (1977:12f). The church works 
toward the goal of human wholeness by bringing its accumulated 
wisdom to bear in helping people to understand the meaning of 
their existence through worship and the study of the Bible (cf. 
Cobb, 1977:18). It follows that the pastor will not be content 
to care only for superficial needs. His or her honesty and 
integrity will inspire a search for the truth of each, situation 
I 
and urge the persons being cared for to understand their deeper 
. 
needs. carnpbell insists that genuine care proceeds from the 
integrity of the pastor, wnich may De understood as that "inner 
strength which prevents us from bending to the influence of what 
is thought expedient or fashionable or calculated to win praise" 
(1981:24). The pastor of integrity is 
"first and foremost a critic of nimself, of tendencies to 
self-deception and escape from reality, of desire for a 
false inner security in place of the confrontation with 
truth which integrity demands" (1981:24). 
Holmes also stresses integrity as a component of pastoral care. 
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The pastor should not 
"serve as a sop for a guilty conscience, an escape for the 
Christian unwilling to face the reality of his and his 
fellowman's sins within the present society. Racism, 
economic exploitation, and failures of justice are often 
covered by mysticism and religious privatism" (1971:247). 
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(b) Pastoral care also possesses a prophetic dimension. This is 
for at least three reasons. First~ the prophetic dimension is an 
integral part of the Barthian vision of ministry. It must be 
taken seriously, for it is "a test of the genuineness of [the 
church's] ministry in every other function that in them too, in 
its preaching, prayer, diaconate, theology etc., its ministry 
should nave this prophetic character regardless of the 
conse<:{Uences" (CD IV /3: 8 97) • Second, this prophetic dimension in 
pastoral care follows from the notion of the integrity of the 
pastor which has been mentioned above. Third, it follows from 
the nature of the theological presuppositions which inform the 
ministry of the church as a wnole. Browning, for instahce, shows 
how the search for genuine caring can be facilitated by a moral 
and theological framework which covers the si tua ti on in question. 
He urges, 
"Be fore the minister starts counseling a couple 
contemplating divorce, wouldn't it be well to deal with this 
within a context of meanings, more or less shared or assumed 
by the members of the churcn? When is divorce legitimate? 
What are the mutual ooligations of the couple to examine 
themselves and their motives before the divorce? What fair 
and JUSt procedure is to be followed in getting the 
aivorce?" (1976:97) ••• 
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"We must have a theological ethics of sexuality as a context 
for our work with persons in sexual difficulties. We must 
have something like a positive theology of interpersonal 
relations, deatn, illness, and aging before we can 
successfully care for and counsel people undergoing crises 
in these areas of life" (1976:16). 
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we might add that caring for and counseling people in a military 
context also needs a moral framework. Indeed, Browning suggests 
that there is an explicit or implicit moral context to all acts of 
care, even when tnese are performed by secular therapists 
(1976:11). He says that care in a Christian context should 
"exhibit a kind of practical moral inquiry into the way life 
should be ordered" (1976:15), since care is not only a question of 
"having the right emotional attitude and a little psychological 
knowledge" ( 1976: 16) • If possible, the re should be a con t.inui ty 
between the goals and procedures of the church and the goals and 
procedures of pastoral care (1976:19). Just as the church sets 
itself the goal of summoning its people to an obedient h·earing of 
the Gospel, so pastoral care snquld participate ·in this overall 
goal. This does not mean that the church uses pastoral care as 
an instrument to inculcate its views in tne hapless client. This 
would lead to legalism and loss of regard for the conscience of 
the person being ~ared for. Campbell suggests that teaching in 
pastoral care need not be indoctrination but can take the form of 
exploration whereby the pastor "endeavours to evoke a questioning 
and searching response in the learner" (1981:17). Pastors, he 
says, should be companions, and not imagine themselves to be the 
representatives of a rigid orthodoxy (1981:15ff). Similarly 
Browning is of the opinion that a major task for training in 
pastoral care in the future is "now to enter into sensitive moral 
J 
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inquiry with troubled 
moralistic" (1976:26). 
and confused individuals without becoming 
This concept of the pastor as helper, 
companion and fellow traveller is related to the assertion of the 
"priesthood of all believers". If, as is increasingly being 
recognized, the key to pastoral care is in the relationship, we 
might ask whetner any person may not be a pastor "simply from the 
depths of his or her own humanity" (campbell, 1981:22). If 
pastoral care is a relationship founded upon the integrity of an 
individual (1981:46), then it becomes possible to speak of the 
"pastorhood of all believers" (Campoell, 1981:41). 
In sum we might say that the pastoral task embraces both a 
dimension of diaconal caring and a dimension of prophetic 
challenging. 
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2. Ethics of war 
I now proceed to outline my presuppositions in the area of the 
ethics of war. My assumptions are four-fold: (i) respecting 
particular wars which occur, the church should at least make an 
effort to distinguish between just and unjust wars; (ii) in 
addition to this, the ch~rch also has a positive mission of 
peace-making; (iii) the church should sµpport sincere 
conscientious objection, whether religious or not, and whether 
pacifist or selective; and (iv) the church should exercise its 
prophetic task by declaring the SADF presence in Namibia to be 
illegal and immoral, and by pointing out that SADF activities 
within South Africa's borders are basically in defence of 
apartheid. These assertions require substantiation. 
(i) vastly differing assessments of the possibility of moral 
discourse aoout war have been expressed. On the one hand, some 
nineteenth-century theorists held that war, as an instrument of 
national policy, was subject only to group interests; to moralize 
about war or to set limits to it would obstruct its purpose, which 
is to subdue the opponent (Best, l980:143ff). Similarly, some 
Marxist commentators hold that all moralizing apart from class 
interest is illusion; the sole ethical reality is the logic of the 
class struggle. Should the latter issue in war, moral scruples 
to limit or prevent hostilities would only be 
counterrevolutionary. In accordance with this thesis, the North 
Vietnamese submission to the diplomatic conference which led up to 
the Geneva Protocols of 1977 allowed only for a 11 i us ad bell um 11 
for anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist wars, excluding all 11 ius 
in bello" considerations (Best, 1980:313ff). On the other hand, 
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of theological ethics believe that our discourse about war is 
inevitably moral. They feel that war is not beyond 1 moral 
reflection and is not subject only to calculations of utility, 
interest and greed. Walzer, for example, speaks of the "moral 
reality of war" (1977), apparent in the fact that the language of 
war is shot through with ethical evaluation. Since the present 
I 
' 
work is one of theological ethics, it seems safe'for my ~urpose to 
I 
assume that both recourse to war and actions within war are, 
theoretically at least, suoject to moral limits. 
The Christian church has traditionally expressed its moral 
seriousness about war through variants of the just war doctrine. 
This is the official position of the Catholic Church, expressed 
most clearly in Vatican II (Gaudium et Spes, n. 79) • The "just 
war" orientation emerges in the Augsburg Confession, the 
Thirty-Nine Articles, and the Westminster Confession (Marrin, 
1971:94f). The 1689 Baptist Confession, which was definitive for 
the Particular Baptists of England and Wales for two centuries, 
I 
and which was re pub lisned by Charles Haddon Spurgeon in 1855 and 
again by English Reformed Ba pt is ts in 1975, permits Christian 
participation in war "when this is found to be just and necessary" 
(A faitn to confess:54). The World Council of Churches, despite 
its strong orientation toward peacemaking, has always allowed for 
the possibility that participation in certain wars may be 
JUStifiable for Ch r i st i ans ( P D : l 0 , l 5 , 21 , 6 2 ) • De s p i t e t he i r 
clarion call for peace, the Reformed churches of West Germany 
retain the lineaments of the traditional "just war" ethic (Das 
Be ken n t n i s : 2 7 ) • Moreover, most "mainline" denominations have at 
least an implicit "just war" orientation, in that their members 
participate in wars, their theologies are not explicitly pacifist, 
and they have supported particular wars in the past, often 
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referring to the actions of ~he warring parties in vividly moral 
ter.minology. - Mo st theologians and ethicists, pacifists excluded, 
normally make use of just war theory of some kind. Though super-
f icially a departure from the just war tradition, Barth's 
"Grenzfall" ethic can also be described as a kind of jus~ war 
theory. O'Brien has compiled a comprehensive bibliography of 
these writers, which is impressive for its ecumenical breadth and 
its sheer volume (1981: 362£). The new journal "This World" 
reflects the recent resurgence of just war thought (as in van 
Rossum, 1982; Owens, 1983 and 1984; Finn, 1984; etc~) 
\ 
:sigqificantlyi many of the nest-known writers are .Protestants. 
These theologian~, and several 6~ the churches referred to above, 
are increasingly resorting to variants of just war theory in the 
search for guidelines about the arms race, guerrilla warfare, arid 
I 
nuclear wa~fare {cf. CB:95; PD passim; the pastoral letter of the 
._ 
US· Catholic Bishops (Time 8.1Ll982, 29.11.82, 11.4.83, 1-6.5.83); 
,_. 
Das Bekenntnis). Johnson's conclusion is ·that the just war 
tradition is "the fundamental way we fn the West think abou't the 
,\ 
justification and limitation of violence" {1981:329). One 
suspects that if any view is a maverick one, it is the view that 
the church has no business distinguishing just wars from unjust 
ones! 
However, this i.s not to make a case for just war doctrine. That 
' 
system of thought has in any case done heavy weather in the 
twentieth century. Just war theory has properly been criticized, 
by pacifists and non-pacifists alike, for its tendency to justify 
war rather than limit it. It has. been pointed out that 
conditions of reasonably control~ed war which may have existed in 
'past centuries no longer obtain {e.g. Hertz, 1968; CB:94-98). Of 
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unequivocal in his rejection of the complacency with which the 
church has traditionally justified war (cf. CD III/4:453ff). The 
debate about whether a particular war can ever be declared just 
cannot be entered into here. Instead, my objective is the limited 
one of pointing out that all moral reflection about war, and just 
war theory in particular, is a double-edged sword. 






certain conditions are fulfilled, then there is the possibility 
that participation is wrong if they are not fulfilled. I't follows 
' that the church may, as an outworking of its ministry of mercy, 
and in the exercise of its prophetic task in society, find that ·a 
particular war does not measure up to its standards of justice. 
That this ·process of judgement of the moral probity of a war is 
complex and risky is no reason for the church to shirk the effort. 
The enormous suffering and evil inflicted by war -especially in 
the twentieth century demands that the church make every effort 
to· decide what is the most moral course to adopt. Thus Barth, 
while rejecting pacifism, condemns various kinds of war, 'e.g. war 
I 
to set right the internal conditions of another state, as "acts of 
murder", and insists that the church should rally against them: 
"The Christian Church has to testify unambiguously that wars 
waged for such reasons are not JUSt and therefore ought not 
to be undertaken ••• the state must not be given carte 
blanche to grasp the ultima ratio of organizing mass 
slaughter in its dealings with other states ••• [The Church] 
is certainly commissioned to oppose the satanic doctrine 
that war is inevitable and therefore justified, that it is 
unavoidable and therefore right when it occurs, so that 
Christians have to participate in it ••• There is never in 
practice an absolute necess{ty of war" (CD 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -81 
III/4:461,456,460). 
(ii) The church has a task of peace (1). At the outset a 
distinction may be drawn between a negative and a positive 
understanding of peace. Tne former regards peace primarily as 
the cessation of hostilities. Reference may be made to the Pax 
Romana, or the peace of mutual nuclear deterrence followi 1ng World 
War II. However, this is to confuse "peace" with "t~uce", or 
"tranquillity". This sort of peace may not be incompatible with 
injustice; it may even be founded on injustice. Tacitus 
attributed a sage remark to a British chieftain regarding the 
Roman invasion: "They have made a desolation, and they call it 
peace" (quoted in Macquarrie, 1973:30). The positive 
understanding of peace, on the other hand, stresses the biblical 
tradition of "shalom" which means wholeness, well-being, and 
harmony with God and with fellow human beings. Along similar 
lines, Gerhard Liedke stresses that peace is better seen as a 
process than as a condition; and if it is a process it entails 
I 
minimizing violence, suffering, lack of freedom, and ~fear (in 
Hessler, 1975:35-42). Peace, as shalom, is inseparable from 
justice. It is an anticipation of that eschatological ideal of 
peace which is fulfilled in the coming Kingdom of God. Peace is 
an aspect of the New Creation which is the destiny that God offers 
to all. Peace on earth springs from Christ's breaking down of 
barriers, starting with the hitherto alienated Jews and Greeks 
( Ep h • 2 : 14 f ) • The Christian community, reconciled by the death of 
Christ (Eph.2:13), assumes the challenge of working for a just 
peace, proceed~ng from its special insight the love of enemies. 
Viewed in this light, the work of peace is constitutive of .the 
Gospel itself. This fact has been taken seriously by the German 
Reformed churches whicn have, with an eye to the ever-present 
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threat of nuclear war, elevated the issue of peace to that of 
"status confessionis" (Das Bekenntnis:6). 
The task of peace is linked to the assumptions made above. 
Because the church is the "experimental garden of a new humanity", 
it assumes the task of reconciliation of the estranged. 
Furthermore, the church's ministry of mercy and prophecy may be 
expressed in its search for a just peace. As part of this search, 
the church is called to participate in providing the means for 
communication among people of different races, cultures and 
political systems. 
Assembly of the World 
Archbishop Kirill pointed out to the Sixth 
Council of Churches in 1983 that the 
churches of the USSR and the USA contributed to overcoming fear 
and alienation between the t~ sides during the "cold war"; and 
were an important factor in replacing confrontation by dialogue. 
He added that the churches, to the extent that they constitute an 
ecumenical fellowship independent of national belonging -and 
political views, have a "special role" of building trust am9ng 
nations (1983:1,4). 
What should the church do when war threatens? Barth stresses 
that the church should do all it can to fashion a true peace among 
nations to keep war at Day: it should press to the last for nego-
tiation and compromise before war is permitted to break out. It 
should reject the "satanic doctrine" that war is inevitable and 
therefore justified. Only if the church has done this may it 
issue a "call to martial resolution" (CD III/4:460£). At this 
point, however, a break must be made with Barth's war ethics. He 
proceeds, on the basis of his "Grenzfall" ethic, to volunteer that 
"If war is ventured in obedience and therefore with a good 
conscience, it is also ventured in faith and therefore with 
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joyous and reckless determination" (CD III/4:463). 
Perhaps the finest critique of this position -- and one with which 
the present author substantially agrees is that of Yoder 
(1970). Space does unfortunately not permit a more careful 
examination of this point. Suffice it to say that many European 
churches and, indeed, many churches throughout the northern 
hemisphere -- have, in view of the nuclear threat, departed from 
their naive just war positions and are insisting that their 
actions respecting war should be informed, in the first place, by 
a theology of peace (cf. literature cited at the start of this 
section). They are increasingly adopting the position that even 
if war breaks out, violence is not to be blessed as a technique of 
resolving conflict. War is always the tra9ic consequence of sin. 
Bven though some of its members may feel constrained by conscience 
to participate in a particular war in order to protect the weak, 
the church cannot be called upon to justify violence and killing. 




"always remains questionable ••• we must call guilt by its 
name and damage by its name, and we must resist the 
temptation to make euphemisms for the use of violence as 
"just struggle" or "just rebellion" (quoted in 
Villa-Vicencio, March 1983: 61). 
The view has been expressed (in Conscientious Objection: A 
Counsellor's Re source Manual, pp 61-64) that participation in 
warfare, if contemplated at all, should take the form of "agonized 
participation". This position holds that "while war can never be 
an act of Justice, it may sometimes be necessary for the 
prevention of a greater evil that would result from permitting 
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ffiO):::ally p~rverse power to gain .political dominance". '£he 
participant~ who suppo~ts the war on the grounds of a "tortured 
..... ~ .. 
Christian sensitivity", c on du c ts t 11 e w a r w i th an a t t i t ud e o f 
cqntrition tree of vindictive hatred, in the full recogni~ion that 
"military victory, while necessary, is but a negative 
attainment that clears th~ way for subsequent political and 
social programmes ·designed to re-establish reasonable 
justice and order". 
This emphasis on "agonized participation" seems an appropriate one 
\ 
in view of the v~stly more destructive technology available to 
modern armed forces. It -would be a corrective to the 
vindictiveness that invites furthe~ rounds of violence, and could 
spare the excesses of violence that might be inspired by Barth's 
I 
confidence that war can' be pursued with "joyous and reckless 




Luther's sorrowful judge (cf. Ba in ton, 1978:241)' ,. the 
,:3el.f-critical attitude implicit in "agdnized participation" could 
·\ 
be a continual check on group pride and anger, and so.help 
preserve trie conviction that war is to be undertaken only in the 
. 
last resort, and even then with the sole intention of bringing 
about a just peace. 
(iii) The topic of p~ace leads on naturally to consideration of 
conscientious objection. I assume that· the church should support 
all sincere conscientious objectors, whether religious or 
non-religious, and whether pacifist or selective. • This seems 
reaso~able, in the first place, in view of the fact that this is 
the position of all .the English-speaking churches under 
consideration, as is evident from statements made in . the past 
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decade. The position of these churches was also revealed in 
their rejection of the new 1983 legislation on conscientious 
objection, on the basis that it fails to allow for all the 
above-mentioned forms of conscientious ObJection (2). 
In the second place, several of these churches have ancient 
traditions of respect for conscience. For instance, the first 
Baptist confession of 1646 in London upheld the freedom of 
conscience ( 3) • Similarly, the Congregational Church has a 
I 
concern for conscience which extends back to its .Anabaptist 
origins. At the other end of the theological spectrum, the 
Catholic Church also has a long tradition, most clearly expressed 
in the Middle Ages, which championed the conscience (4). Whereas 
Pope Pius XII disapproved of conscientious objection under a 
democracy (PD:137), the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed the 
traditional doctrine that 
"every man has in his heart a law writ ten oy God. To obey 
it is the very dignity of man" (Gauaium et Spes n.16), 
and went on to commend conscientious objection (Gaudium et Spes 
n.79). Pope Paul II regards conscientious OOJection as a "sign of 
maturity" (Southern Cr o s s 11. 3 • 1 9 8 4) • Accordingly the US 
catholic Bishops hold that if conscience impels one not to 
participate in a particular war, then one "sins gravely" Dy taking 
part in it (documents reprinted in CIIR, 1982:105). 
Within the Anglican tradition, successive Lambeth conferences have 
upheld the right of conscientious obJection (CB:l25). In 
addition there is much in the Reformed tradition to support the 
~ rights of conscience. Ca 1 v i n wr i t es , 
"Our consciences have not to do with men but with God only 
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the worship of God, and the spiritual rule of living 
righteously, are superior to all the decrees of men 
human laws ••• do not therefore in themselves bind the 
conscience" (Inst. IV/X,S). 
Therefore, Calvin proceeds, 
"We are subject 
only in the Lord. 
to the men who rule over us, but subject 
If they command anything against Hirn let 
us not pay the least regard to it" (Inst., IV/XX,32). 
Kuyper insists that the government "must give way itself to the 
sovereign conscience" 
opinion, 
(1976:108). Conscience, in Kuyper's 
"can never be suoject to man but always and ever to God 
Almighty ••• In order that it may be able to rule MEN, the 
government must respect this deepest ethical power of our 
human existence. A nation, consisting of citizens wnose 
consciences are bruised, is itself broken in its national 
strength" (1976:108). 
Also in the Reformed tradition, Barth argues that the question of 
war "is addressed specifically and in full seriousness to tne 
individual •• [and] should oe the theme of a supremely personal 
interrogation". To assert otherwise is to make an "illusory 
distinction between individual and social ethics" (CD 
III/4:464ff). 
In the third place, there is massive evidence that churches 
throughout the world have, in tne twentieth century, come to 
respect sincere conscientious objection of all the above-mentioned 
kinds. For example, "Words of Conscience" lists some 75 different 
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religious groupings and denominations in the USA which support 
sincere conscientious objection across the board. Among these 
are "main-line" Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian; Episcopal, and 
Lu.theran churches. The World Council of Churches has, since its 
inception, lauded those who "refuse military service of all kinds" 
(PD:l6). (5) Recent opinion in the WCC and the Catholic Church 
embraces selective conscientious objection as well. For 
instance, an expert conference in Austria in 1970, reporting 
I 
for Justice and 
cf. lalso wee 
Jointly to the WCC and the Pontifical Commission 
Peace, allowed for this right (Bailey, 1972:20: 
statements at Uppsala, 1968, documented by Kinchy, 1976:34). 
In the fourth place, the view that conscientious objection is 
impermissible, or that it is limited to religious pacifism, 
appears to be restricted to a minority in the present century. 
Incidentally, Schleiermacher denied the individual the right to 
distinguish between just and unjust wars, because the individual 
does not have the information to make such a judgment, and must 
therefore obey authority (quoted in van Wyk, 1984:218). Heyns' 
view, later adopted as the official NGK view (NGAS:ll6), is that 
universal pacifism as a principle is unacceptable and foreign to 
the tradition of Christianity ( Heyns, 1980:5,11,15). 
Furthermore, selective conscientious objection, because it strikes 
at the existence and orderly functioning of the state, and hence 
threatens society as a whole, is intolerable to any government 
(1980:7,8). For no stated reason, Heyns then asserts that 
universal pacifist objectors should be granted a non-military 
alternative to military service, but that selective conscientious 
objectors should not (1980:20). This self-contradictory position 
has been given a richly deserved rebuttal by Dr. Etienne de 
Villiers (in CIGS, 1984:42-46). 
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In conclusion, it seems reasonable that the church should support 
sincere conscientious objectors, whether religious or 
non-religious, and whether universal or selective. 
(iv) My position on the conflicts in which the SADF is involved is 
essentially the same as those which certain South African churches 
have adopted. This section therefore consists of a bri~f 
exposition and defence of those positions. I commence with the 
case of Namibia before proceeding to discuss SADF activities 
within South Africa. Since this area is one of acrid.c~ntroversy 
1 
within the churches and elsewhere, I have included a much more 
thorough treatment of the subject in Appendix A. 
In 1982 the South African Catholic Bishops issued a "Report on 
Namibia" which said there was "a universal consensus ••• that 
South Africa has no right to be in Namibia", and urged the with-
drawal of the South African security forces from the area as a 
precondition for the implementation of Security Counc.il Resolution 
435 (Report:ll4). The following year both the CPSA and the MCSA 
adopted similar resolutions (cape Times 19.4.1983, and Statement). 
This position is based, first, upon the illegality of south 
Africa's presence in Namibia. After world v~a~ I, Sou th Africa 
administered the territory as a League of Nations mandate. After 
World War IJ1 all former League mandatories were invited to submit 
their mandates to the UN trusteeship system. All but South 
Africa agreed. Later the National Party argued that the 
dissolution of the League terminated the mandate, and South Africa 
• 
now ruled by right of occupation. (In fact this remained the 
official south African position until the 1970s). south Africa's 
motives were deeply distrusted when the Prime Minister announced 
that SWA was to be granted representation in the South African 
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parliament in oraer to knit the region constitutionally closer to 
South Africa. In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia asked the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to confirm that South Africa 
was obliged to submit to UN supervision, and could not modify the 
mandate by making SWA into a "fifth province". However, the ICJ 
ruled in 1966 that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the necessary locus 
standi to obtain a decision. Nevertheless, the General Assembly 
passed Resolution 2145 (XXI) in 1966 which terminated the mandate. 
In 1968 the Security Council endorsed the Assembly resolution and 
passed its own Resolution 276, which deemed South Africa's 
presence in the territory illegal. Thereupon the Security Council 
asked the ICJ for a legal opinion. After overruling south 
Africa's preliminary objections to the case, the ICJ gave its 
verdict. It doubted that the General Assembly Resolution 2145 
(XXI) was legally binding, but stressed that the Security Council 
Resolution 276 was legally binding under Article 25 of the 
Charter. South Africa was therefore obliged to withdraw from 
SWA. The ICJ case appears to hinge on the question of the UN 
succession to the League. In this regard it is of note that 
South Africa had itself acknowledged the UN succession by 
submitting a report on the territory to the General Assembly in 
1946. The court had, moreover, insisted on UN succession in its 
judgements of 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1962 (Dugard, 1971:464). Thus 
it seems reasonable to conclude that South Africa has no legal 
right to administer the territory. 
The position of the churches is based, second, on the fact of 
South African maladministration of the territory. As soon as 
1922, Africans were confined to reserves and subJected to police 
checks and pass laws (CIIR, 1981:10). During the 1950s, the 
apartheid system was gradually extended in the territory, in con-
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travention of the terms of the mandate. The 1964 Odendaal 
Commission Report urged the implementation of the homelands policy 
in Namibia. 
Resistance dates back to well before the 1950s, when chiefs and 
church leaders made representations to the government. In 1958 
the ovamboland People's Organization (later SWAPO) was formed. 
However, its non-violent efforts at reform were met with the 
violence of arrests, imprisonment and torture (CIIR, l981:13ff: 
I 
resorted to guerrirla warfare, using Angola 
n.44-66~. SWAPO 
. I 
as a base. The 
cf. UN International Conference, A/CONF. 120/5, 
result was a massive South African troop buildup on the northern 
border of Namibia. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the churches of Namibia adopted an ever 
stronger stance against the South African occupation. For 
instance, in an open letter to Dr. Henry Kissinger in 19J6, church 
leaders expressed their conviction that "the vast majority" of 
black Namioians wanted south Africa to leave the territory, 
because of South Africa's "ever increasing role of terror" 
(Statements:Sf). Neither the UN, nor SWAPO, nor the churches 
were satisfied with South Africa's repeated attempts to outflank 
the desires of the rnaJority, from the Turnhalle Conference in 1975 
to the Multi-Party Conference in 1984. 
Thus it seems that the South African churches were justified in 
calling for the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia. 
Regarding the activities of the SADF within South Africa, the 1982 
Provincial Synod of the CPSA adopted the standpoint that a "vital 
function" of the SADF has become the protection of the unjust 
structures of apartheid. It went on· to express its "serious 
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doubts about the legitimacy of a military system whose role is 
increasingly seen as the protector of a profoundly immoral and 
unjust social order" (see CPSA,1"Acts and Resolutions of the 24th 
Session of Provincial Synod, 1982", Resolution 13: "Service in the 
SADF", p 42f). This position should be understood, first, in the 
light of the perceived inJustice of the racial order in South 
Africa. The foundations of tne "homelands" system were laid by 
the 1913 Land Act which dispossessed thousands of Africans. From 
the 1950s orr, Africans were stripped of their South African 
citizenship and made citizens of one or other of the "homelands", 
which together comprise some 13% of tne area of south Africa. 
This political and economic dispossession of the majority, 
together with the innumerable laws which buttress this racial 
order, constitutes the fundamental injustice of the system which 
came to be known as apartheid. Crucially important, in the CPSA 
view, is that the reformist moves of Prime Minister Botha have not 
even attempted to tinker with this central aspect of South 
Africa's racial dispensation. 
The English-speaking churches' tradition of opposition to raci~n 
extends back to the time of the early nineteenth century 
missionaries, and especially John Philip of th~ London Missionary 
Society. However, it was. after the accession to power of the 
National Party in 1948 that the churches began tb make strong 
public statements on racial policy. For instance, in that year 
most of them criticized proposed legislation aimed at depriving 
Africans of their limited Parliamentary representation (de Gruchy, 
1979: 54f). Apartheid also came in for .at tack by Prof. Ben Marais 
and Prof. B.B. Keet of the Dutch Reformed Church. A high point 
was reached with the promulgation, in 1957, of a clause of the 
Native Laws Amendment Bill which would have made it difficult for 
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black people to attend worship in churches in so-called white 
areas. Several of the English-speaking churches announced that 
they would be forced into disobedience should this Bill 6ecome law 
(de Gruchy, 1979:6lf). The offending clauses were soon dropped. 
In that year, the Catholic Bishops issued a statement in which 
apartheid was rejected as "fundamentally evil" (de Gruchy and 
Villa-Vicencio, 1983:145ff). 




l960, which concluded that ~no-one who believes in JeJus Christ 
his Jolour or 
laboJr and JOb . I 
may be excluded from any church on the gro~nds 6£ 
race"., and mentioned the evil effects of ~igratory 
reservation (de Gruchy, 1979:66). It also gave rise to the 
formation of the Christian Institute led by Beyers Naude. The 
"Message to the people of South Africa" marked a further 
stiffening in.the position of the English-speaking churches. The 
"Message" declared that apartheid had become a "novel gospel" 
which conflicted with the Christian Gospel, because it ~holds out 
to men a security built not on Christ but on the theory of 
separation, and the preservation of racial identity" (in de Grucny 
and Villa-Vicencio, 1983:154-159). In 1977 the Lutheran VJOrld 
Federation declared that the situation in Southern Africa 
constituted a "status confessionis" (de Gruchy and Villa-Vicencio, 
1983:160f). Finally, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 
mieting at Ottawa in 1982, declared "that apartneid is a sin, and 
that the moral and theological justification of it is a travesty 
of the Gospel and, in its persistent disobedience to the Word ot 
God, a theological heresy" (documented in de Gruchy and 
Villa-Vicencio, 1983:170). 
The armed conflict in Sou th Africa should oe understood in the 
' 
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3. The argument for the military style of chaplaincy 
With these theological presuppositions in mind, let us briefly 
examine the rationale commonly advanced for having military 
chaplaincy rather than a church- (or civilian-) based ministry to 
military personnel. The argument typically takes the following 
form. On the theological side of the equation, it is assumed (as 
L nave above) that the church has an obligation to minister to 
all, and that this ministry includes giving all at ten ti on, possible 
to the deep-seated and urgent needs of young men in the armed 
forces. On the institutional side of the equation,. it is assumed 
that the military environment requires that ministry oe perform~d 
by a full member of the armed forces. The institutional side of 
the argument calls for some elaboration. 
It is argued that an elementary appreciation of the facts of 
military life leads to the acceptance of full military status 
including uniform as the best instrument for effecting this 
ministry. A civilian might not be trusted, and could be 
perceived as a security risk; civilian-based ministers could 
easily be disregarded by commanders and troops alike (cf. for 
example EC:68). To gain access to remote bases requires both 
security clearance and transport; the latter can frequently be 
offered only by the military, e.g. to outlying naval or air force 
oases. If this is true in time of peace, it is even more true in 
time of war. For example, a commander faced with a choice of 
taking a chaplain or taking an extra load of ammunition in a 
bomber might easily opt for the latter unless it is the chaplain's 
military right to accompany the troops (Abercrombie, 1979:51). 
(In South Africa it has also .been argued that the Geneva 
Conventions require the chaplain to be a full uniformed member of 
CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -95 
the armed forces (e.g. J. Daines, Letter to Seek, February 1984). 
Since the Geneva argument has been advanced, to my knowledge, only 
by South Africans, discussion of it is deferred to Appendix B). 
In order to respond fully to the total range of needs of the 
serviceman, it is felt that "insider status" within the military 
is necessary. This phrase is used by Hutcheson, a well-known 
writer about the US military chaplaincy, and so it will be worth 
our while to discover what he intends by the term. Now Hutcheson 
is not explicitly making an argument for the superiority of 
military chaplaincy over church-based chaplaincy: ra1ther he 
contrasts the form of ministry of the ordinary parish priest with 
the specialized ministry of the military chaplain who operates in 
the "total institution" of the military. In doing this he makes 
extensive use of Goffman's work "Asylums" (1961). Since this work 
is so famous for its chilling revelations about the operations of 
"total institutions", I shall assume a basic familiarity with its 
contents on the part of the reader. Hutcheson modifies Goffman's 
concept considerably when applying it to the military environment. 
First, he says that the separation between officers and troops is 
by no means as rigid as that between staff and inmates in· total 
institutions like mental hospitals. Officers, Hutcheson says, 
are "as totally involved and as subject to institutional control 
as enlisted men There is, consequently, a large measure of 
"we're all in this together" feeling betwe~n military officers and 
enlisted men which may not exist between staff and members of the 
autonomous total institution" (1975:44). Second, he says that in 
most total institutions staff perform some servicing function 
(e.g. healing, education, etc.) for the "insiders". In the armed 
forces, however, 
"members and staff are united in a task exterior to the 
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organization: national defense, fighting wars, ••• This 
sense of commonality of endeavour does much to elimin~te the 
kind of enmity which Goffman found to be characteristic of 
the autonomous total institutions which he examined" 
(1975:44). 
-96 
Therefore, Hutcheson argues, military chaplains comprise one of 
the few groups of clergymen who can minister as "insiders" to a 
total institution. Shared insider status, moreover, 
important advantages: 
has several 
(i) removal of the artificiality, even hypocrisy, which sometimes 
intervenes between the pastor and the parishioner who "wants to 
show only his Sunday self" (1975:50) 
(ii) full sharing of the conditions under which parishioners 
live, and hence better preparation for a more effective pastoral 
ministry to their needs 
(iii) continuing contact with the unchurched 
(iv) the possibility of ministering creatively to the institution 
by changing the conditions of service, thus making of it a more 
humane environment (Hutcheson, 1975:48f). 
On the basis of this line of argument, it has been argued that the 
military chaplaincy is the best, or even the only, form that 
"effective" ministry to military personnel can take (Boozer, 1979: 
78f: EC:66). Now the advantages of "insider status" should not 
be underestimated. Identification with parishioners by sharing 
the conditions they live under can be a valuable aid in ministry 
to them. One of the assumptions I have made above is that 
ministry should, as Hutcheson ooserves, include ministry to the 
institution by humanizing it. The church should also be grateful 
for added contact with the unchurched. However, the question is 
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whether these conditions of effective ministry can be gained only 
by chaplains' adopting full military membership including uniforms 
and other accoutrements of military status. If ministry by 
civilian- or church-based chaplains can also share in these 
advantages, then the "institutional side of the equation" referred 
to above breaks down. The most obvious reason why the 
institutional side of the equation does in fact collapse is that 
there is a counter-example: the chaplaincy to the West German 
Bundeswehr. As has been mentioned in the literature survey, this 
chaplaincy is church-based in several important respects, one 
exception being its reception of military pay, which is; perhaps 
\ 
the most important legacy from the heavily militarized chaplaincy 
of the pre-World War II era. I am not aware of anything; in the 
literature which suggests that the chaplains' semi-civilian and 
temporary (six to eight years) status is an impediment to 
ministry; or that officers do not respect them; or that officers 
decline to give them permission to minister on account of their 
civilian dress; or that the Geneva Conventions do not protect the 
chaplains; or that their semi-civilian status prevents them from 
humanizing the military environment in the way that Hutcheson says 
military chaplains can; or that they are seen by troops as 
outsiders or aliens to the point that their pastoral ministry is 
ineffective. On the contrary, the literature indicates that they 
do share the advantages cited above: absence of artificiality, 
effective ministry, contact, and ministry to the institution. It 
stands to reason that, as long as the military can be persuaded, 
as it was in West Germany, of the church's desire for independence 
from military control and membership, arrangements can be made to 
provide the chaplain with sufficient opportunities for ministry. 
We might also weigh the adequacy of Hutcheson's interpretation of 
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Goftman's concept. Now Goffman' s work is a devastating critique 
of total institutions. It shows how the process of 
"mortification of the self" systematically eliminates the former 
self to make the inmate/patient/member malleable in the hands of 
tne institution -- a point which Hutcheson recognizes (1975:45). 
However, in his application of Goffman's concept to the military 
situation, Hutcheson deprives it of its force as critique. He 
refuses to regard the totalistic military environment as a 
theological problem. He proceeds to place the most favourable 
construction upon some selected observations that Goffman made, 
notably those referring to the inmate-staff relationship. 
I 
I 
Hutcheson has no critique of the "new institutional self" which 
(as he acknowledges) the military, as a total institution, 
creates; he has no critical word about the "insider world" of the 
institution, except to suggest that the chaplain may want to make 
humanitarian adjustments -- which in turn end up making the total 
institution run more smoothly (1975:50). He brushes over the 
"deep caesura" (Keijzer, 1978:37) between the officer class and 
servicemen, though in fairness he is writing of a volunteer army 
where the gap may well be reduced. He swiftly passes over the 
moral problem of "participating in organized killing in the face 
of the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill'" (1975:48), without 
pausing to consider what implications this could have for ministry 
(Should the chaplain participate witn his or her parishioners in 
any moral contradiction? How great was the moral contradiction in 
Vietnam? Should the chaplain seek "insider status" in any army, 
e.g. Hitler's Wehrmacht?, etc.) Hutcheson also ignores the 
aspect of propaganda and indoctrination. To unite people in the 
common objective· of destroying the enemy, it is necessary in some 
armies to mould attitudes by means of propaganda; thus the feeling 
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of camaraderie, which Hutcheson fondly refers to, does not 
necessarily exist on its own account, but may have to be created 
through means which the chaplain might not consider ethical. For 
these reasons Hutcheson's idealistic conception of the armed 
forces, his problem-free conception of the chaplaincy, and his 
almost opportunistic interpretation of Goffman are open to 
question. 
Furthermore, there are several aspects of military life which are 
not as conducive to or compatible with ministry as Hutcheson would 
give us to believe. 
institution in mind, 
With Goffman' s critique of the total 
I now try to examine some of these 
problematic aspects of military life. At the same time I bring 
to bear the other assumptions about the church and ministry which 
I have made above, noting, in passing, that most writers who 
defend the military form of chaplaincy have tended to concentrate 
on the "obviou~ duty of the chaplain to minister to all people 
everywhere, to the exclusion of factors such as those which I 
raise. This brief examination is not done in order to "prove" 
that the church cannot exist within the military, as some extreme 
forms of pacifism would posit. Rather it is done in an attempt 
to show that the presence of the church in the military should be 
regarded as a theological problem, and that there is a certain 
incongruence between the values of the church and the values of 
the military. These assertions in turn form the backd ro.p to the 
discussion in chapters 3 to 5. 
It may be valuable at this point to distinguish between official 
and unofficial chaplaincy. Unofficial chaplaincy, at its most 
extreme, is in church pay, is responsible only to the church and 
does not form an official part of the institution. The unofficial 




chaplain may perform chaplaincy work in addition to normal church 
duties. Official chaplaincies, on the other hand, are more 
closely integrated with their respective institutions: at their 
most extreme they are in the institution's pay, are partly 
responsible to the institution, and form an official part of it. 
Institutional ministry may therefore be seen as a continuum of 
varying degrees of church and institutional integration, with, in 
practice, a tendency to concentrate at either end. In the 
military environment, official chaplaincy takes the .form of 
military chaplaincy, which, at the extreme, entails military pay, 
uniform, commission and rank, partial military supervision, 
subjection to the MDC, basic training in the military, and 
voluntary use of arms. Unofficial chaplaihcy in the military 
realm takes the form of church- or civilian-based ministry, by 
ministers or by lay people, who form no official part of the 
military, but who enter the military for specific periods, e.g. 
the limited six- or eight-year term of West German chaplains, or 
the weekly visits of SAChS part-time chaplains. Unofficial 
chaplaincy also includes ministry to military personnel outside 
the military context, e.g. when soldiers leave camps to go to 
church meetings. In practice most ministry to military personnel 
tends to be located somewhere between these extremes. 
4. Characterization of the military 
"It is the mission of organized use of violence, on oehalf of the 
state, to guard its vital interests against interference, which 
primarily characterizes the military the management of 
violence [is] the characteristic trademark of the military" 
(KeiJzer, 1978:31). The point of this very rough characterization 
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of the purpose of the military is merely to observe that in terms 
of the assumptions about the ethics of war made above, the 
presence of the church within the military cannot be assumed to be 
problem-free. The violence that the military uses always stands 
in need of justification. The church will only condone such 
violence if it is genuinely the last resort: and even then the 
church will not seek to find rationalizations and justifications 
for it. To the extent that the church always regards war as the 
tragic consequence of sin, it can never be at ease in the military 
environment. 
Let us now return to .the question of the inner nature of tne 
military and examine what this implies for ministry within it. In 
all military systems, strict command and authority relationships 
are maintained. Obedience is the prime military virtue (Boozer, 
1979:62: see also the sophisticated argument of Bra,dford, 1968). 
I 
Huntington states the position succintly: 
"When the military man receives a legal order from an 
authorized superior, he does not argue, he does not 
hesitate, he does not substitute his own views: he obeys 
instantly. He is judged not by the policies he implements, 
but rather by the promptness and efficiency with which he 
carries them out. His goal is to perfect an instrument of 
obedience: the uses to which that instrument are put are 
beyond his responsibility" (1957:73). 
Van den Aardweg quotes Kurt Lang as saying that the ordinary 
soldier "has no recourse but to obey: discipline is his primary 
virtue" (1971:!14). When the virtue of obedience is lacking, 
threat and submission are essential to the maintenance of 
discipline. The Netherlands Regulation on Military Discipline 
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(1922) goes as far as declaring subordination to be the soul of 
military service (Keijzer, 1978:49). This factor is more 
prominent in conscript armies, as Hutcheson notes (1975:5lff). In 
the lower ranks, threats often concern physical forms of 
punishment. Although corporal punishment is normally illegal, as 
in the South African Army, it may nevertheless be crucial to the 
process of discipline, especially during the formative period of 
basic training. Among higher ranks the process of authority, 
obedience, threat and submission is more subtle and gentlemanly, 
resting finally - upon the fear of loss of honour and rank, but it 
is no less real. Thielicke points out that, when p'atriotism 
I 
fails, naked fear of punishment by a superior officer may oe the 
only factor which will inhibit disobedience; undesirable though 
this may be, it is one of the sacrifices which has to be made if 
the nation seriously believes that it is engaged in a just war of 
defence ( 6) • The writer's experience in the South African Army 
(1974) and the detention barracks (1980) bears out these insights. 
The importance of detention barracks for upholding discipline, and 
hence maintaining the conscription system, might be underlined. 
As the ultimate threat against recalcitrance among troops, the 
detention barracks in the SADF is fundamental to the maintenance 
of order and the efficacy of the conscription system. Within the 
detention barracks physica,l punishment in the form of 
square-Dashing and "push-ups" is backed up with the threat of 
solitary confinement. Repeated two-week spells of solitary (11 
in tne case of the author) for minor infringements are not unknown 
( 7) • 
These factors lead us back to Goffman's characterization of total 
institutions. In many respects it is true of the military: the 
total life of the member is spent within the institution; there 
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are often physical barriers to exit, especially in conscript 
armies and at the start of training~ and a deliberate effort is 
made to make the conscriptee fit the institution's requirements, 
often including verbal aouse and other "informal" methods of 
exacting conformity. van den Aa rdweg says that "the size, 
complexity, and special functions of the army are productive of, 
and make necessary •• a relative loss of the individuality of its 
members through discipline and regimentation" (1971:111). use is 
made of propaganda (films) and ingroup/outgroup i language 
I 
("communist") to unite soldiers in a common purpo~e. The 
implications for the church and its ministry of this more critical 
characterization of military life may be set out as follows. 
There is a certain incongruence about the presence of the church 
as the "alternative society" within the military. Whereas no 
member of the Body of Christ should issue orders and threats, and 
exact obedience and submission from another, the military is 
dependent on this process for its very existence. To reply that 
ranking privileges are not exercised during church services, or 
that the Body of Christ is not of this world but spiritual is no 
solution to tne dilemma, because this involves positing an "ideal 
c h u r c h" • Th e tang i o le real i t y ( We be r , 1983:521) of the church 
would be denied if it were insisted that it ceases to have 
relevance on weekdays or outside the church building. To deny 
the operation of the special internal relationships of the Body of 
Christ amid the processes of the empirical world would be to deny 
the Body of Christ as such. 
However, this incongruence between the alternative society and 
society at large must be seen in relative terms. If it we re 
taken absolutely the church would have to secede from the world 
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altogether like the mediaeval monastic movement, for there is not 
a single social setting in which the presence of the church is not 
problematic to a certain extent. The church, as we have seen 
above, is the "experimental garden of a new humanity"~ it strives 
to be an example of what humanity can be when 
Spirit. It should, in full awareness of 
carefully sift the norms, attitudes, rules·, 
renewed by the 
its own failure, 
traditions and 
practices 1of every context in which it offers ministry. It 
should live as a "sign of contradiction" of such worldly 
influences and powers. It should recognize that some a'spects of 
its ministry could vary, depending on the extent to which it saw 
its ideals enacted or denied in each context of ministry. 
Furthermore, it should be appreciated that some institutions, like 
the "totalistic military community" (Langford, 1979:36~ cf. 
Boozer, 1979:63), come close to diametric opposition to the 
church's ideals. Sometimes the opposition can be so intense that 
the church cannot afford to be officially associated with them in 
the exercise of its ministry. That this principle is recognized 
in the current practice of the church emerges from the examples 
which follow presently. In parentheses it may be noted· that 
there is next to no discussion of this question in the literature. 
The theological problem of the church's relationship with 
institutions has rarely been posed in this way. I suggest, then, 
that a distinction be rnade among three types of ins ti tut'ion. The 
actions of the first type are essentially good, which gives rise 
to a presumption that an official chaplaincy may be offered. 
Some of the actions of the second type are questionable or even 
evil but the purpose of the institution may be justified as the 
lesser of two evils, and so an official chaplaincy may be 
conditionally offered or sometimes refused. The actions of the 
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third type are evil and can in no way be justified; hence the 
preslllilption is that no official chaplaincy should be offered. A 
few examples drawn from the current practice of the church 
illustrates this line of reasoning. 
Hospitals and retirement communities are an example of the first 
type of institution. Under normal circl.llilstances, the church has 
no qualms about allowing its ministers to serve on the staff of a 
hospital, because saving life and healing are praiseworthy 
actions. Similarly, the church has a long tradition of paid 
I 
chaplaincy in schools and universities because of the unquestioned 
value of education. However, if hospitals were being used to 
repress dissidence oy applying psyc hia tr ic "treatment" to 
political opponents of the regime, as happens in the USSR, the 
church would have to reconsider its official hospital chaplaincy. 
Similarly, if institutions for the handicapped or mentally ill 
were to practise euthanasia, as happened in Nazi Germany, the 
church might have to withdraw an official chaplaincy; 
alternatively, if its chaplains criticized the institution on the 
basis of the Gospel, they would probably be di smi'ssed. 
The second group includes the military, industries, tne nation's 
security apparatus and the police. The military falls into the 
second group because its actions which include destruction of life 
and property are evil but are, in the view of many cnurcnes, 
justifiaole for the sake of the defence of the community from 
greater evils. Depending upon the circumstances there is debate 
about whether the church should offer an official or only an 
unofficial chaplaincy. In most Western countries an official 
chaplaincy is offered to the military. In Western Germany the 
chaplaincy is only partly official for fear of repetition of the 
CHAPTE~ 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS -106 
Third Reich experience when the church found itself too intimately 
connected with an obviously unJust war. 
Industrial chaplaincy also falls into the second group. Sometimes 
the churcn offers an official industrial chaplaincy. However, 
the church cannot allow an official chaplaincy to a firm or 
industry with a history of shady deals and graft or whicn was 
regularly in the news because of maltreatment of workers. 
Ministers of churches in the textile region of Gaston County made 
distasteful history because of the authority mill owners had over 
them through the selective payment of subsidies to churches (Pope, 
1942: 149). Indeed, financial leverage resulted in ministers 
serving "as an arm of the employers in control of the mill 
villages" (1942: 161). 
A nation's security apparatus also falls into the second group. 
For instance, there is a morally relevant distinction between an 
official chaplaincy to the highly reputable Scotland Yard and an 
official chaplaincy to tne CIA, because the bad press that the 
latter has had, and Some of its unpopular, not to say scurrilous 
political dealings, would make an official chaplaincy the object 
of derision and accusations of having been bought. 
Likewise the police force falls into the second group. Nearly 
all Christians acknowledge the need for a police function within 
society because this conduces to the ultimate good of all~ hence 
police chaplaincies are a common feature of the ministry of many 
churches. If the consensus was broken by regular and gross 
violations of ht.nnan rights by policemen in a certain area then the 
police chaplaincy could conceivably be withdrawn. If, for 
\ 
instance, it was known that the police authorities had no 
intention of bringing to book the crimes of the South West African 
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paramilitary unit Koevoet, and that its members would continue to 
be trained in 'extermination', then the church would reluctantly 
have to withdraw its chaplaincy from Koevoet if it had ever had 
one. 
Massage parlours and brothels fall into the third group. Under 
no circumstances would the church of fer an official chaplaincy to 
these, even though ministry to tnis group is valued highly by 
church. For instance, the church in Brazil does important 




Fortaleza; the Southern Suburbs Vagrancy Project in Cape Town is 
focused on ministry to prostitutes. Independent abortion 
clinics, as in Japan, also fall into the third group, because they 
take life in a way which most churches consider morally 
unjustifiable except in extreme cases, as when pregnancy follows 
rape. Casinos are another example of the third group. Moreover, 
one of the purposes of a chaplaincy to such an organization would 
be to undermine it; but no institution would give 1official 
authorization to a chaplaincy which is designed to destroy it. 
Another example of the way in which the church distinguishes group 
two from group three institutions is its ministry to criminals. 
The church is willing to provide official chaplaincy to criminals 
through prison ministry, but it cannot put ministers on the 
payroll of criminal syndicates (Dewolf, 1979:24). If doctors were 
being used by the interrogation section of a police department to 
ensure that prisoners under torture would suffer maximum pain 
without dyin~, the church would probably consider an official 
chaplaincy to the medical service or the police department 
concerned a serious moral compromise. In fact Amnesty 
International has a section concerned specifically with this use 
of medical personnel by undemocratic regimes. 
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It therefore appears that several theological considerations would 
be ranged alongside pastoral needs -- in the present practice of 
the cnurch in the decision whether to upgrade an unofficial 
chaplaincy into an official chaplaincy. If there is not 
sufficient congruence between its own values and those of the 
institution under question, the church seems, by and large, to 
offer only an unofficial chaplaincy. For instance, neither the 
distress and the physical danger of a woman seeking an abortion, 
nor the low self-esteem and lack of employment al ternat'ives of a 
I 
prostitute could serve as a rationale for an official chaplaincy 
at an abortion clinic or a brothel. 
In conclusion it mignt be stated that the military, like all other 
institutions, constitutes a theological proolem for the ministry 
of the church. The form of the chaplain's ministry in the 
military should take into account the particular character of the 
military, such as its rank and authority st~ucture (which make it 
an example of a total institution) and its guiding purpose of war. 
A closer inquiry into some of these aspects now follows. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CHAPLAINS' SERVICE 
1. Introduction 
Having set out a series of theological assumptions about ministry, 
I attempt in this chapter to apply these theological assertions to 
the situation of the military chaplaincy of the English-speaking 
churches of· South Africa. 
I first attempt to show that, as far as the SADF and the 
; 
government are concerned, a crucial function of the chaplaincy is 
the maintenance of morale. However, it is apparent that most 
chaplains would reject indignantly any suggestion that their 
ministry is in any way suoject to military morale objectives. 
They understand themselves to be first and foremost ministers of 
their own churches. This divergence of perspective calls for a 
more careful inquiry into the self-perception of the chaplains. 
To do. this, I try to distinguish three groups of chaplains: the 
"pastoral chaplains", whose overriding concern is to minister to 
their church members,· wherever they are: the "patriotic 
chaplains", who tend to agree with SADF perspectives on South 
Africa: and the "critical chaplains", who tend to reject these 
perspectives, or at least to feel uneasy with them. This 
typology emerges repeatedly in the subsequent discussion about the 
chaplaincy. 
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Next I examine the structure of the SAChS, analysing it in the 
light of my theological assumptions about ministry. I attempt to 
show that its hierarchical structure, rank, uniform, command 
influence, and in-house training for chaplains -- all elements of 
the chaplain's military status -- present problems for ministry. 
This is because they tend to drive in a wedge between the "normal" 
ministry of the church and its "special" ministry in the armed 
forces, in such a way as to erode the church's authority over its 
ministry to military personnel. The upshot of this analysis is 
that civilian status would be a better vehicle for the chaplai?'s 
ministry. However, detailed discussion of what concrete steps 
could be taken, is deferred to Chapter 4. Also deferred is 
discussion about the moral and theological implications of 
military status at a time when the cnurch questions the justice of 
a particular war. 
Finally, the question of freedom is dealt with. It is submitted 
that the reason why most chaplains, and especially the traditional 
cnaplains, claim to be completely free in the military is that 
their views are in most cases congruent with those of the 
military. This congruency emerges in several areas, 
that of military obligation, where many chaplains 
including 
draw a 
distinction be tween "religious" and 11 political 11 objectors -- a 
distinction which is as uncongenial to the churches' of which tney 
are members as it is congenial to the military. I ·argue, in other 
words, that the freedom to which the pastoral and patriotic 
chaplains lay claim is a reflection of the correspondence of their 
views on military ethics with those of the institution for which 
they work. Thereafter additional evidence is led, mainly from 
critical chaplains, which suggests that it cannot be assumed 
without further ado that the current military style of chaplaincy 
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provides a completely free environment for ministry. Again, 
discussion of the alternative t~ military chaplaincy (viz. 
ministry oy ministers with civilian status) is deferred. A common 
misconception, namely that the Geneva Conventions require 
chaplains to have full military status including uniform, is dealt 
with in Appendix B, so as not to interrupt the flow of the 
argument. 
2. SADF expectations 
Analysis of statements and writings of spokesmen of the SADF 
reveals an area of ambiguity about the role that the SADF expects 
the ~nglish-speaking chaplain to play. On the one hand, it 
appears that the SADF allows tne church complete freedom to 
minister in the military context, without making any further 
demands of tne chaplain. On the other hand, it appears that the 
chaplain is required to play the role of morale-builder in the 
unit. These assertions are now dealt with in detail. 
2.1. The "freedom to minister" perspective 
The "freedom to minister" perspective on SADF expectations of the 
chaplain is described first (1). It stresses the official 
emphasis on the independence and freedom of action of the church, 
the breadth of opportunity offered it by the SADF, and the 
assurance of SADF directives to the effect that the chaplain 
remains a priest/minister of the church (IB n.2k). 
are discussed in turn. 
These points 
(a) Official SADF documents guarantee the authority of the church 
in the area of ministry. The "SADF Order on Religion" 1/21/78 
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makes the SAChS responsible for 
"the pastoral care of members of the SADF (and dependants) 
in their own faiths and according to the doctrines, orders 
and customs of their own churches" (n.4: cf. IB n.7d). 
The , chaplain "must always remain a minister" ( IB, n. 7d), carrying 
' 
out his "high calling" in this unique field of opportunity (HB:4). 
Chaplains have the status of colonel for protocol purposes, but do 
not carry colonel's rank: in fact their rank is that of chaplain, 
and this does not confer executive powers (ef. the discussion 
about the origin of this ruling in Potgieter, 1971:230-238). They 
are addressed by their church titles, viz. "Padre", "Dominee", or 
"Pastor" (HB:4). Chaplains are in the Defence Force because of 
their calling by God to proclaim the Word and ~uild up the church 
in the SADF, according to the usages and practices of their 
denominations (HB:l,7). They have the further privilege of being 
co-ministers of the civilian congregations to which they are 
attached (HB:S). 
'(b) Official SADF documents grant the church and its chaplains 
many privileges which facilitate their spiritual work. In the 
chaplains' periods and in church and prayer parades, chaplains can 
educate the youtn in church life and practice, and discuss current 
matters affecting the church and the faith (HB:9). Chaplains may 
attend church meetings without having to apply for special leave 
(HB:l3). Since they conduct services on Sundays, they are 
entitled to take one day off per week (HB:l4). Chaplains are 
given "all possible assistance" by officers in command for the 
execution of their duties. Permanent Force chaplains are 
entitled to official transport and to pension, medical, railway, 
insurance, sport and recreation, and housing privileges (HB:l3ff). 
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Salaries of PF chaplains are determined according to their years 
of service in the church, not in the SADF (IB n.7c). In their 
capacity as officers, chaplains are subject to the Military 
Discipline Code (HB:S)~ as ministers, to the discipline of their 
churches (SADFO, n.26). The church and the SADF will deliberate 
in any disciplinary action contemplated by either of the two 
parties (SADFO, n.26). 
The official doci..unents carefully specify that there is no 
interference with church doctrine while chaplains are being 
trained. The training of chaplains deals with the place and task 
of the chaplain in the SADF and does not include theological or 
ecclesiastical training (SADFO, n.17). 
While on duty, all chaplains but part-time chaplains who are not 
officers wear uniform, but all may wear clerical dress during 
public worship, and also whe~ attending church functions where the 
wearing of uniform would be inappropriate (SADFO, n.Slf). The 
relation between the church and the SAChS is determined by 
"Agreements" ,approved by the different churches and the SADF (2). 




the churches also 
identity or 
fulfil their 
calling within the milieu of the SA Defence Force as in all 
other spheres of life" (SADFO, n.37). 
Thus the freedom and opportunity given to chaplains, and the fact 
that they remain ministers of their own churches, under the 
protection of church-SADF agreements formulated on a presumed 
basis of equality, would seem, to many, ample justification of the 
chaplain's role. 
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Statements by Chaplain-General J.A. van Zyl appear to underscore 
the above exposition of the official documents. He is recorded 
by Fr. R. Cawcutt as saying, at a November 1981 conference of 
navai chaplains, that the chaplains should preach the Gospel 
according to the policy of their churches, and be ambassadors of 
the Kingdom of Jesus Christ in the SADF in the imitation of Christ 
(1982:1). Again, van Zyl is recorded in 1983 as emphasizing that 
the chaplains are not expected to subscribe to government policy, 
but are appointed to minister to their people as servants of the 
I 
Word (CCMC, 7.3.1983:4). . ' 
2.2. Expectations of morale-building 
However, several sources suggest another interpretation of SADF 
expectations. Both politicians and SADF officials see the 
chaplain as a dispenser of "religious preparedness" for war, and 
as a link between the officer commanding and the men, without 
envisaging any conflict between these roles and the chaplain's 
normal role as minister or parish priest (3}. 
Evidence from each of these two groups is dealt with in turn, 
starting with the politicians. The evidence is marshalled at 
considerable length because this point has so frequently been 
denied by military chaplains of the English-speaking churches 
(e.g. "At no time is the chaplain expected to motivate the soldier 
to oe a soldier" (CCMC, 7.3.1983:1)). 
In response to the 1974 SACC resolution on conscientious 
obJection, wnich questioned the oasis of appointment of military 
chaplains, politicians have regularly praised the SAChS in 
parliament. Mr P.J. Badenhorst noted that military, physical and 
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spiritual preparedness were the indispensable condition of 
victory. In waging the struggle, spiritual preparedness must 
bind the church and state together; for this reason he 
congratulated the chaplains for their contribution to the war in 
the form of spiritual preparedness (Hansard, 7.5.1976:6279ff). Mr 
W.M. Sutton concurred that the chaplains had effectively wielded 
. the "mighty weapon" of faith in the spiritual preparation of 
soldiers for the struggle against the assault of communism 
(Hansard, 7.5.1976:628lff. See similar statements, Hansard 
17.4.1978:4917ff; 23.4.1979:4782; 30.4.1980:5242f; 
24.9.1981:4720). 
The Minister of Defence stated that 
"Religious preparedness is ••• of the utmost importance, and 
in this regard the Chaplains' Service is playing a 
significant role in keeping up the morale of our troops" 
(Hansard, 22.4.1982: 30l(S)). 
In 1979 Mr Kobie Coetzee, then Deputy Minister of Defence, 
addressed a Chaplains' Conference in Bloemfontein. Contemporary 
conditions demand that South Africa be "prepared", he said, and 
all facets of preparation are ultimately bound together by faith; 
thit is why ( "Juis daarom"). the doors of the SADF are open to the 
church. Mr Coetzee continued by thanking the chaplains for their 
I 
contribution in making soldiers "religiously and psychologically 
prepared" (In Hoc Signo, Oct 1979). 
To summarize, National Party politicians believe that spiritual 
preparation is as important in the struggle against communism as 
any other part of the soldier's training, and are convinced that 
the spiritual preparation offered by the chaplains is successfully 
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keeping morale high. 
Second, some of the important SADF expectations of the' chaplaincy 
may be described as follows. 
(a) The chaplain is required to be the morale-builder of the unit. 
By winning the confidence of the men, the chaplain becomes "the· 
spiritual provider, counsellor, morale builder, cultural leader, 
welfare worker, friend and father of every member of the SADF" 
(HB:8). Chaplains' periods are to be used, among othe~ things, 
to "promote esprit de corps in the SADF" (HB:9). Durihg field 
exercises, chaplains' duties embrace "assistance with welfare and 
morale" (HB:lO: cf. IB, n~7k.iv), and the officer commanding must 
"use the cnaplain as a means at his disposal for the raising of 
the morale of his troops" (HB:lO). Part-time chaplains, too, are 
responsible for "the building up of the morale of the serviceman" 
(HB:l7): among the duties of Citizen Force chaplains is "working 
very closely with the Commanding Officer of the Regiment/Commando 
to build up the morale of the unit" (HB:l9: cf. IB, n.6b.iv.2). 
Tne SADF submission to the Eloff commission asserted that if the 
cnurches were to end their identification with the SADF, the 
respect and esteem of the religious community for the SADF would 
be undermined: 
"lsou ditj die aansien van die SAW in 'n relatief sterk 
godsdienstig georienteerde gemeenskap aantas" 
(Ge tuienis: 2 3) • 
In its final report, the Eloff Commission concluded that if the 
churcnes were to bring their association with the SADF to an end, 
it "would possibly" mean that morale in the SADF would be 
"seriously undermined" (Eloff:200). 
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Statements by SADF officials confirm the views expressed in the 
official documents. Many such statements are available, and have 
shown remarkable consistency for over a decade. For instance, a 
senior SAChS official who has in the past run ~haplains' courses, 
Brig. Dr. J.F. Potgieter, wrote in his doctoral dissertation that 
the task of the chaplain is "te stig, te versterk, te verseker, te 
bemoedig, te vertroos, te inspir~er en te motiveer" 
d·ie eenheid" 
(1971:362) I 





with approval us Army injunctions that the 
and maintain in the fighting man tne moral and 
that will cause him to fight the enemy" 
At the official opening of a new course for the first-ever intake 
of National Service chaplains, the Officer Commanding of the Army 
College, Col. George Kruys, said that "in every different sphere 
of warfare -- be it the service branch, medical, logistic or 
theological there is a distinctive way of preparing for war". 
The chaplains must be "willing to roll up their sleeves, and by 
their actual participation, if circumstances call for it, give 
their men moral support" (Paratus Supplement, Feb. 1977). 
To quote a recent example, Col P. Jordaan, one of the directors of 
the Chaplains' 
chaplains that 
Service, said at a 1983 conference of Jewish 
"When the situation in the operational area is quiet as is 
the case at present, that is when-the chaplains have to work 
extra hard to keep up the morale". 
He is quoted further as saying that the aim of the chaplain was to 
provide help to the troop in his fighting capacity and in his 
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living standards (Uniform, Feb. 1983:3). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the SADF expects chaplains to 
be morale-builders. 
(b) The chaplain is required to prepare men spiritually for war. 
The uepartment of Defence "White Paper on Defence and Armament 
Production", 1973, said that the SAChS, 
"by striving to provide the necessary religious equipment 
for each soldi~r ••• is making a most important contribution 
towards the development of spiritual preparedness of the 
members of the Defence Force" (n. 172) .• 
The "White Paper" of 1977 referred similarly to tne chaplains' 
contribution to preparedness; the SAChS also features prominentiy 
in the "Wnite Paper" of 1984. The fact that the chaplains are 
referred to in these published documents on military strategy is 
significant. The spiritual preparedness they offer is seen by 
the Department of Defence as an important component in military 
success. This observation is underscored by the regular 
insistence upon this function of the chaplain in SAChS documents. 
The chaplain is reminded that the object of field exercises is "to 
prepare soldiers for war, and that everything, including the 
spiritual worK, is subject to this end" (HB:lO). In 1978 the 
Chaplains' Service Training Centre consisted, 
of a Religious Preparedness wing (SADFO, 
among other things, 
n.22e). Indeed, 
"religious preparedness forms an 
preparation in the SADF" (SADFO, n.29; 
integral part of total 
IB, n.6b.iv.2), and for 
this reason, chaplains' periods were to be presented alternately 
as church periods and religious preparedness periods (SADFO, 
n.30). One of the purposes of the SAChS is to make troops 
____ .......................................... =iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii=====iiiiiiiiii=====;.;,;--;;_-..;.-..;.;.··..;;;--;;..··..;.........;;;.;;;;;._;;~;_-;_;-=.;-=---=--=---=-----------------~-
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n.7g). The chaplain and the officer commanding must work very 
closely together "to create a good spirit in the unit" ( HB: 8 I 19) •' 
To tnis end, the chaplain must participate in field exercises by 
holding services and prayer parades, and by assisting with welfare 
and morale (IB, n.7k.iv~ SADFO, n.33). The chaplain must be 
involved in the planning of the exerci~e, attend unit order 
groups, and send a report to the Chaplain-General after every 
exercise (HB:lOff). .It is apparent that the SADF does not afford 
the chaplain this opportunity of preaching the Gospel fo~ entirely 
disinterested reasons. The SADF is confident that the chaplains' 
application of the Gospel will contribute to the country's defence 
capabilities. Thus chaplains 
"must seize tne unique opportunity offered them of 
communicating the Gospel and relating it to the lives of 
those in uniform. Tnus our youth will be equipped to do 
their duty in defence of our Country and many ~ill be 
committed to the Church and the Kingdom of God" (IB, 
n.7k.iv). 
To summarize, the SADF expects the chaplain to be the commanding 
()/..) 
officer's link with the troops and, in so doing, to promote~esprit 
de corps. 
2.3. Conclusion 
The English-speaking chaplaincy seems uncomfortably poised between 
military demands for morale-building on the one hand and firm 
assurances that the cnurch is the sole determinant of its ministry 
on the other. However, the English-speaking chaplains do not seem 
to be troubled by the morale expectations of the SADF. The 
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question arises why the English-speaking chaplains do not perceive 
these expectations to be subversive of their freedom to preach the 
Gospel as their churches understand it. Why do the 
English-speaking chaplains not perceive acute tensions between the 
"reli~ious preparedness" role that the SADF prescribes for them, 
and the freedom from state control that their churches believe is 
necessary for the preaching of the Gospel? 
It is not because these expectations are restricted to Afrikaans 
chaplains. If this were the case, the relevant docume.nts would 
not have been issued in English (e.g. documents like HB, IB, 
SADFO, etc.) While the informal pressures associated with 
nationalism are probably greater for Afrikaans chaplains, the 
formal documents make no distinction. 
sought elsewhere. 
The explanation must be 
One explanation for this apparent lack of tension lies in the 
above-cited ambiguity within the official stance on the tasks of 
the chaplaincy. The English-speaking chaplains are able to 
JUStify their role in the SADF by flatly denying that they are 
ever forced into a morale-building role and by simultaneously 
stressing the 
expectations. 
"freedom to minister" perspective on SADF 
Thus the MCSA chaplains argued in 1983 
that "at no time is the chaplain expected to motivate the soldier 
to be a soldier" (CCMC,7.3.83), and believe that misunderstandings 
regarding the task of the English-speaking chaplains are due to 
the Afrikaans title given to the chaplains' lectures, viz. 
"Godsdiensweerbaarheid" (CCMC, 
seen, Fr • R • Ca wc u t t ju s ti f i e d 
7.3.83). 
the role 
Similarly, as we have 
of Catholic military 
chaplains by quoting SADFO to the effect that the SAChS is 
responsible for the pastoral care of church members according to 
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the doctrines and usages of their own churches, and by quoting the 
I 
Chaplain-General to the effect that chaplains are ministers of 
their own churches, called to preach the Gospel according to the 
policy of those churches (1982:1). It has thus far gone 
unnoticed that these interpretations of SADF requirements of the 
chaplaincy are selective, to the extent that they ignore several 
other aspects which could oe profoundly disturbing to their 
respective churches. were they to realize that the object of 
field exercises is "to prepare soldiers for war, 1and that 
I 
I 
everything, including the spiritual work, is subJect to this end" 
(HS:lO), and that the chaplaincy's aim is "to provide the desired 
religious support to comoat operations, according to the 
requirements of the church" ( IB, n. Sa.ii), their churches might 
want to question the basis upon which the,chaplains are appointed 
to their posts. Could it be that the above-mentioned chaplains 
deliberately adopted a selective interpretation of the relevant 
SADF documents in order to justify their positions before their 
critics? 
A second possible explanation is that the chaplains might not see 
the important contribution which they themselves make to morale 
merely by adopting full military status. What they might 
understand in purely instrumental terms (e.g. by arguing that the 
I 
uniform is necessary to obtain chaplain's status in terms of the 
Geneva Convention), might better be understood in symbolic terms 
(e.g. the symbolism of uniform as representative of where the 
church really stands on the military issue in South Africa). This 
is discussed below under the heading of the authority structure of 
the SAChS. 
A third possible reason for this lack of tension is that, 
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wittingly or unwittingly, the chaplains are making a contribution 
to morale through their pastoral work, even though they might not 
use that word. By imparting to troops "a confidence through 
faitn in Christ" (cf. Stiglingh, quoted below), and by being there 
"to console and comfort" (cf. Daines, quoted below), the 
chaplains may be 
While they would 
contributing 




execution of their 
pastoral duty, others would, by viewing the chaplain's work in the 
full context of South African and Namibian history, see this as 
functional to the existence of an oppressive military machine. 
Some comments on religion in the SADF by General Constand Viljoen 
seem to confirm that chaplains are indeed successful 
morale-builders. 
Servicemen in 
Viljoen said that a census among National 
the operational area showed that their main 
motivating factor was the retention of their 
and their faith in Christian principles 
Clearly tne function of the chaplain 
freedom to worship 
(Argus ll.12.1980). 
requires careful 
investigation. As a first step in this investigation, what is 
needed is a closer inquiry into the self-perception of the 
English-speaking chaplains. No doubt they do not see themselves 
in the same light as the SADF sees them. What, then, is their own 
self-understanding? How do they see their role and task? 
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3. Self-perception of the English-speaking chaplains 
Over the past decade the English-speaking churches have undergone 
profound changes in their understanding of social justice, the 
place of the military in South Africa, and conscientious 
objection. This has in turn led to changing perceptions of the 
role of the chaplain. Many chaplains have themselves arrived at 
new insights about their place and task. This mutation of 
attitudes makes characterization of the self-understandinJ of the 
English-speaking chaplains a perilous undertaking. 
The researcher is faced with further difficulties, like 





let alone a researcher publicly associated with conscientious 
obJection: unavailability of material internal to the SAChS: and 
perhaps fear on the part of some chaplains that such 
investigations might jeopardize their position. Denominational 
and age differences: varying levels of 'political awareness: and 
the perpetually indefinable nature of hlllilan behaviour render any 
typology or generalized description of the chaplains inaccurate to 
a certain extent. Therefore, the following attempted 
characterization is tentative and subject to correction. 
I shall propose a differentiation between three types of chaplain: 
the "pastoral chaplain", the "patriotic chaplain" and the 
"critical chaplain". This does not imply that every chaplain 
falls precisely into one or other category, nor that this is the 
only possible typology. It suggests that, by and large, most 
chaplains would feel a strong resonance with one of these types, 
and possibly that many would feel that their attitudes are 
described with reasonable accuracy by one of them. In otner 
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words, this discussion makes use of the Weberian methodology of 
the "ideal type", which formulates a typology by identifying the 
significant features of its types, but without asserting that 
these are empirical averages (Weber, 1976:71, 200 n.28). 
It is worth noting that the patriotic chaplains are more strongly 
represented among the Permanent Force chaplains, while the 
critical chaplains are more strongly represented among the 
National Service and Citizen Force cha pl a ins. 
! . . 
.The patr1ot1c 
chaplains tend, by'and large, to adhere to the SADF pointfof view 
I 
regarding South African society and the function of ~eligion, 
while the critical chaplains tend to be uneasy with these and 
other military-related values. That this is so could have been 
anticipated, since Permanent Force chaplains have adopted ministry 
to military personnel as a career, and hence are more likely to 
feel at home in th& military enviionruent: while National Service 
and Citizen Fore~ chaplains are no exception to the rule that 
civilian conscripts are prone to feeling a sense of compulsion 
about having to oe in the military environment. Discussion about 
the chaplains' self-perception will arise throughout the course of 
this chapter, but especially in the final section about the 
freedom of tne chaplaincy and the process of "self-selection". 
3.1. Pastoral chaplains 
The pastoral chaplains regard themselves primarily as servants of 
their own churcnes. They insist that their concern is to 
minister in the military context, not out of any militaristic 
motive, but only because there are members of their churches in 
the armed forces: whatever view the church may adopt regarding the 
morality of war, it nevertheless has to reckon with the reality of 
j 
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war, with the fact of conscription, and by deduction, with the 
necessity of military chaplaincy. Mo st of its members in the 
armed forces are there< by compulsion, and the church is ooliged to 
minister to them (cf. letter from Rev. D. Hart, Seek (Nov. 1982). 
Therefore the chaplains' central task is pastoral care for their 
parishioners in the armed forces (so e.g. Hymer, Wittstock, 
Erasmus}.' This includes administration of the sacraments, leading 
men to a deeper experience of Christ, and providing counseling, 
encouragement ahd inspiration (cf. letters from Fr. Johan: Strydom, 
' 
Uniform (March/April 1983):7, Southern Cross (25.12.1983):6). 
Much of the chaplain's time is consumed by basic mission work, 
because many soldiers are nominal members of their churches only. 
The chaplains' task would oe easier if local parishes did a better 
job of equipping their young men spiritually (Daines, 1983a:2). 
The pastoral chaplains believe that the church should provide 
"effective ministry" or "maximum ministry" to all as an integral 
part of its total mission (Daines, l983a:l~ Permanent Force 
Chaplains' Statement, n.9)~ 
The universality of the mission of the church implies two things: 
first, that the church must do everything possible to minister to 
people on both sides of the conflict. In most wars in the 
western world Christian is likely to be pitted against cnristian~ 
if the church is to fulfil its role as a proclaimer of the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ, it must exercise the same responsioility to both 
sides (Daines, 1983a:l). Moralistic withdrawal of ministry from 
either siae would be tantamount to negation of the Great 
Commission of Jesus found in Mt. 28:19. However, the argument 
cuts two ways. The universality of the church's mission implies, 
in the second place, that membership of the armed forces, together 
with uniform and officer status, is a precondition for effective 
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ministry. The uniform is important for influence on senior 
military personnel. Officers generally talk freely to officers 
but not to members of other ranks (Anderson). A civilian would 
be seen as a visitor, or could simply be disregarded by the 
ofticer commanding (WittstocK). Furthermore, full membership of 
the armed forces is necessary for the sake of availability for 
service: in order to be able to approach all officers and men: to 
save the church from an impossibly large financial burden: for the 
sake of freedom of movement, which in turn necessitates security 
clearance: and for better identification with the service and the 
men, and closer integration into the life of the unit (Permanent 
Force Chaplains' Statement:2: see the detailed discussion' below). 
Finally, the First Geneva Convention (Article 24) makes no 
provision for the protection of chaplains unless officially and 
regularly appointed by the military authorities. To be able to 
offer maximum ministry to all its members, the church has to abide 
by the reasonable conditions laid down by those organizations open 
to its ministry: in the armed forces this means acceptance of full 
memoership and uniform. 
To submit to the reasonable conditions set by the armed forces 
does not, in tne opinion of the pastoral chaplains, imply craven 
suomission to its ideology. Two Permanent Force cha pl a ins, Rev. 
J. Voegel and Rev. E. Hymer, chose not to use any weapon at all, 
which for them signified a reluctance to be fully identified with 
the aims and methods of the military. The pastoral chaplains 
believe that they are not expected to motivate the soldier to be a 
soldier (CCMC, 7.3.83). The English Language Commission has 
provided a set of lecture notes, but these are only a guide. 
There is a prescribed syllabus, but the chaplains have a free hand 
to construct their own (so, e.g., Lawrie). Their first call is 
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to be servants of their churches, who preserve the identity of 
their churches in the SADF (Daines, 1982:2). They are aware of 
the pitfall of becoming spokesmen for the values of a particular 
culture and are thankful for the conscientious objectors and 
others who remind them of these dangers (Daines, 1983b:8). The 
pastoral chaplains believe that they are completely free to 
expound the teaching of their own churches (so, e.g., Hymer, 
Clack, Lawrie, Royston). They are neither instructed what to 
preach nor discouraged from giving proper emphasis f to any 
Scriptural truth. In fact, they are freer than they wo~ld be in 
I 
some churches, which prescribe the line to be adopted on 9octrines 
like the Second Corning (Stiglingh). It would be contrary to the 
SADF's own cornmi~ent to religious freedom to prescribe to 
chaplains what to say -- indeed, the SADF is fighting cornmrnunism 
in order to preserve, for all South Africa's citizens, the very 
religious freedom that it grants its chaplains. Therefore, the 
pastoral chaplains believe that the SADF does not require 
chaplains to be "morale officers". 
3.2. Patriotic chaplains 
Nevertheless, one senior chaplain, Rev. c. Stiglingh, ar~ued that 
there is no doubt that chaplains are one of several factors which 
do contribute to morale, in the following way. They lead men to 
faith and trust in Christ and then teach them to exercise that 
faith in adverse circumstances. The troops in turn look upon the 
cnaplains as men of God who can oe a source of encouragement to 
them in the intangible things of life. Chaplains can share with 
them in their uncertainties, fears and frustrations and impart to 
them a confidence through faith in Christ (Stiglingh). Spiritual 
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well-being and hence high morale are, in a sense, inevitable 
results of the preaching of the Gospel. ~If a man is a 
committed, practising Christian, he will be better prepared to 
meet his Maker, and make sacrifices for his fellows (give his life 
for them if necessary) than will the uncommitted and the 
unbeliever. This is the preparedness which every priest must 
strive for among his people The chaplain must be there before 
the men go into action, whilst they are lying wounded or dying and 
when/if they return alive from battle. be 
there to console and comfort ••• " 
The chaplain jmust 
(Daines, 1982:3). The 







levelled at any civilian ministers or priests who nave ~roops in 
their congregations (Daines, 1982:4). 
The patriotic chaplains do not condone Nationalist ideology, but 
at the same time "we cannot however ignore the influence of 
Communism hor its imperialistic designs" (Daines, 1982:6). One 
chaplain expressed his admittedly rather extreme view in this way: 
"The next point which needs clearing up is that "liberation" 
is two very different things: l) It is a beautiful theory, 
And 2) When applied in practice in a sinful world, it always 
goes viciously wrong. Let us accordingly ask very 
carefully, "What does the fire look like, BEFORE we jump out 
of the frying pan?" 
"I recently had the privilege of touring the operational 
area in s.W.A./Namibia, and saw at close quarters what 
"liberation" really looks like. It does people good to 
come down out of the Ivory Towers of Pure Tneory, and see 
the Flesh at worK. To me, "liberation" stinks of fear (did 
you know that fear can be smelt?), blood, rotting flesh, 
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faeces and stale urine, sometimes mixed with the acrid smell 
of TNT, and the musical jangle of spent AK47 cartridges. 
And the vast majority of the victims are black. The only 
"liberation" here is 
"all-the-way-to-the-Pearly-Gates-in-one-bang". Just 
remember. too that it was a "liberation" regime that killed 
Arcnbishop Luwun. Even Hitler's Nazi party was a 
"liberation" regime, wresting power in order to "free" the 
German people from their 
reparations. 
bondage to crippling war 
"Remember too that although this country has its Crossroads 
and its Robben Island, most of the "liberated" countries ARE 
Crossroads and Robben Islands. -Mo st of them had to be 
"liberated" to discover what true oppression, poverty, and 
nopelessness really are. There is an ancient Chinese 
curse which says quite simply, "May you have an interesting 
day today". I believe it can very accurately be updated to 
a modern African curse which says equally simply, "May you 
live to see liberation". 
"I am not trying to defend Apartheid and all that goes with 
it, but we would be irresponsible to refuse to admit that 
there are worse things. 
especially for Blacks. 
And liberation is one of them --
I could never fight a war to "maintain white supremacy in an 
oppressionist society", but I have no difficulties about a 
war to keep "liberation" out of this country. Such a war, 
I believe, is just. In refusing to fight in such a war, 
are you not in fact aiding the advancement of "liberation"?" 
(Letter from Rev. s. Middlemost to P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979) 
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The patriotic cnaplains generally prefer to designate the enemy as 
"terrorists" rather than as "guerrillas" because of what they 
believe to be overwhelming evidence snowing that the strategy of 
the latter is to terrorize and cow the local population (cf. 
Daines, 1982:4: Middlemost, Letter to P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979). They 
are aware of the church's role as "reconciler of man with man and 
man with God", and as the "conscience of both sides of the 
conflict" (Daines, 1983a:l). They believe that the role of the 
' 
cnaplain includes preaching on social I justice, that plenty of 
' 
opportunity is provided for this, and that the present 
English-speaking chaplains perceive this as an obligation 
I . 
about the evils of 
' 
( ca WC U t t t l 9 8 2: l 1 2 ) • Thus they are concerned 
apartheid. However, the patriotic chaplains see no causal. 
relationship between the war in which the SADF is involved and 
black nationalist reaction to apartheid. Brief examination of 
the geopolitical realities of southern Africa would dispel, they 
believe, any notion that the SADF is protecting sectional white 
privilege. Tne war is essentially a war of defence against 
external aggression. The prime cause of the war, in their 
opinion, is Soviet expansionism. The Soviets have repeatedly 
declared their objective of world domination and tneir opposition 
to all forms of religion. Their underwriting of nationalist 
causes in tne southern tip of Africa is the clearest evidence of 
their imperialistic designs on the region, which are aimed 
ultimately at the Cape sea route and South Africa's mineral 
riches. Therefore the USSR and its surrogates Cuba, East Germany 
. .. 
and Czechoslovakia give weaponry, finance and troop support to 
nationalist movements which, unaided, would be unable to survive. 
Thus the patriotic chaplains are in broad agreement with the 
. I 
overall aims of ·the Defence Force: South Africa's territorial 
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integrity must be maintained, the advance of communism through 
Soviet-sponsored terrorism must be contained, and in this way the 
existence of civilization and the church will be guaranteed. 
The patriotic chaplains point out that the SADF is not only 
preserving peace, which is the precondition for meaningful change, 
but is itself opposed to apartheid. The SADF has progressed 
further in deracialization than most other government departments, 
and indeed a good deal further than many churches, even some 
English-speaking churches. On the border black and w~ite are 
I 
fighting together against the communist menace. 
I - . Ofticers' 
I 
salaries are the same across the races (Middlemost). :All that 
I 
I 
remains to De done is racial equalization of salaries in ~he lower 
ranks -- but that is dependent on the vagaries of the Public 
Service Commission, not the SADF (Grundy, 1983:194: Letter from 
MaJ. -Gen. A.P. Roux to P.G. Moll, 30.4.1984). One cnaplain 
argued, 
"there is virtually no evidence of apartheid in the SADF. 
We have officers and NCO's who are black and coloured who 
have exactly the same privileges as we have: they eat at the 
same mess: they stay at the same officers' clubs: there is 
no distinction" (Stiglingh). 
Therefore they feel that it would be quite wrong to say that 
chaplains place a moratorium on their churcnes' social JUStice 
efforts. In reality the chaplains are pursuing their cnurcnes' 
struggle against aparcheid. 
Nevertheless the patriotic chaplains believe that they were not 
called by God to be politicians. They regard themselves as 
preachers of the Gospel of Christ and are not ashamed that this is 
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their primary duty. The SADF has provided the church with 
wonderful opportunities of evangelism. When young men are on the 
border, they are understandably . apprehensive and there many of 
them start to take spiritual matters seriously for the first time. 
"This field of labour in the SADF has very little to equal it for __ 
reaching out for the Salvation of souls" (Stiglingh~ similarly 
Erasmus).· Any limitation of the chaplains' contact with the 
troops would have grave consequences for the church's ministry. 
Both parents and troops would feel strongly that the c
1
hurch had 
1 d h h · h h b · d. I · · d neg ecte them, or t at t eir c urc was eing iscr1m1nate 
I 
against by its having less contact with its members (Permanent 
Force Chaplains' Statement:l,2). They warn that disparag~ment of 
this ministry could lead to its destruction, which wouid in the 
end be flagrant disregard of the Great Commission. 
3.3. Critical chaplains 
The critical chaplains adopt a rather more critical view of the' 
tneology of tne SAChS, and of the political role played by the 
SADF. Their critical theological and political orientation finds 
expression in a distinct set of attitudes about the theology of 
warfare, the role of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia, the use 
of uniform and other symbols of soldiery, and the task of the 
chaplain, which differs marKedly from the set of attitudes of the 
patriotic chaplains. 
The critical chaplains are wary of the identification of the 
church with the institutions of war. For some, the instinctive 
sense that the church is the representative of the Prince of Peace 
and has oeen placed in the world to witness to God's salvation 
which overcomes sin and death, is enough to make them uneasy about 
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their visible identification with the SADF. Some have taken the 
further step of investigating the theology of pacifism (e.g. by 
reading the works of J.H. Yoder (1970,1971 and 1972)) and 
embracing aspects of it. To register their apprehension about the 
taking of life, several critical chaplains are non-combatants. 
For instance, one of the first National Service chaplains took a 
firmly principled but by no means easy stand against using a 
rifle, and still has difficulty seeing how anyone could undergo 
training to make killing seem normal (BotSis). 
The critical chaplains adopt a more critical position than do the 
. . . . h . . . di l f patriotic chaplains wit respect to the government i eo ogy o 
total strategy and the communist menace. They do not deny a 
communist presence within the ANC and SWAPO, but feel that, in the 
main, these are nati~nalist mo~ernents with fairly widespread 
support in South Africa and Namibia respectively. They are aware 
that the larger churches in Namibia support SWAPO. They tend to 
agree with the catholic Bishops' opinion that Namibian, 
international and UN censure of South Africa's illegal occupation 
of Namioia could mean that SWAPO will one day govern the 
territory. One chaplain recalled an embarrassing, but in the end 
deeply touching, encounter with an ovambo Anglican minister who 
questioned whether the chaplain could really be a minister of God 
if he had on the uniform of an army which had no moral right to be 
in Namioia (Botsis). Regarding South Africa, the critical 
chaplains feel that constitutional methods are much the better way 
of bringing about change, but several of them believe that the 
government has restricted the available avenues of such change to 
the point where it is difficult or even hypocritical to expect 
blacks to abide by those alone. Hence some critical chaplains 
believe that the SADF is to a certain extent the instrument of the 
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Government to forestall cha~~e. 
Tnese beliefs about the extent of support for the ANC and SWAPO, 
and about. the dishonourable uses to which the SADF is being put, 
are held with differing intensity by the critical chaplains.· For 
some critical chaplains, th~se beliefs amount to little more than 
a suspicion, and make little impact upon their preaching bbt for 
an occasional remark about mutual respect among raceso For 
other chaplains, these beliefs call into question their own status 
as soldiers (Dixon, Brews, West, Mitchell). They are 
uncomfortable ,with tne uniform, offi~er status, and, in the case 
of ~ational Service chaplains, with lieutenant's rank; they wonder 
whether their reception of military pay would be a stumbling-block 
to black Christians; they are inclined to point, out to troops 
their rn~strust of the objectives 6£ the S~DF. Some critical 
chaplains are sharply critical of the Permanent Force chaplains' 
,p~nchant for uniform and military status (Hart, Lawrie, Laxton, 
Rqyston)~ Some critical chaplains are so struck by the hollowness 
of the total strategy doctrine that tn/y feel their ministry would 
.\ 
be gravely compromised in its current ~ilitary form. Therefore 
they prefer to minister in the ·1ocal parish context where the 
probability of corruption of their own ministry is smaller. Thus, 
although there are differences of belief within the group 
designated as critical chaplains, there is a basic similarity 
which revolves around their rejection of identification with the 
attitudes and perceptions of the SADF. Am?ng the critical 
chaplains interviewed were: Botsis, Hart, Mitchel],, Brews, West, 
Veldhuysen, Long, Retie f, · Hovers, · Fahey, Maree, and Attwell. 
What impact have these critical perceptions made upon the work of 
-the critical· chaplains? As pointed.out above, some have decided 
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to be non-combatants. Others have been reluctant to use the 
uniform, and this has led to disagreements with the SAChS. For 
instance, one chaplain attended a camp in clerical dress, and 
another wrote to the Chaplain-General stating that he was no 
longer able to don the uniform (Mitchell, West). Some critical 
chaplains find themselves in an extremely difficult situation. 
They can see good reasons of principle to diminish their 
identification with the SADF, but fear that a generalised effort 
l 
b · · 
1 ·d d b e1ng prov1 e y 
I 
to do so could result in even ministry less 
. I h Since t ere are 
I 
English-speaking ministers present. than at 
Christians on the border who do not see a chaplain of their own 
church for eight to nine months, and since these Christians are 
there because they have to be, 
"It is disgraceful that part of the People of God ••• in a 
situation of ethical conflict and political pressure must 
then hear that the Body of Christ is calling for a 
withdrawal of their ministers. We face the harsh judgment 
of Mt. 25:31-46" (Letter from D. Hart, Seek, Nov. 1982). 
Nevertheless a few- critical chaplains have left the ·service: the 
position that these latter have adopted differs little from that 
of the selective conscientious objector. For instance, one 
chaplain felt that the Council of Churches of Namibia was correct 
in refusing to send ministers to military bases as chaplains, and 
instead inviting soldiers to attend local churches in the 
territory. Being in agreement with the Council that SADF bases 
constitute an illegal presence in Namibia, he refused to go to the 
Walvis Bay base (Brews). 
Some chaplains point out that rank and uniform are not really 
necessary for ministry in the military. They recognize that rank 
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and uniform give the chaplains added influence and status, and to 
that extent make their job easier. However, they are conscious 
of the "deep caesura" between commissioned officers and others in 
most armies, and hence of the psychological barrier that officer 
status places between the chaplains and the men. Some critical 
chaplains believe that.their most effective times of ministry are 
at night when they are able to mix freely with the men, dressed in 
jeans and T-shirt. One of them pointed out that one does not 
need to be an alcoholic to minister to alcoholics, nor a I jailbird 
I 
to minister to prisoners: far from being a precon~ition for 
I 
effective ministry, the uniform can sometimes inhibit it 1< Hart). 
I 
The critical chaplains tend to be more critical than the patriotic 
and pastoral chaplains of the SADF expectations of the chaplain as 
motivator. Religious preparedness, to them, is a confusing and 
mistaken concept, since it appears to rest on the assumption that 
there is a "total onslaught" directed against the RSA by the 
communist world with its allies and dupes. They have difficulty 
seeing how one can be religiously prepared for war -- especially a 
war whose purposes the church questions -- for this seems to 
instrt.nnentalize religion for military purposes and to make God the 
servant of nationalistic aspirations (Laxton: cf. also Laxton's 
letter to SA outlook, August 1984). 
4. Structure of the SAChS 
The SAChS is presently structured along the following hierarcnical 
lines. At its head is the Chaplain-General, who is directly 
responsible to the Chief of the SADF. He carries the rank of 
MaJor-General, and is chosen from one of the Afrikaans churches. 
Responsible to him are the Assistant Chaplains-General of the 
-' 
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Army, Navy, Air Force and Medics, as well as several other staff 
personnel, e.g. Directors of Operations, Logistics and Finance, as 
of 1978 (IB, n.4). Under the Assistant Chaplains-General are 
command chaplains: under these are unit chaplains, to whom other 
Permanent Force chaplains, and also part-time chaplains, and 
National Service chaplains are responsible. The Chaplain-General, 
Assistant Chaplains-General and Directors all carry rank, from 
colonel to Major-General, and are addressed by means of it. They 
are not pastors so much as administrators. Other Permanent Force 
chaplains and Citizen Force chaplains ~arry the "unique" !rank of 
; 
chaplain (HB:6), but are the equivalent of colonels for: protocol 
purposes (HB:4). Part-time chaplains have no rank since they 
remain civilians. National Service chaplains are two-pip 
lieutenants. 
From the theological point of view, these details' of the SAChS 
structure are not as important as the deeper issue of church 
identification with military structures. However, as they are 
symbolic of the deeper issue, I now discuss the chaplaincy 
structure under the following heads: choice of administrators, 
command influence, rank, and uniform. In each case I pose the 
question: What are the implications of the theological principles 
outlined in Chapter 2 for this aspect of the authority structure? 
In each case I show that the church faces difficult moral 
dilemmas, which together suggest that non-uniformed or 
church-based ministry might be a better option. At the outset, 
though, it is worth mentioning the proolem that if the doctrine of 
the priesthood of all believers is taken to its logical 
conclusion, then it would seem inconsistent for a minister to 
refuse to do what parishioners do (viz. accept military status). 
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If something is wrong for one Christian is it not wrong for all? 
On one level this is quite true. All the dilemmas which emerge 
in the following pages apply to any ranking officer who exercises 
ministry. On the other hand these dilemmas can perhaps be said 
to apply most forcefully to ministers of the churches, because the 
latter (i) are specially set aside for the task of ministry; (ii) 
receive a salary in order to perform this ministry; (iii) are 
therefore special representatives of the church in a way in which 
parishioners are not (although it can be argued tlhat this 
difference is one of degree, and not absolute); land (iv) 
therefore, the church may most speedily change its compJexion by 
I 
I 
having its ministers change, which in turn can act as an example 
to parishioners who experience the same moral dilemmas with 
ministry on account of possessing military status. With this 
qualification in mind, let us turn to examining the chaplaincy 
structure in detail. 
4.1. Choice of administrators 
First, the church's involvement in the process of selecting the 
hierarchy is conspicuous by its absence. Nowhere in tne 
available publications (IB, HB, Agreement) is reference made to 
church nomination or appointment of the Chaplain-General or other 
staff officers. Presumably they are appointed by more senior 
Defence Force officers. This is a matter of concern because the 
Chaplain-General has a certain amount of influence over most 
chaplains~ "~11 matters concerning chaplaincy or church affairs 
are the concern of the Chaplain-General and must be referred to 
nim" (HB:6). The SAChS is "commanded" by him (HB:6;SADFO, 
n. 22a) • "Under the command and direction of the Chaplain-General 
j 
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the Chaplains Service is solely responsible for all 
ecclesiastical and religious matters in the SADF" (SADFO, n.S). 
The Assistant Chaplains-General are directly responsible to him 
(I.a, n.6a). It is his duty to hold meetings to gather information 
and discuss results and problem areas (IB, n.6a). 
However, ministry is entrusted by Christ to'the church as a whole~ 
it should oe done representatively. Senior administrators of the 
church's ministry should be selected by regularly appoin~ed church 
1 
bodies, whose task is to discern the Holy Spirit's g:i;fts which 
· 1 · ·t l ff' · · I · l entit e a person to spiri ua o ice. This is essentia to 
prevent the intrusion of alien or inimical values into the 
I 
selection process. For instance, military aptitudes and 
attributes, obeisant attitudes to military authority, and the 
"right" political views should not become factors in the choice of 
the leadership of the church. To have the military appoint 
chaplains to leadership positions is an instance where the "ius 
circa sacra" has become a "ius in sacra", which could easily 
degenerate into an attempt by the state to shape the chu~ch's will 
and rule its inner life. An analogy might be made between the 
"Reicnsoischof" at the time of the Third Reich, and the 
Chaplain-General of the SAChS. Like the Chaplain-General, the 
Reichsbischof was appointed by the state~ the danger then existed 
that the state would use this power of appointment to control the 
church. This is not to assert that the political situation in 
South Africa is the same as that in Nazi Germany, or that the 
church-state situation in South Africa bears direct comparison 
with that of Hitler's time. For one thing, the South African 
government considers itself to be Christian, while National 
Socialist ideology was essentially opposed to Christianity. 
However, the similarity lies in the power of the state to appoint 
j 
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church officials. In this regard it is of significance that the 
Barmen Declaration rejected this form of state control: 
"The various offices in the Church do not establish a 
dominion of some over the others~ on the contrary, they are 
for the exercise of the ministry entrusted to and enjoined 
upon the whole congregation. We reject tne false 
doctr~ne, as though the Church, apart from this ministry, 
could and were permitted to give to itself, or allow to be 
! 
given to it, special leaders vested with ruling powers" 
(documented in Ecunews (April 1984):21). 
Admittedly, the CPSA "Agreement" does say that the Liaison Bishop 
and the Principal Chaplain must be consulted, and the approval rof 
the Diocesan Bishop obtained, before CPSA chaplains are appointed 
to administrative posts (cf. also IB n.4c). On its own, however, 
this assurance is inadequate, because other churches have no say 
in CPSA a ppoin tmen ts. The Defence Force may, if it chooses, 
"divide and rule" the churches by making strategic appointments 
wnich other churches have no right to veto (4). For instance, it 
might elevate to a very high position a man whose church is 
numerically insig ni f ican t, but whose "loyalty" to the SADF can 
always be relied on. 
Anotner difficulty with the present structure is the dominance of 
ministers of the Afrikaans churches. For two decades, tne most 
senior position in the chaplaincy has been occupied by a minister 
of one of tne Afrikaans churches. Apart from the fact that tnis 
is not an ecumenical gesture, this situation is serious at a time 
when several of the English-speaking churches deem the theological 
JUStification of apartheid to be a heresy. How is it possible to 
have one's own ministers under the authority of a minister of a 
J 
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church which adheres to a heretical theology? This is not only a 
problem with respect to the position of the Chaplain-General. 
Nearly all the area, unit and formation chaplains are ministers of 
tne Afrikaans churches, because of the large n tnn be rs of the 
latter. Hence nearly all the English-speaking chaplains report 
directly to one of these chaplains, who in turn report to more 
senior people in the SAChS. (Rev. J. voegel mentioned that he 
had to write regular reports on his work for the Wynberg Command 
Chap~ain, despite the fact that he was Principal CPSA bhaplain. 
Similarly, Fr. B. Royston said he had to write reports elery six 
I 
months for his superior). It might thus be argued that the· SAChS 
represents an erosion of the church's authority over I its own 
ministry. 
4.2. Command influence 
Second, the chaplaincy should be free of all command influence. 
This is because authority in the Body of Christ is not the same as 
I 
authority in the world. In fact, authority in the Body of Christ 
takes the form of servanthood. However, the current chaplaincy 
structure is not free of command influence. The first way in 
which this occurs is through military appointment of the SAChS 
administrators. The second way is through reporting 
relationships of chaplains to line officers, of which the most 
prominent is that of the Chaplain-General to the Chief of the 
SADF. Every chaplain is responsible simultaneously to both SAChS 
and line officer superiors (5). For example, command chaplains 
are "accountable to" the Assistant Chaplains-General and to the 
Officer Commanding of the relevant command (IB, n.7b). The unit 
chaplain is "responsible to the Unit Commander for the effective 
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functioning of the religious and ecclesiastical activities in the 
unit" (IB, n. 7c). 
However, the chaplains should be responsible solely to the church 
for the ministry they offer. It is granted that for certain 
purely administrative purposes the chaplain might be responsible 
to the Officer Commanding. However, the jurisdiction of officers 
commanding seems to go well beyond this, e.g. the officer 
commanding must "use the chaplain as a means at nis dis~osal for 
the raising of the morale of his troops" (HB:lO). ChaplLins are 
expected to "work very closely" (HB:l9) with officers coLmanding, 
and to "create an unshakeable unity" with them (HB:B). On the 
face of it, command influence seems to be considerable •. At the 
Pretoria Detention Barracks in 1980, a Permanent Force chaplain 
was severely taken to task by the officer commanding, MaJor Krige, 
for having had a conversation with the author. Later in the year, 
a National Service chaplain was given the same treatment by the 
major and one Staff-Sergeant Erasmus, for the same offence, if 
"offence" is the word. In the available publications, the 
relationship of church and military responsioility is cursorily 
treated. It is assumed, in selecting the appropriate channel, 
that "Defence Force matters" are distinguisnaole from "matters 
concerning the cnurch" (SADFO, n.27). No explanation is given as 
to how this distinction is made. Elsewhere this distinction is 
made in terms of "profession", referring to the SAChS chain of 
command, and "function", referring to the line officer hierarchy 
(IB, n.4e). Again, it is difficult to see how this can be of any 
use because it is so ill-defined. The same problem arises with 
respect to ~iscipline. Theoretically the chaplain is subJect 
both to ecclesiastical discipline, "which the Defence force 
honours", and to military discipline, with which the church agrees 
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not to interfere (IB, n.7f). Military discipline is maintained 
by line officers (IB, n.7g) in terms of the Military Discipline 
Code. By what rule does one distinguish between a military and 
\ 
an ecclesiastical breach of discipline? Which takes precedence 
if it is both? The available sources are of little help. This, 
precisely, is the rub. The churches have contracted into a 
system in which their ministers' lines of responsibility are not 
clear and disciplinary channels not defined. It appears that the 
military has considerable influence over the chaplaincy, ·which 





already suggests that a "ius in sacra" is to tne 
exists 
that they could be aoused by the military. 
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4.3. Rank 
Third, there is the question of the use of rank. Th is occurs in. 
four ways: (a) all but part-time chaplains are commissioned 
officers: (b) National Service chaplains are two-pip lieutenants: 
(c) the SAChS hierarchy carry military rank (colonel to 
major-general): and (d) Permanent Force and Citizen Force 
chaplains are deemed to have the rank of colonel for protocol 
purposes. 
Rank implies a hierarchy of status within the institutio~ which is 
sustained by ritual and social distance. Van den Aardweg, a 
senior SADF chaplain, explains how the process of ritual and 
social distance upholds military status: 
"The clicked heel, salute, formal courtesy calls by new 
officers upon the commanding officer, the standing to 
attention when addressed by an officer, all are ceremonial 
scaffolding holding up the .status hierarchy of rank. These 
I 
rituals and actual physical separation between officers and 
men help maintain the clearly defined social 
distance ••• " (1971:107). 
The hierarchy of rank, he argues, 
"exerts an all-pervasive influence on military society. It 
is an established system of stratification with respect to 
power, authority, status and privilege ••• Because of the 
stratification which exists there is a hiatus between the 
statuses of enlisted persons and officers" (1971:112,113). 
(6) 
Stated baldly, the theological proolem which the chaplain faces is 
J 
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that "power, authority, status and privilege" are values which run 
\ 
counter to those espoused by the church as the "alternative 
society" • If the chaplain were to adopt officer status, this 
would, outwardly at least, not tend to convey the theological 
I 
value of servanthood within the Body of Christ. Ra the r i t wo ul d 
seem that discordant relationships of authority were being 
imported into the ministry of the church. The form and existence 
of the church could, in this case, convey their own message about 
the church's conformity with the military as an institution. More 
I 
' 
than this, the very notion of hierarchy within the churc~ might be 
questioned. The Lutheran, Re formed, Congregational and Baptist 
traditions all reject the notion of a permanent hierarchy (while 
allowing for an efficient system of administration). As has been 
pointed out in Chapter 2, it is becoming increasingly accepted, 
even in Catholic circles, that since the heart of ministry is 
servanthood, the offices of priest and bishop involve collegiality 
not lordship (cf. Kueng, 1978:418). The Dutch Reformed writer 
Meyer argues, 
I 
"There is no hierarchy of offices in the Bible. Therefore 
to have a Chaplain-General at the head of the Chaplains' 
Corps is surely a situation devoid of both biblical and 
canonical justification. Clearly we have here a 
confrontation between two worlds: the military with its 
disciplines and the church" (1979:43; my translation). 
A sort of hierarchy is implicit in the fact that Permanent Force 
chaplains have the (protocol) rank of colonel, but ;National 
Service chaplains the rank of two-pip lieutenant. On e a r g urn en t 
for this arrangement is that National Service chaplains cannot be 
raised above other National Servicemen simply because they are 
J 
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ministers~ apparently there is already some resentment at the fact 
that the chaplains' orientation course is much shorter than the 
regular officer's course for National Servicemen (Laxton). 
However, the effects of this arrangement (which was hastily 
introduced in 1977 with the extension of the period of military 
service) are to put some chaplains in an inferior position 
compared with others. One chaplain pointed out that 
"when you are a Lieutenant it is difficult to say you are 
I 
first a man of God and second an officer. You have ~o go 
through the channels. · Whereas the chaplain's triangle 
gives you freedom of access" (Wittstock). 
One National Service chaplain mentioned that a Permanent Force 
chaplain had used the prerogative of rank to tell him what to do~ 
but noted that in practice chaplain's rank doesn't mean very much 
"A chaplain may be in a pub, and if a major walks in the men 
stand to attention", whereas by rights the major should ask the 
chaplain for permission to join the group (Veldhuysen). 
' 
It emerges, then, that officer's rank can create superibr status 
as well as inferior status, both of which can interfere with the 
process of ministry. Incidentally, it was to avoid precisely 
these problems associated with inferior rank that South African 
chaplains were permitted to dispense with signs of rank during 
world war I I: 
"This arrangement was made to protect the chaplain, in view 
of his lower rank and consequent subjection to senior 
officers, and to place him in a position to move freely and 
on the same level as people of all ranks, including his 
inferiors, who otherwise would have been reticent towards 
j 
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him" {Potgieter, 1971:221: my translation). 
The problem of rank should not be viewed in black and white. The 
same sort of dilemma is faced by the church in other institutions. 
For instance, members of a theological faculty at a university --
who play a significant part in training ministers and thus 
influencing the pattern of the church's future ministry -- are 
awarded promotions by the university councii. Promotions may be 
awarded for academic prestige, innovative thought, or service to 
the university -- none of which are necessarily identical to the 
church's discernment of the gifts that entitle one to minister. 
Extreme situations might even be imagined where the church would 
feel that a university promotion system had become a "ius in 
sacra" by subtly attempting to shape its ministry by selective 
promotion: the intimate association of church and state in 
Rumania, for example, could lead to such a position. On the 
other hand, there are advantages to be gained from 
university-based theological training: only a careful examination 
of the academic ethos, its effect on professors, the attitudes of 
professors and students to academic status differentiation, and 
the influence of all this on the church's ministry could reveal 
whether, on balance, the church could have a compact of this kind 
without compromising its sovereign control over its ministry. 
The problem is wider than the church's agreed relationships with 
specific institutions. This was shown by Pope's researcn into 
the unedifying case in Gaston County where financial leverage was 
exercised over ministers {Pope, 1942), and by Cochrane's research 
which showed that the social witness of the Anglican and Methodist 
churches in the early twentieth century was beholden to interest 
groups of capitalists {1983:326f). Within the local parish, 
powerful ·influences can be brought to oear which could harm tne 
J 
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church's witness. An example is the erstwhile racially 
differentiated salary system of some of the English-speaking 
churches in South Africa. One thing, at least, is clear: ministry 
is always vulnerable and subject to corruption (Langford, 
1979:39), because there is always contention between the church 
and the controlling orders of life (~angford, 1979:32). The 
question is how the church responds to challenges to its 
understanding of the Gospel. With this in mind, we return to 
consider some other problematic aspects of rank. 
The system of rank can be protected by coercion if need oe. In 
an extreme case an officer may use a weapon to restore the· 
authority of his or her rank. Much more common than this unlikely 
event is the resort to litigation or "press-ups", et6. Instances 
in which the chaplains are involved in enforcing discipline are 
probably rare, but they are not unknown, e.g. the author recalls 
the anger of a chaplain (who will be referred to as Chaplain D for 
his own protection) at the unwillingness of a past Permanent Force 
detainee, Mortimer Lee, to attend a service in the detention 
barracks in Pretoria. The chaplain ordered Lee to stand in front 
of the office of the Officer Commanding, Maj. Kr ig e, and 
threatened to charge him, but withdrew the threat later. 
Obviously this is only an isolated case; more important is that 
inferior officers, especially corporals, enforce discipline and 
respect for the chaplain. This is all of a part with the 
compulsory nature of religion in the SADF. National Servicemen 
are "compelled" to attend on~ service per Sunday (SADFO 1/21/78, 
n. 39) • It seems that exemption may be obtained from attendance 
at these services (Director of Public Relations, SADF, writing in 
Argus 14.2.1980), but it is unlikely that many people would go to 
these disagreeable lengths. Moreover, cha pl a ins' periods and 
,,, 
I 
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morning prayer parades are always compulsory as they constitute a 
normal part of the daily or weekly routine (see South African 
Baptist (October 1983), p7). To the mind of the SADF, this has a 
disciplinary function: 
"Our policy is that every National Serviceman should attend 
a church service at least once a Sunday. Church attendance 
is also part of discipline, even if it only works towards 
self-discipline" SADF, in 
response to a letter "Why does my son have to attend, bhurch 
I 
(Director of Public Relations, 
parades?" (Argus 14.2.1980)). 
One chaplain conceded that "many resent having to attend a church 
service, yet it has been my joy to lead some of these very 
resentful young men to Christ" (Stiglingh, in South African 
Baptist (October 1983), p6). It appears that the coercive nature 
of the rank structure and the involuntary nature of religious 
observance in the SADF go hand-in-hand. 
one unavoidable effect of rank is that soldiers or , even an 
individual soldier alone in a room must spring to attention at 
the approach of a chaplain. In the words of one chaplain, troops 
are "petrified of rank", especially during basics: colonel's rank 
is "fine for those looking down, but not for those looking up" 
(Lax ton) • The message that the rank structure conveys to the 
soldier is clear: the structure of military life extends to 
religious observance: this applies to religious people and 
non-religious people alike. After bemoaning the paucity of 
literature on the pastoral problem implicit in rank, Meyer 
comments, 
"This rank structure is a serious hindrance in practice 
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It is surely no way to create a spontaneous atmosphere which 
enables the serviceman to associate with such an officer. 
The situation is even uncomfortable when the chaplain 
receives a visit in his own office from a serviceman who is 
in need. On grounds of military discipline, the serviceman 
may not sit down before he has been ordered to" (1979:43: my 
translation) • 
Another aspect of rank is the influence it has upon the career 
For obvious reasons, this appl~es more objectives of chaplains. 
I 
to Permanent Force chaplains. It is possible for the ~ystem of 
rank, together with the selective granting of military honours and 
medals, to create a spirit of competitiveness and rivalry. 
Clearly this is a problem that faces clergy of every church, and 
lay people as well: hence this point should not be made in a 
spirit of self-righteousness. Having said that, it is important 
to note that the rank structure lends itself to abuse by people 
with strong careerist and militaristic leanings. In the absence 
of nard empirical data, it would be invidious to make any 
assertion about this aspect of the rank structure in the SADF. 
However, it is1 worth noting that several of the National Service 
chaplains interviewed thought that many Permanent Force chaplains 
were rather too attached to their rank (Lawrie, Hart, West). 
The unavoidable impact of rank on the chaplain's role may usefully 
be examined in light of the theological assertion in Chapter 2 
about ministry as service. Rank makes a bad match with the 
notion of mutual submission in ministry. It can convey the 
impression that the church is making use of worldly power to 
enhance the success of its ministry, and can suggest that this 
reliance could supersede the church's reliance upon the testimony 
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of Jesus Christ, its ultimate source of empowerment (cf. Weber, 
1983:569: Thielicke, 1982: 23 7: Torrance, 1979:728). From 
another angle, one could reason that if the key to pastoral care 
is in the relationship, and if the pastor is a companion, then 
rank might be a negative element in the process of pastoral care 
( 7) • 
From yet another angle, officer status is uncongenial to the 
concept of the priesthood of all believers. For instance, it 
I 
might be that Christ has given a special gift to al troop to 
I 
minister to a chaplain. The hierarchical rank structure, 
imposing a gulf between the officer class and others, could be an 
inhibiting factor in the exercise of this ministry. 
on the positive side, it cannot be denied, as Hutcheson in the US 
and many chaplains in South Africa have claimed from their 
personal experience, that officer status can enhance and 
facilitate certain aspects of ministry (e.g. Anderson, Laxton). 
A chaplain with high rank, having the ear of senior officers, can 
minister to soldiers by seeing that dehumanizing working 
conditions are changed. They are able to obtain transport with 
ease; their uniform and rank command immediate respect; there are 
fewer barriers between them and very senior officers. Thus 
chaplains of high rank are better able to pursue the chaplain's 
objective of ministry and evangelization. Like Paul, some 
chaplains argue, they are willing to be all things to all meh for 
the sake of winning as many people as possible to Christ. On the 
other hand, non-commissioned rank or private's rank would lack 
several of these advantages which arise from the status of 
officer's commission. 
In one sense these advantages are attractive. One thinks of 
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ADercrombie's notion of the "prophetic chaplaincy" which can help 
prevent war crimes (1973:222): or of Daines' notion of the 
chaplain as the "conscience" of the armed forces (1983a:l). Would 
rank not be of help in this prophetic aspect of the church's 
ministry? (8) 
On the other hand, though, efficacy in achieving certain 
objectives is not the only criterion employed by the church in 
deciding how its ministry is to be done. The end cannot JUStify 
the means. This leads us back to the attempted charactkrization 
I 
of institutions at the end of Chapter 2. Certain objectives, 
e.g. evangelism (of a kind) might well be promoted by the 
church's having an official chaplain at one of the less salubrious 
institutions cited in category three. However, the church also 
has to consider what sort of institution it is, the extent of the 
church's freedom to preach, and the question of what sort of 
witness to the world such a chaplain would cons ti tu te. 
Similarly, in the case of rank, the church has to consider the 
upon the church's prophetic witness, the extent 
its impact 
I . . to which it 
' 
total environment in which rank is being used, e.g. 
exemplifies the "alternative society", the extent to which . it 
permits pastoral care, etc. The wider issue of the ethics of 
involvement with the SADF in the context of South Africa and 
) 
Namibia should be considered carefully in this connection, but 
discussion of this is deferred to a later chapter. In the 
meantime it is worth noting that rank has itself been perceived, 
in the USA at least, as part of the problem, since it induces 
hesitancy to act as the conscience of the military. Possession of 
rank can become a factor in chaplains' reluctance to criticize, 
since it might be felt that only people at .the top of the rank 
structure should do this. For example, when the author suggested 
J 
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that the Anglican chaplains protest SADF actions in Namibia, 
Chaplain J. Daines replied that such suggestions should j be sent 
either to the church representative (church matters) or to the 
Chaplain-General (military matters) (Letters to P.G. Moll, 
13.4.1984 and 17.5.1984). This answer neatly sidestepped the 
issue of whether the chaplains could use their high-ranking 
influence to urge the armed forces to conform to the chaplains' 
own ideals of how a "Christian army" should act. This is because 
the Chaplain-General is from the Dutch 
official position of which is that the war is 
Reformed Church (the 
just (cf.! Heyns, 
1980:9, and NGAS:ll6)). In his high position on the general 
staff, it would be unlikely that he would take it up, because this 
would probably come too close to a fundamental questioning of the 
bona fides of the SADF. 
As far as the other advantages of rank are concerned (easier 
fulfilment of the Great Commission, etc.), the question is whether 
the church should use worldly powers to achieve these valid and 
important aims of ministry. Clearly this assertion should be 
seen in relative terms. The church often makes use. of the 
instruments the world provides for communicating its message and 
facilitating its ministry (e.g. radio, TV, universities, 
institutional chaplaincy, money, etc.) Their use is not wrong 
per se, but when it leads to the wielding of undue powers, and the 
incorporation of values foreign to the Body of Christ, these 
methods are set aside. For instance, force is one of these: the 
value of freedom of religion and of free response to the grace of 
Christ is held so firmly today that parents are reluctant to use 
force to make their teenage children attend church~ this situation 
is a far cry from that of the Middle Ages church which had no 
scruples about the use of military force to obtain conver~ions. 
j 
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In the case ot ministry to military personnel, it might be argued 
that a minister ~hould not give in to the temptation of using the 
instruments of state to obtain a hearing for ·the Gospel; the 
Gospel is its own best witness. 
These points about the incompatibility of rank with sevetal of the 
theological principles outlined in Chapter 2 should also be 
considered, finally, in the light of the central Barthian 
assertion that miniatry 





the heart of the. 
that chaplains adapt 
themselves to ~he rank structure could be viewed as a "ius in 
sacra", since such a requirement would tend to shape the character 
of the church's ministry. If ministry is genuinely the product 
of the church's theological reflections, then the .church could not 
tolerate a situation in which the military would set aiien 
requirements and thereby influence .the nature of its ministry. 
.\ 
I 
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4.4. Uniform 
Rank is of course inseparable from uniform -- and this constitutes 
the fourth point in connection with the chaplaincy structure. A 
uniform can be worn only if some or other rank is selected, since 
the absence of rank is identical with the status of private or 
r i fl em an. As discussed earlier, the likely result of such a 
selection process is that the chaplains would be awarded fairly 
senior rank, which in turn presents theological andlpastoral 
problems. In this way the uniform itself adds to the dilemma of 
I 
the military chaplaincy. 
The Dutch Reformed writer Meyer quotes favourably the German 
theologian Bastian (in Hessler, 1975:13), in support of his 
argument that a non-uniformed chaplaincy (i) permits a more 
• 
spontaneous pastoral context and (ii) is a better link with the 
soldier's familiar environment, viz. the civilian environment, and 
thus serves as a reminder that life in uniform and subJection to 
military discipline are temporary (1979:45). Argument ( i) 
underscores my previous point about the unnecessary ~ . · ormal J. ty 
introduced by rnili tary rank. At the risk of repetition, I quote 
Meyer's conclusion, which agrees substantially with mine: 
"Correct military oehaviour is not the essential point in 
the relationship between the chaplain and the serviceman. 
More important is the discovery of theological moments 
( "momente"), e.g. love of neighbour, etc. The most 
important question which the chaplain has to answer · is 
whether he has succeeded, amid the environment of military 
discipline, in allowing these theological moments to break 
through" (1979:45: my translation). 
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Argument (ii) seems less convincing in the abstract sense, since 
conscripts hardly need any reminders that their military status is 
temporary~ their day-counting syndrome and the disaffection 
written on the faces of AWOLers in detention barracks is abundant 
witness to that. However, argument (ii) does link up with the 
line of reasoning in Chapter 4, that civilian status can be an 
important witness to the military during a time when the church 
regards a particular war as unjust. 
However, there are broader issues to be raised in connect~on with 
l 
uniform. Of these the most important is what a uniform 
symbolizes. A dictionary definition is "distinctive dress worn by 
all members of a particular military or other institution" (Oxford 
Illustrated). Uniform, in the common use of the term, is a sign 
of belonging. It serves to identify the wearer with the 
organization. Implicit in the concept of uniform is a oroad 
identification with the purpose and ideals of the organization, 
combined with a certain loyalty to it. It does not necessarily 
follow that dissidents are excluded, or that identification 
implies full assent (or mindless assent) to every aspect of tne 
organization's purposes. Full membership and uniform may harbour 
considerable diversity. Yet this diversity i~ limited. It is 
limited, in the.first place, by the attitude of the leadership of 
the organization, whose purpose in having a uniform (e.g. at a 
school, a church choir, a business security service, the police, 
the army, a prison, the Bantu Affairs Administration Board), is to 
indicate a unity of purpose, to encourage esprit de corps, to 
remind members that when they are in uniform they are expected to 
be good representatives of the organization, to facilitate order 
and discipline, t~ show to the public that the person concerned is 
a representative of the organization, etc. Improper behaviour 
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when in uniform is strongly discouraged, even if this behaviour is 
acceptable for someone in civilian dress. Improper behaviour 
may also be punished severely. An indication of the seriousness 
with which the SA Army takes the uniform is given by the treatment 
meted out to a non-member who wore the uniform to get a lift when 
hitch-hiking. The man, Mr Jan Isaacs, was picked up by a Military 
Police Staff-Sergeant. After a time he admitted to 
Staff-Sergeant that he was 
later charged and brought to 
not a member of the SADF. 
l 





Passing sentence, the magistrate took into account the customary 
military regulations regarding dress and security. He said that 
Isaacs had committed a very serious offence in the light of the 
present military situation in South Africa. He said if Isaacs 
had been arrested near a military camp or institution, the 
sentence would have been heavier (Argus, 16.2.1984). (9) The 
extreme reluctance of the SADF to allow Jehovah's Witnesses 
alternative overalls in detention barracks in the late sixties, 
and the insistence of the SADF in putting Steele, Moll, l1and Yeates 
in solitary confinement and then sentencing Yeates to a year's 
ht> "--
imprisonment for theii:" refusal to wear military uniform, would 
' seem to underscore the importance for the military of uniformity 
of external appearance. 
Diver~ity is limited, in the second place, by members of the 
organization themselves. By and large, they come to adopt the 
way of life of the organization, identify broadly with its aims, 
and participate in its esprit de corps. The more strongly 
controlled the organization is, the greater the pressures that can 
be brought to bear by members upon other members to have them 
"live up to" the standards of the uniform they bear. That these 
pressures are subtle, having to do with self-image, competition, 
; 
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the desire for repute among one's peers, etc., in no way detracts 
from their importance. 
Diversity is limited, in the third place, by the attitudes of 
non-members. They, if anyone, regard the uniform as a symbol of 
identification with the organization. For instance, a member of 
tne public knows that he ·or she must comply with the instructions 
of a uniformed policeman. It cannot be denied that black people 
see uniformed police as a symbol of dominance, because of the 
oppressive laws which the police are obliged to enforce. It is 
reasonable to assume that someone who wears church choir garb 
identifies with the church to the extent of being a believer. As 
signs of identification with their respective groups, students 
wear jeans, businessmen wear pin-stripe suits, and clergy wear 
clerical garb. Non-members in turn identify members of these 
respective in-groups by means of tneir dress, and come, by and 
large, to expect certain kinds of behaviour and certain kinds of 
attituaes from people who have been tnus identified. 
Thus it can be concluded that the uniform is a 
I . 
symbol of 
belonging~ in the military context, it involves, generally 
speaking, identification with and allegiance to the military 
institution. Irrespective of their personal intentions, military 
chaplains are then part of ·the military institution, as symbolized 
by the uniform. However, the result is implicit religious 
legitimation for the armed forces. This is of great importance in 
the South African context, because the military chaplain conveys 
to the armed forces an aura of religious respectability -- a kind 
of moral underpinning which, in the absence of obvious prophetic 
ministry, tends to undercut and belie the church's convictions 
about the activities of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia. we 
J 
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return to this point in Chapter 4 (10). 
\ 
However, at this stage it is important to consider this implicit 
moral support for the military in the light of Barth's 
understanding of ministry. If the military insists that the 
uniform be a condition for the exercise of ministry, then the 
church stands in danger of bartering away its sole authority over 
its ministry~ The military requirement of uniform could then be 
regarded as unwarranted interference by the state in matters 
' 
internal to the church~ to use Barth's words, a "ius in ~acra" is 
operating. 
The Permanent Force chaplains of the English-speaking churches are 
aware that some SADF members would prefer civilian pastors and 
that "strong feelings do exist among certain sections of the 
population that chaplains in uniform are identified with the SADF 
which appears to them to be the armed agent of the political party 
in power" (cf. their Statement of 1.3.1978). Nevertheless, they 
"strongly recommended" the retention of uniform for fifteen 
reasons, the essence of which are: 
(a) Identification: Uniformed chaplains are fully identified with 
the service and are integrated into the life of the unit. This 
enaoles them to approach all officers and soldiers. 
( b) Access: They have access to soldiers on manoeuvres, on the 
border and at sea. 
(c) Administration: They nave access to SADF training facilities. 
Being in uniform removes from the church responsibility for their 
medical, housing, and salary expenses, and transport and office 
facilities. 
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(d} security: Uniformed chaplains have security clearance. The 
SADF cannot be held responsiole for the safety of civilians in 
certain operational areas. Civilians in certain operational 
areas "could be regarded as spies". The Geneva Conventions 
require official appointment by the military authorities. 
{e) Parents: Parents of National Servicemen would feel strongly if 
uniformed chaplains were withdrawn. 
(f) Ecclesiastical: "His being in uniform provides him with a 
voice and place in the structure of Church activities in the 
SADF". 
It is important to note that the chaplains' decision to retain 
uniform was not based upon a theology of ministry. Interestingly, 
there is not a single explicit reference in the "Statement" to 
theological ·writings of any kind. 
are considered carefully in the 
And when the fifteen reasons 
light of the theological 
assumptions identified in Chapter 2, they throw up their own 
serious theological problems. Let us deal with them in order. 
(a) Identification: Identification can be understood in two ways: 
(i) as identification with the military as such, and (ii) as iden-
tification with the way of life of those being ministered to. (i) 
In 1978, as now, the churches were concerned to reduce their 
identification with the military to the minimum compatible with 
sympathetic ministry. I proceed to snow, in Chapter 4, that the 
churches had, and still nave, good reason for doing so. (ii) As 
I nave tried to show above, it does not follow that uniform (with 
the high rank which is likely to accompany this) is good for 
pastoral- identification. This point also raises Goffman's 
characterization of the armed forces as a "total institution". 
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How can the p~stor best identify with the "mortification of the 
self" that the troop undergoes, during basics at least? 1 How can 
the pastor identify with conscientious objectors? For example, 
several National Service chaplains thought that their best times 
of ministry were after hours, when they were dressed informally 
(e.g. Hart, Laxton). The author recalls the resentment of 
detention barracks inmates at some of the patronizing comments of 
chaplains who had no vague appreciation of the strains imposed by 
that cruel and deprived environment (11). I 




this is more an argument for uniformed ministry fori certain 
defined occasions than an argument for uniformed ministry 
throughout. But even so the argument fails. Accessibility to 
I 
personnel in remote areas by civilians is not impossible; it 
depends on wnether the military is willing to allow such an 
arrangement. West German chaplains, for example, have unlimited 
access to soldiers despite their semi-civilian status. This 
applies ooth to in-camp and manoeuvre situations (,"Military 
! 
chaplaincy service"; Stueber, 1975; Potgieter, 1971:291-298). 
(c) Administration: The issue of chaplains' training is deferred 
to a suosequent section, but in passing it might be stated that 
this aspect of the SAChS's work is not problem-free and has oeen 
censured by several National Service chaplains. It is possible, 
moreover, that if the church were to take on the responsibility of 
training its chaplains directly, it might be more committed to 
that form of ministry and might take it more seriously. The 
church 1 s lack of responsibility for the housing,. salary, etc. of 
its chaplains is not an unmixed blessing, for the same reason. If 
the church had to care for and pay its chaplains it might take 
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more trouble to inquire about the purposes to which its energies 
and money were being put. In any case things like:medical, 
housing and salary expenses need not be dependent on uniform or 
even membership of the military~ West German chaplains are paid by 
the government but remain civilians in many other respects. 
(d) Security: Uniform is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for security. It is not a necessary condition because 
many non-uniformed people in the SADF have security clearance: 
Armscor officials, white female secretaries, and blackllworkers. 
That it is not a sufficient condition is evident from the failure 
I 
of the security system to prevent Commodore Dieter Gerhard from 
supplying the USSR with information for many years. Thus the 
issue of security clearance is no argument for uniformed ministry. 
Furthermore, the issue of security clearance throws up its own 
serious theological problems at a time when the church has 
fundamental questions about the war, as I explain below. The 
argument that the SADF cannot be held responsible for the safety 
of civilians in certain operational areas is at best an argument 
for uniformed chaplaincy in operational areas only. Most of this 
ministry, incidentally, is done at base camps within the 
operational area, where the SADF certainly is responsible for the 
protection of chaplains, be they civilians or otherwise. In any 
case many people change into casual or civilian clothing after 
work hours on the border. Some say that to nave civilian clothes 
there can even be a point of prestige! On the other hand, one 
chaplain pointed out that uniform is necessary on the border 
because one tends to be assigned to units whose members do not 
know one and so the officer commanding might not treat one 
properly in the absence of any visible indication of who one is 
(Wittstock). In sunmary, it seems that much depends on tfie 
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officer commanding concerned; if he and the chaplains were 
properly introduced the "necessity" for uniform might fall away. 
For instance, Rev. Vivian Harris was t6ld by one commanding 
officer that he regarded Harris' clerical garb "as a uniform", and 
therefore Harris could have free access to/the troops (Telephone 
call, 6.8.1984). 
The suggestion that civilian chaplains could be regarded as spies 
is revealing. If suspicion of disloyalty to the SADF is a reason 
for wanting uniformed chaplaincy, this raises theological 
difficulties, because the minister of God cannot be required to 
hold prescribed political or military views as a precondition for 
ministry. This would tend to undermine the church's sole 
competence to recognize the Holy Spirit's gifts and to ordain its 
ministers. 
(e) Parents: Parents' fears of withdrawal of chaplains constitute 
an argument for the maintenance of ministry as such, but not 
necessarily for uniformed ministry. 
(f) Ecclesiastical: This reason is rather obscure. I am unaware 
of any theological reason why military status should confer the 
right to speak in the church. On the other hand, it may be a 
poorly stated way of saying that officer stat~s "gives the 
chaplain legitimate standing within the military establishment, 
removing his identity as an outsider and showing his identity with 
the men and the system" (MMP: 88). This point has been dealt with 
under (a) above. 
The chaplains' reasons for retention of uniform would thus seem to 
be lacking in theological foundation. 
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4.5. Chaplains' training 
In this section we discuss the in-house training given to 
chaplains by members of the 
refers primarily to the 
SAChS and 
cha pl a ins' 
SADF. This discussion 





chaplains' dourses" for Permanent Force chaplains are not dealt 
witn as information about them was too difficult to obtain. 
4.5.1. Description 
National Service chaplains do the orientation cours~ after 
completing their basic training. Prospective Citizen Force 
chaplains, who have not previously, worked as chaplains in the 
SADF, are normally required to undergo an orientation course. The 
orientation course lasts for a few weeks. It is run by senior 
men in tne SACns, of whom Brig. ds. F.J. Potgieter, author of bie 
Militere Kapelaan, is one. Officially speaking it is not a 
theological course, since doctrine is the province of tne church 
( IB n. 6(b) iv). Instead it supplies the "background against which 
the ministry to the men is carried out" ("National Service 
Chaplains" ) • Information gleaned from the terse 
documents indicate that the course includes the following: 
* use of audiovisual aids 
* "communism" ("National Service Chaplains") 
* tne organization of the SADF, the unit and the SAChS 
* the office and task of the chaplain ("National Service 
Chaplains" ) 
*the •place, duty and function" of the chaplain (HB:5). 
official 
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Interviews supplied a more comprehensive indication of the course 
content: 
' * revolutionary warfare and psychological warfare (Laxton) 
* Geneva Conventions 
* Task of the hospital chaplain (Lawrie, Royston, Thomas) 
* Morale and motivation (Thomas, Laxton, Dixon) 
* religious preparedness (Thomas, Laxton) 
* "The church as the anti-revolutionary force in society" 
(Thomas) 
* Pacifism and the New Testament (Royston) 
* The war in Angola (Dixon) 
* "Total Onslaught" (Royston) 
* National Service Refusal or Conscientious Objection, 
done at least once by Maj. -Gen. C. Naud e (Lax ton, 
Thomas), and once by a professor from Pretoria Univer-
sity (Veldhuysen) 
* Work of the chaplain in the operational area. 
4.5.2. Discussion 
At the outset two important points must be granted to the 
organizers of the orientation course. The first is that the 
orientation course gives no explicit instruction on doctrinal 
questions (e.g. baptism, the eucharist, etc.) and in this sense 
does not intrude upon the church's task. The second is that an 
orientation course of some kind is necessary for incoming 
chaplains to familiarize them with 
(a) purely functional and uncontro~ersial aspects like SADF and 
SAChS organization, the Geneva Conventions, the use of audiovisual 
J 
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aids, etc. 
(b) Other elements peculiar to the military institution, which 
also constitute the background and context of the chaplain's 
ministry, and where understanding is necessary in order to 
exercise relevant and compassionate pastoral care. Examples are 
the ethics of warfare, the nature of the current war, 
conscientious objection, the "place and task" of the chaplain in 
the context of war, etc. The question, then, is whether these 
aspects are being communicated to the chaplains in a suitable way 
and by suitable personnel. As far as the purely fµnctional 
aspects are concerned, none of the chaplains interviewed had any 
difficulties. It was with the latter, less easily definable 
category of instruction that they found themselves uncomfortable, 
bored, or irritated. 
waste" (Veldhuysen). 
One chaplain thought the course a "total 
While acknowledging the necessity of 
dealing with broader issues relating to the chaplain's task, they 
questioned some of the 
theological assumptions 
concepts conveyed and 
underlying them., For 
the awkward 
instance, the 
concept of religious preparedness was criticized for its political 
assumptions (e.g. that there is a communist-inspired "total 
onslaugnt" against the RSA) and its religious assumptions (e.g. 
that religion, as one of the elements of ~total preparedness", 
could be used to bolster the morale of soldiers) (thus Laxton and 
others) • For instance, one chaplain commented, 
"I cannot recall much of what we were taught in our 
chaplains' course -- it was far from memorable. In fact I 
was not nearly the only one who thought the courses 
nonsensical and boring. (I remember one exception -- a very 
good lecture by the chaplain at Voortrekkerhoogte Military 
Hospital on pastoral care for the wounded). The military 
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courses were in fact quite sensibly presented but the 
chaplaincy ones were hair raising at times. I detest 
1
. t I particularly repulsive in militarism, but I find 
ministers. I prefer not to mention names since I cannot 
remember either the more sickening references nor all the 
lectures. Perhaps many were innocent, but then the bad 
impressions created by the others stuck. (They were all 
army chaplains)." (Letter from Rev. D. Lawrie to P.G. Moll, 
20.1.1983) 
Let us therefore examine the second category more closely~ 
The problem with this category is that, however delicately it is 
treated, the form of its presentation will rest on theological and 
political assumptions which, in the South African context, are not 
necessarily held in common by the churches. One of the most 
important divides here is that between the Afrikaans churches on 
the one hand and the Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist churches on 
the other. Although the SAChS does not deal with theological 
matters explicitly, it assumes them, and communicates them, by 
ostensibly dealing with the "background" of the chaplain's work. 
Furthermore, this theological thinking is presented by the 
organizers (normally all dominees of the Afrikaans churches) as 
thougn it were fact, not recognizing that it is highly 
controversial~ That denominational representatives are given some 
opportunity to present their views does not·alter the fact that 
the central thrust of the orientation course contains theological 
assumptions uncongenial to some or all of the English-speaking 
cnurches. Some examples will suffice. 
(a) Maj. -Gen. c. Na ude' s exposition of conscientious objection 
differentiates sharply between "political" and "religious" 
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objection. This depends upon the theological assumption of being 
able to regard the latter- as "genuine", being the pr6duct of 
I 
conscience, while simultaneously denying moral and religi~us value 
to the former. This is not done by the English-speaking churches 
(including the Baptist Union), as is clear from their rejection of 
the legislation on conscientious objection in 1983. 
(b) Instruction on communism, revolutionary warfare and psycholo-
gical warfare, done, as it is, by senior members of the SADF and 
SAChS, implies important assumptions about social I change in 
i 
general, and about social change in the South African a'partheid 
state in particular. Now the English-speaking churches have what 
they oelieve to be theologically founded beliefs regarding so~ial 
change in South Africa (e.g. see the "Message to the People of 
south Africa"). Hence there is already the potential for 
disagreement, on tneological grounds, between the SADF and tne 
SAChS, on the one hand, and the English-speaking churches on the 
other. Further assumptions arise, e.g. about capitalism, 
social ism, and communism, their desirability or otherwise, and 
about the ideological leaning of SWAPO and the ANC. The 
definition of these words is of immediate relevance to the 
churches because of the state's frequent assumption (as, for 
example, in the Eloff Commission) that the English-speaking 
churches are wittingly or unwittingly helping communists, through, 
for instance, statements like that on conscientious objection at 
Hammanskraal in 1974. The potential for sharp theological 
disagreement becomes greater when it is argued that the church 
should be an anti-revolutionary force in society, as this implies 
an array of theological assumptions about what apartheid is and 
does: here there can be no talk of commonality between the 
Afrikaans churches and the English-speaking churches. 
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(c) To perceive the chaplain's role as a motivator implies theolo-
gical assumptions about the place of religion in war in general 
and aoout the ethical value/disvalue of the current war, which are 
not shared oy the English-speaking churches. Furthermore, the 
theological stance of some leaders of the English-speaking 
churches would lead them to conclusions precisely opposite to 
those of tne SADF and the Afrikaans churches, since the former 
believe that the SADF is so disastrously in the wrong that the 
church should motivate young 
I 
men to be conscientious objectors 
I 
(e.g. Archbishop Hurley, as quoted in Church and Conscience, and 
in Sunday ~ribune, 8.2.1976). 
4.5.3. Conclusion 
It appears that the orientation course does convey theological 
values to chaplains, despite official statements to the contrary. 
It is possible that chaplains of a conservative religious and 
political outlook would not perceive that theological values are 
oeing conveyed, because their own religious and political 
assumptions do not differ markedly from those of the SAChS 
hierarchy. This might help explain statements like those of, for 
example, Stiglingh: 
"The course itself has nothing to do with any Theological 
views or emphasis. All we are presented with is military 
procedure and organisation ••• I want to state emphatically, 
there are NO theological ideas or concepts presented to us. 
Let me quote to you the words of one of our then Senior 
Staff Officers: "Gentlemen, you are first and foremost 
ministers of the word of God, that is your supreme task" 
(Letter to P.G. Moll, 8.10.1983~ similarly letter from Rev. 
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K. Clack, 29.11.1983). 
Indeed, it is inevitable that theological values will be conveyed 
in some way when trying to deal with the context and background of 
the chaplain's work, for it stands to reason that not only sermon 
content but also perceptions of the chaplain's role, the SADF, 
South African society and other factors making up the chaplain's 
context are coloured by, and in turn colour, one's theological 
assumptions. In the final analysis it is impossible to drive in 
a wedge between theological and (allegedly) non-theological 
elements of the chaplain's work. 
If the English-speaking churches, the Afrikaans churcnes ·and 
I 
the 
SADF were able to view the chaplaincy as a partnership, the 
inculcation of theological values by the SAChS leadership would 
not present so serious a problem. For instance, the German 
chaplaincy is seen by one writer as a cooperative partnership 
between state and church, whereby each partner promotes its own 
interests as well as a common interest (Kruse, 1982:160-169). 
However, the commonality of interest upon which the Germ~n system 
rests is not present in South Africa where fundamental theological 
differences manifest themselves in realms like nationalism and 
apartheid, the relation of apartheid to the war, the ethics of war 
and conscription, the relation of church and state, and the limits 
of obedience to the state. If theological partnership is 
impossiole, how should training of chaplains oe done? 
One solution is to allow each church, or any combination of 
churches which hold sufficient theological values in common, to 
take full control of all aspects of chaplaincy training, but for 
the purely functional elements identified above. If the church 
did this, its chaplaincy would more closely approximate the 
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Bartnian vision in which the church is the sole authority over its 
ministry. 
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5. Freedom of the chaplaincy 
Huber comments that the church is nowhere more · I d · 1 imm,e ia te y 
confronted with the problem of peace than in the military 
chaplaincy: of all areas of church work, the military is the area 
where the church is most tempted to surrender its task of peace. 
Therefore, Huber argues, one test of whether the military grants 
the military chaplaincy freedom to preach the Gospel is whether 
the biblical message of peace can be preached freely in the 
military (1973:225). I shall suggest that this test be used as a 
point of departure for the discussion about the freedom of the 
South African military chaplaincy. This point ia central to the 
Barthian conviction about the sole authority of the church over 
its ministry since, if the church is not completely free to preach 
the Gospel, the church's ministry is in danger of coming under the 
control of, or being influenced by, other powers -- in this case 
the military. 
It is probably true to say that most of the chaplains of the 
English-speaking churches consider themselves to be at complete 
liberty in the military environment. All of the serving 
Permanent Force and several of the Citizen Force chaplains 
interviewed said as much. Perhaps this view is representative: 
"It is true that I am paid by the state, but that in NO way 
remotely implies that I am controlled by the state. I have 
enjoyed a liberty in preaching the Word as if I were in any 
Baptist Church. In fact there are certain Baptist Churches 
I would not be able to accept an invitation from them (sic) 
to become their pastor because in their constitution they 
DEL"lAND that the pas tor hold certain es cha to logical v ie1ws ••• 
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I can assure you the moment the state in any way suggests 
any thought of control regarding my ministry and preaching, 
I will resign without hesitation" (Stiglingh). 
Is this freedom which the chaplains insist they have the same 
·freedom to which Huber refers? I shall tentatively suggest that 
it is not the same freedom. The "self-selection" process, as 
well as these chaplains' attitudes about conscientious objection, 
their attitudes about obedience to the state, and their attitude 
about the role of the SADF considerably limit, if not altogether 
extinguish, the chances of chaplaincy-SADF friction. Therefore 
the issue of the church's freedom to preach its message of peace 
does not even arise for these chaplains. Therefore, I proceed to 
argue, these chaplains' subjective impression is not yet a 
reliable test of whether the church has freedom to preach its 
message of peace in the military environment. After this I try 
to show that the experiences of some chaplains suggest that the 
issue of the freedom of the chaplaincy is not a finally settled 
one. 
5.1. "Self-selection" 
It may be that the reason why the chaplains appear to have 
complete freedom in the military is tnat the chaplaincy consists 
of those ministers in the church who are favourably disposed to 
the military. It stands to reason that a "self-selection" process 
would operate: those who share military values are more likely to 
feel at home in the military, hence would volunteer for that work. 
Conversely, those who reject military values would not want to be 
involved in ministry to military personnel. Unfortunately, no 
sociological studies of this phenomenon have been done in South 
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Africa. If this process is operating in the SAChS, it would also 
serve to explain the differentiation made above between patriotic 
and critical chaplains, since the former are, by and large, 
volunteers, whereas many of the latter are conscripts with no 
specific sense of calling to ministry in the military. An 
American study contended that the process of "self-selection", 
along with the "pervasive acculturation processes of the military 
community which confirm and support that predisposition, combine 
to commission and create chaplains who strongly identify with the 
., 
military. Augmented by the trend toward careerism andja stable 
! 
professional chaplaincy in which the large majority remain 
' 
until 
retirement, the turnover rate is low the chaplaincy is 
institutionalized and career oriented" (MMP:65f. Similarly 
Abercrombie, 1979:48f). 
5.2. Chaplains' attitudes about conscientious objection 
Nearly all the chaplains interviewed said that they were•at least 
tolerant of, or supported, religious conscientious objection on 
pacifist grounds (12). Clearly the chaplains' attitudes have 
changed considerably -- in tandem with changes of attitude in the 
English-speaking churches generally -- since the days of the SACC 
resolution on conscientious objection ~t Hammanskraal in 1974, 
when the chaplains issued what amounted to a call to martial 
resolution: 
"We, the chaplains of the English-language churches serving 
in the SADF, are dismayed by the decision of the SACC, taken 
at Hammanskraal, which appeared to encourage South Africans 
\ 
to refuse to serve in the defence of the country. We 
recognize inJUStices at all levels of our society but 
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believe that the statement that this society is so different 
from others that it warrants being described as basically 
unjust and violent, is unfounded and ill-considered. we 
therefore dissociate ourselves from this resolution. The 
SADF has never demanded anything else from us but the 
proclamation of the Word of God and the pastoral care of the 
members of our various denominations in the SADF. we, as 
chaplains in the SADF, who are familiar with the aims, 
objects and methods of the communistically inspired 
terrorists who by murder and force attempt to gain access to 
our land, urge every member of our churches and especially 
the young men to make their personal contribution in the 
defence of our country" (quoted in Hansard, 15.8.1974:803f). 
However, by 1978 the chaplains were asking for alternative service 
for conscientious objectors: 
"~aring in mind the possibility of a man, not a member of a 
pacifist denomination, Deing at any particular time a 
conscientious objector, we recommend: 
a. That the SADF make provision for such a man to do 
non-combatant service if he so desires; and 
b. That the State institute a form of non-military national 
service. In order to est~blish whether a person is a 
bona-fide conscientious objector we recommend that Regional 
Boards be appointed; 
c. These Boards should consist of SADF personnel, 
representatives of the legal pro~ession and theologians 
nominated by the churches and appointed by the Minister; 
_j 
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d. To prevent the abuse ·Of these privileges the possibility 
of a reasonable extension of the period of service may be 
considered" (Permanent Force Chaplains' Statement, 
1.3.1978). 
The meaning attached to the term "conscientious objector" in the 
1978 statement is unspecified. Does it encompass religious 
pacifism only, or is i.t · subject to a wider interpretation 
includj.ng non-religious form~ of objection, as well as objection 
on ethical and mor-al grounds to a particular war? The 1978 
document does not say. Hence we have to resort to interviews 
\ 
with chaplairis ·and other pieces of· evidence to discover how the 
chaplains view-the phenomenon of conscientious objection. 
From interviews conducted and letters written in :1983 it became 
clear that the chapl~ins had a certain r~gard for religious 
pacifism. Some were themselves noncombatants on more or less 
-.. .. these grounds (e.g. Voegel, Botsis, Hovers, Hymer) • Others 
rejected relig"ious pac·i~ism personally, but accepted that o,thers 
I 
.might be conscientious objectors, e.g.: 
"I am obviously not a conscientious objector. I find no 
Biblical Basis for this ••• Where people disagree with me,. I 
accept this, for I believe that every man must live by his 
own convictions and will one day be answerable to God alone 
for every decision and action" (St ig lingh). 
Despite this respect for religious pacifism, as of 1983 the only 
monograph on the subject of the ethics of war distributed by the 
Ertglish Literature Commission of .the SAChS was Major Aldworth 
Cowan' s pamphlet "Pacifism?", which is essentially an attack on 
the idea that a Christian might be a pacifist. There was no 
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balancing pamphlet motivating pacifism or other forms of 
conscientious objection (Letter from Chaplain D. van der Spuy to 
P • G. Mo 11 , 3 • 7 • 19 8 4) • To this extent the publications of the 
SAChS were far from representative of the theological 
understanding of the English-speaking churches. Now it may be 
that the views of the chaplains themselves differed from the 
thrust of the~r puolications: but then the question is why the 
publications were not ufdated in, say, the seven-year period 1977 
to 1983, despite the existence of a 
staff. It may oe, too, that the 
Commission with full-time 
twelve-pamphlet leries on 
I 
conscientious objection of the CPSA prepared by Dr James! Moulder 
has Deen distributed by Anglican chaplains. Even if this is the 
case, their distribution would seem to have been limited. 
Moreover, these pamphlets, unlike Cowan's work, are descriptive 
rather than motivational in nature. 
Most of the chaplains seemed to treat tne issue of the ethics of 
war passively, i.e. by tolerating and helping conscientious 
objectors out not by actively promoting thought and reflection 
~ about the subject by, for instance, using the SACC resolution, or 
the catholic and Anglican statements on the war. One chaplain 
tells of his treatment of the problem: 
" ••• some 15 000 troops have passed through our unit ••• of 
these I can only recall two who were conscientious ObJectors 
by conviction. There have been others who have been 
somewhat uncertain and have come to share their feelings 
with me ••• If they felt strongly about the matter, I would 
assure them that I would arrange for them to be placed in an 
administration post, or to serve in the medics" (Stiglingh). 
Yet several entertained some suspicion of those who objected on 
j 
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grounds other than "pure" religious pacifism. One chaplain had 
never met an objector who "connects the SADF with apartheid", and 
was not sure what such a person would mean~ but asserted that "if 
it means· that the SADF is responsible for apartheid, then I must 
reject it entirely" (Stiglingh). By contrast, a Catholic 
chaplain accepted the bona f ides of objectors to a specific war: 
"in one sense I do see the distinction between religious 
,, 
objectors and political obJectors, but of course in another 
I would put politics in the realm of morality, ~o the 
I 
distinction cannot be made. In that sense my full sympathy 
goes to the selective objector" (Cawcutt, Letter to P. G. 
Mo 11, 1 9. 9 • 198 3) • 
The response of some chaplains to the Naude Commission and the 
subsequent legislation on conscientious objection in the Defence 
Further Amendment Act of 1983 seems to confirm that there is a 
bifurcation in their views between religious pacifism and other 
forms ·of o bje.ction. Now the Act d if feren tia tes between 
"religious objectors" (to whom it grants a six-year period of . ' 
"community service" in lieu of military service), and all other 
objectors (who are liable to a six-year Jail sentence). A summary 
of the conclusions of the Naude Commission is given by Rev. D.R. 
Briggs of tne United Board Free Churches. The parts which 
indicate the bifurcation referred to above read: 
"Because conscientious objection is advanced by radical 
young men for political ends as well as by those with 
genuine religious scruples, tne commission felt that the 
first need is to identify those who have genuine religious 
convictions. Conscience per se is not always a valid norm, 
since it can change according to circumstances in which the 
j 
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oojector finds himself. On the other hand, the commission 
had sympathy for those with strong religious objections and 
urged than these be considered apart from those whose 
OOJeCtions are mainly or entirely of a political nature ••• 
" ••• the commission recommends as follows: 
"l. Non-combatants should be allowed to do military service 
which does not involve the carrying of arms or weapons 
training. 
"2. Non-militarists (who refuse to wear uniform but are 
willing to do work beneficial to the Defence Force) should 
be employed out of the military system and not in uniform; 
their length of service should be one and one-half times the 
lengtn of military service together with camps. 
"3. Non-militarists unwilling to nave any part of the 
Defence Force should be required to engage in otner forms of 
national service (e.g., as firemen, hospital workers, in 
forestry), and, corresponding to provisions operating in 
other countries, their national service should be twice the 
length of military service plus camps operating at the time 
of their hearing by the board. 
"4. Objectors on political grounds should not be placed in 
military detention, because theirs is not a military 
offence, but should be gaoled for a period twice the length 
of military service, and in their case there would be no 
remission of sentence for good behaviour. 
"The commission recognizes that objectors with genuine 
religious convictions would also be politically motivated, 
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN CHAPLAINS' SERVICE -181 
but trusts that the board hearing the cases would be able to 
distinguish these men from those whose convictions have only 
a political, radical base" (Letter to J. Wing, 10.9.1982). 
The restrictive terms of the Act have been rejected by the 
Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Baptist churches, in official letters 
Congregational and 
written to SADF 






(see the section on 
2). Since this is a highly 
controversial and sensitive issue in the churches, it was not easy 
to gauge the chaplains' response to the Commission, the subsequent 
Act of 1983, and the operation of the Board for Religious 
Objection, the task of which is to implement the terms of tne Act. 
However, the following tentative picture emerges. 
First, although Maj.-Gen. c. Naude, who headed the Commission, is 
a chaplain, the author is unaware of any serious attempt by the 
chaplains to persuade him to recommend inclusion of a wider set of 
conscientious objectors. It is not that Maj.-Gen. Naude operated 
in total isolation from the chaplains. Admittedly, he might not 
have consulted them or requested their opinion; but he did present 
his ideas 
Pre tori us, 
to them 
Lax ton) • 
on several different occasions (Thomas, 
However, none of the individuals consulted 
said that they had strongly motivated a broadening of Naude's 
concepts; nor, apparently, was there any collective response. 
Whereas they had taken the trouble to compile public statements on 
conscientious objection in 1974 and 1978, in 1983 there was 
silence, which can only be taken to imply consent. This is 
significant in view of the fact that the 1983 legislation does not 
meet all of their earlier demands. In 1978 they requested that 
tne theologians on the Board be nominated by the churches (see 
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above): but one of the main criticisms that the churches have made 
of the Board is that the theologians are appointed by the Minister 
of .Manpower, completely by-passing the churches (see, e.g., SACC 
National Conference 1984, Resolution 39). 
Second, a senior chaplain, Brig. A. van den Aardweg, has spoken in 
favour of the new legislation. At an Air Force memorial service 
he reportedly praised the "Christian soldiers" of the SADF who he 
said were "fighting the forces of atheistic communism", and then 
paid tribute to the Minister of Defence, General Malan, and the 
Chaplain-General, Maj.-Gen. Naude, for their contribution to the 
new legislation regarding conscientious objection (EP Herald, 
2.5.1983). The Paratus report on the service quoted him as 
saying, 
p80). 
"With God on our side, no-one can defeat us" (July 1983, 
It would be naive to think that the military men present 
took this Rom. 8 paraphrase in its original sense: more likely is 
that they took it to mean that God is on the side of the SADF 
against its miiitary and political "enemies". 
That van den Aardweg is a Baptist makes his statement all the more 
surprising, in light of the Baptists' historic stance on 
conscience. The Baptist Union of South Africa resolved in 19i2 in 
response to the recently passed Union Defence Act, 
"that in harmony with the tradition of ~the Baptist 
denomination which has emphasized the sacredness of 
conscience and has stood for civil and religious liberty, we 
record our regret that the principle of compulsion should 
have been embodied in the SA Defence Act, and hereby urge 
Parliament to take such steps as may be necessary to 
withdraw the compulsory clauses as soon as possible" (quoted 
in south African outlook (Feb. 1983) :24). 
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Ag a in, the Citizenship Committee of the Baptist Union wrote a 
letter to the Minister of Justice on 31 March 1983, protesting the 
di f feren ti al trea trnen t of "religious" and other objectors. Th us 
it would appear that one of the most senior SAChS officials is out 
of step with his own church in his restrictive understanding of 
the phenomenon of conscientious objection. This view may be 




Third, the author discussed the legislation with the Assistant 
I 
Chaplain-General (Navy), Rev. M.M. Pretorius, who disapproved of 
what he termed "political" refusal of military service. I However, 
due to Pretorius' subsequent rejection of the entire contents of 
the author's write-up of the interview, this observation should be 
treated with.circumspection. 
Four th, the response of the United Board Free Churches is 
enlightening in tnis connection. The UBFC has no official powers 
or constitution, and serves only as liaison between the'SADF and 
I 
the "Free Churches", who presently include only the I Baptist, 
Presoyterian and Congregational churcnes (Letter from Bri~. A. van 
den Aardweg to P.G. Moll, 23.9.1983). Maj.-Gen. Naude presented 
his plans for treatment of conscientious objectors to the UBFC, in 
much the same way as eventually emerged in the legislation (see 
above) • Rev. D. R. Briggs was chairing the UBFC, on which sat 
some chaplains, including Brig. van den Aardweg. Briggs wrote to 
Rev. Joseph Wing saying that all members of the UBFC were present 
for the meeting, and after receiving the report gave their 
unanimous support to the recommendations (Letter, 10.9.1982). (13) 
Fifth, one CPSA chaplain felt that a positive view of the Naude 
proposals should be taken (Middlemost). In fact he had some 
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years before written to the a~thor, trying to persuade him not to 
De a conscientious objector (Letter from Rev. s. Middlemost to 
P.G. Moll, 3.5.1979, part of which is reproduced earlier in this 
chapter). 
Thus it seems that there is broad agreement between the patriotic 
chaplains and the SADF over what constitutes valid conscientious 
objection. The pastoral consequenc~s for potential conscientious 
obJectors are often difficult as a result. Instead of a clerical 
advocate, the conscientious objector may De faced with a military 
adversary. One might speculate that this is exactly what the 
military wants of its chaplains. Hence it is unlikely that 
friction would arise out of these chaplains' understanding of the 
ethics of war. Indeed, some of the chaplains volunteered that 
they would urge or help conscientious objectors to seek 
noncombatant status (Clack, Stiglingh), which, in most cases uhtil 
the new 1983 Act, could be obtained with relative ease. Even in 
the case of some chaplains who sympathize with selective 
conscientious objection, friction is unlikely to arise because of 
what seems to be a hesitancy, or even an unwillingness, to suggest 
to a troop courses of action which are not approved of by the 
SADF. This is sometimes Justified on the grounds of a sort of 
clerical division of labour: 
"I think our JOb is to work with those "in the business" --
there are other priests working with those hot yet in, 
trying to help them to decide, which is of course difficult" 
( Ca wc u t t , Letter to P • G. Mo 11 , 19 • 9 • 19 8 3 ) • 
Hence it seems that the stance of several chaplains on the ethics 
of war is unlikely to be a real test of the church's freedom to 
preach its message of peace. Hence their suDjective impression 
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of complete freedom should be understood against the backdrop of 
their restrictive, or alternatively, passive understanding of the 
church's message of peace as it relates to military obligation. 
This is not to impugn the sincerity of the chaplains in question. 
They, according to their lights, believe they have complete 
freedom to preach the Gospel as they understand it. Yet a more 
durable test of the SADF's tolerance would be given if, say, Fr. 
David Russell of the CPSA were permitted, as a full-time but 
civilian-based chaplain, to teach troops about the Anglican 
position on war and explain to them, in the context of Anglican 
I 
social teaching, why the CPSA has requested the withdrawal of the 
SADF from Namibia and has expressed the view that the SADF is 
defending a grossly unJUSt society. However, such a test is 
unlikely to arise, as the military would not permit it. 
Furthermore, as slJ39ested above, there probably occurs a process 
of "self-selection" whereby ministers who are favourably disposed 
to the SADF volunteer as chaplains, while ministers who identify 
with the Catholic, CPSA or MCSA stance on the SADF, fearing an 
unfree environment and not relishing rank, uniform and . military 
command, would avoid chaplaincy work. 
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5.3. Chaplaincy and security clearance 
But in any case, 
strongly identified 
if a priest of, say, the Catholic church, who 
with his church's rejection of the SADF 
presence in Namibia (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A), were to seek 
entry into the chaplaincy, he could be seen as a "Trojan Horse" 
and be barred by the security clearance mechanism. 
the church's desire for freedom to preach its message 
In this way 
of peace 
sets in high relief its difficulties with security clear~nce. Oh 
the one hand, it is clear that every military institution has to 
have some process of security clearance, to bar entry to people, 
literature or influences which would tend to hamper its purpose or 
worse, destroy it. 
peace includes 
On the other hand, if the church's message of 
(a) the possibility that any Cnristian might be a conscien-
tious objector 
(b) the rejection of a particular war as unjust, 
then it is obvious that a convinced representative of this message 
would be seen by the military to have a profoundly negative 
effect. It was not for nothing that the Eloff Commission said 
that the SACC's advocacy of conscientious objection gave rise to 
"deep perturbation" on the part of the SADF, because this "strikes 
at the root of a system on which the SADF is dependent for its 
existence and performance", and "could impair the capability of 
the .SADF". Therefore, the Commission concluded, the SACC's 
stance is "inconsistent with the national interest" 
(Eloff:l91,199f). Thus the SADF might deem it necessary to 
exclude a chaplain who held firmly to this SACC view, or to the 
CPSA or SACBC stance (the latter are dealt with in more detail in 
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Append ix A). such a process of exclusion is not unknown in South 
African history. South African chaplains in World war II had to 
make a declaration that they were not opposed to the government's 
policy (Potgieter, 1971:220). The particular circumstances which 
probably gave rise to this ruling (viz. deep divisions among the 
parties whether to support Britain) do not diminish this point~ 
they might strengthen the point as the divisions in the Southern 
African community over the war are also intense today (see 
Ap pend ix A ) • 
The consequence of this reasoning is that the military would 
probably not allow a chaplaincy that faithfully refl1cted the 
I 
message of peace of, say, the CPSA and the catholic Church. One 
I 
might go further and speculate what would happen if some thaplains 
actually became selective conscientious objectors or war 
protesters. It is possible that the security clearance procedure 
would be used to exclude them. But the churches themselves have 
no such policy of excluding people on the basis of their beliefs 
about war. Therefore, if such a process were carried out by the 
SADF, one could rightly speak of discrimination~ as the US UCC 
study put it, this would amount to 
"denying one class of clergy equal opportunity for 
employment on the basis of religious belief, and inhibiting 
the church's free exercise of its right to determine the 
qualifications of clergy for ministry" (MMP:60). 
The UCC study therefore recommended that the church and the 
military enter into a written agreement, providing adequate 
safeguards against the security clearance process acting as a test 
of either religious beliefs or political beliefs and legal 
political activity (MMP:61). In similar fashion, Abercrombie 
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recommended that the US United-Methodist Church strongly protest 
and refuse to cooperate with the military requirement that 
chaplain appointees receive a "favourable" . I security check 
(1979:56). 
Now in the SAChS the author has been able to locate only one case 
where the security clearance procedure has barred entry. It 
concerned the Rev. Neville Russell Campbell, a CPSA priest, who 
not 
applied to become a military chaplain in the 1970s, 
. 1 h. j . . security c earance process. T is, in his 
1 h h I . . 1 J. Voege , t e t en Principa 
of his involvement, sole twenty I . 
but who did 
get through the 
opinion, and in that of Rev. 
Anglican chaplain, was because 
years before, with the Congress of Democrats. During Campbell's 
interview with the security police (as part of the security 
clearance procedure), his security file was produced, containing 
photographs of him taking part in a demonsttation. A "special 
appeal" was then lodged by Rev. Voegel, on the grounds that this 
involvement had taken place when Campbell was very young. 
However, this too was turned down. This is a dramatic 
illustration of the church's problem with security clearance. It 
means that the MCSA, CPSA and Catholic churches may be faced with 
a dilemma of how to perform ministry if they were to intervene in 
the "self-selection" process by encouraging the entry into the 
chaplaincy of ministers who more closely represent their message 
of peace. They might then have to heed the stern warning of the 
US United Presbyterian report on the military chaplaincy: 
"it is all to easy to begin to surrender faithfulness to the 
gospel without realizing it. The church and its chaplains 
must be keenly sensitive to the erosion, exploitation or 
softening of its witness. The church needs to be 
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courageous enough to resist any such encroachment, and, if 
necessary, must not hesitate to exercise the right of 
withdrawal from such a system to establish such other 
approaches as it may devise" (Appelquist, 1969:42). 
The issue of security clearance might also be viewed from another 
angle. Could it be that the trust reposed by institutions like 
the clearance 
' 
reveals in a chaplain through security SADF 
something about the kind of ministry that that chkplain is 
offering? In other words, is not the fact that one is considered 
I 
"trustworthy" by the SADF an indication that the SADF 
I 
can safely 
anticipate only a certain kind of behaviour of one, viz. behaviour 
which will help the institution, or at least not hinder it? I 
state this in question form because there is no way of telling 
exactly how the SADF views the security status of the chaplains, 
except of course from the high command itself, which is unlikely 
to tell. However, one can afford to be a little more certain 
about the fact that various degrees of security clearance are 
awarded. The question might then be phrased in this way: 
) 
why is 
the SADF willing to trust certain chaplains more than others? 
Would it not be easy for political judgments to enter into the 
security clearance process? For example, would a chaplain who 
agreed strongly with the Catholic Bishops' stance on Namibia be 
able to get a high degree of security clearance? If not, 
security clearance could become a theological problem, for it 
would be a powerful means whereby the state could mould the 
ministry of the church. Obviously ministry to military personnel 
is affected by the issue of security clearance irrespective of 
j 
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whether it is civilian-based or military-based. Either way the 
implications of security clearance should not be obscured: it 
should be faced squarely as a theological problem that has the 
potential to challenge the integrity of the church's ministry. 
5.4. Chaplains' attitudes about obedience 
The attitude of the patriotic chaplains about church and state 
comes down fairly heavily on the side of obedience to tde state. 
I 
While there is some recognition that the church's obedience to the 
state is limited (e.g. in E.L.C. Lesson 18, "Authority"), in 
practice little weight is given to this teaching, on the grounds 
that the New Testament injunctions to obedience were given in tne 
context of a grossly unjust government. Perhaps the following 
view is representative: 
"I believe that both Paul and Peter made it quite clear that 
obedience to the state is a Christian responsibility. 
Remembering that both of them lived under the Roman 
government with its manifold injustices yet how clearly 
Peter puts it: "Be subject for the Lord's sake to every 
human institution, whether it be to the emperor, or to 
governors ••• Honour all men, love the brotherhood, fear 
God. Honour the emperor". This is the inspired Word of 
God and for myself I would find great difficulty in 
bypassing this passage and Romans 13. This in no way 
implies that I agree with everything the government does, 
but I must oe subject to it, and use legitimate means to 
bring about change" (Stiglingh). 
The fact that this view was expressed in the context of a 
I 
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discussion about selective conscientious objection is significant. 
It suggests that it is precisely in the area of military ethics 
that the chaplain concerned believes that the state's authority 
will normally hold sway. The literature distributed by the SAChS 
seems to confirm that this attitude aoout military obedience is 
fairly common among the chaplains. For instance, in the 
soldier's "Guide to National Service" compiled and distributed by 
the SAChS, the soldier is brusquely told that 
"One of the first things you will learn is that every order 
must be obeyed. Unconditionally! It will not be 
prefaced by "please", nor followed by "thank you", but you 
will DO IT, and do it at once ••• your response will be 
automatic ••• Immediate unquestioning obedience to orders 
will always contribute to the successful carrying out of 
whatever aim your superiors have in mind ••• That is what 
authority and discipline are all about, and if you get the 
idea right away, it will help you to settle down" (Guide to 
National Service:llf). 
In fairness, it is true that the writer of the "Guide" advances 
reasons why this obedience is necessary: it could save life, it 
could help the soldier to 'settle down better, it could aid the 
success of the military operation, etc. Nevertheless it is the 
case that a religious body, the SAChS, is here found to be using 
its religious prerogatives to encourage obedience. The efforts 
made by the SAChS to indicate the limits to obedience are on 
nothing like the same scale~ as we shall see below, its assertion 
of the limits of obedience suffers a "death of a thousand 
qualifications". In this particular "Guide", this passage about 
the virtues of obedience is followed by a theologized legitimation 
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of military obedience: 
"DISCIPLINE HAS A SPIRITUAL VALUE. A true Christian is a 
disciple of Jesus Christ. Being a disciple has a strong 
link with "discipline" the discipline which the 
Christian exercises is learning how to deny himself +. the 
person who is prepared to discipline himself will not· find 
I 
military discipline an intolerable burden" (Guide to 
National Service:l2). 
Another SAChS publication, "The Whole Armour of God", supplies 
what seems to be an open-handed discussion about the dilemma of 
I 
loyalty to God and loyalty to the State. This publication used 
to be distributed to troops in the 1970s but is apparently being 
replaced now. The author was given a copy by Assistant 
Chaplain-General Morel Pretorius in 1983. Its chief value is to 
indicate the theological position of the published materials of 
the SAChS at a point in time: unfortunately no more recent 
judgment could be made as there were no comparable materials 
available. The relevant part reads: 
"Thus we come to the position where we can say that every 
totalitarian claim by the state is not acceptable to the 
Christian. Where, as would happen in a Communist State, 
the State claims your full loyalty, the Christian has no 
choice but to reJect the State. The State cannot be given 
what belongs to God. So also Christians the world over 
believe there are certain principles involved in the 
ordinary affairs of State where their beliefs and the State 
policy clash. Again the Christian's first loyalty is to 
God. At the same time it must be firmly and strongly 
stated that every citizen has a responsibility to his 
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country. He is bound as a Christian to pay his taxes, to 
obey the laws of the land except where there is a clash of 
principle, and to fulfil the rea~onable demands the country 
may require of him by way of service and sacrifice. 
Citizenship involves many privileges, and we cannot accept 
the privileges unless we share the responsibilities." (The 
Whole Armour of God:l2f). 
Leaving aside the gratuitous asst.nnption that the Christian must 
reject (only?) the Communist state, let us see how this theory is 
applied in south Africa. The writer continues, 
"Any person who now thinks about his solution will soon see 
that while the problem is solved in principle, the pr~ctical 
difficulties remain. We are not living in a State that 
makes totalitarian claims, and although some people do have 
convictions which involve clashes with certain State 
policies, it is the particular policy and not the whole 
I 
attitude of the State which causes the clash" (The. Whole 
I 
Armour of God:l3). 
There is a logical leap between the former and the latter passage. 
The writer gives no explanation for his failure to consider 
whether or not apartheid makes "totalitarian claims", and whether 
or not the "whole attitude of the State" as exemplified in its 
policy of apartheid causes a clash of principle (which was 
precisely the burden of the "Message to the People of South 
Africa" and the Ottawa decision on apartheid by the W.A.R.C.). 
After this unsatisfactory appli~ation o~ his theory to the South 
African situation, the writer seems to forget his original 
statement that obedience can be offered only when there is no 
clash of principle: 
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"The State can rightly claim an exclusive authority for the 
promulgation of law, for the administration, defence and law 
enforcement within the State. Thus the Church must keep 
out of these areas, and should the Church feel that there 
needs to be improvement or change in these matters of State, 
the proper channels should be followed" (The Whole Armour of 
God:l4). 
It is well and good to follow the "proper channels", but the 
present debate is about what happens when there is a clash. This 
problem is suddenly forgotten, and the writer 
I 
attempts to 
demarcate areas where the church has to "keep out", all the while 
failing to specify what should be done if the State makes no 
improvement following the church's request, and omitting to 
consider what happens if there exist few or no "proper channels". 
He also gives us no explanation of the contradiction inherent in 
saying that tne church must "keep out", but that it may follow 
"proper channels" should it feel that improvement is needed. He 
also seems to oe forgetful of the church's JUSt war tradition, 
some strands of which say that the church and the individual 
Christian must decide on the justice of a particular war and act 
accordingly (see Chapter 2). But after all these ambiguities, 
contradictions and unsubstantiated opinions, the writer still 
comes down squarely in favour of conscription, as though there 
were no moral problem at all: 
II Thus National Service may even be seen as an 
opportunity of showing one's loyalty to God, the State and 
one's- fellow men, for it offers wonderful avenues of service 
to each" (The Whole Armour of God:l4). 
Obviously individual chaplains' views may and do differ~ but if 
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN CHAPLAINS' SERVICE -195 
they differ significantly, why was this publication issued in the 
first place, and that in the name of the Corps of Chaplains? And 
if their views were different, why did they distribute it to 
troops? Clearly these observations are more relevant to the 
Permanent Force chaplains (and by implication the patriotic 
chaplains) because it is the former who control the compilation 
and distribution of literature in the SAChS. 
When this set of attitudes about obedience is combined with the 
views of the patriotic chaplains about the war and the j SADF as 
I 
outlined above, it becomes possible to see why they fee~ they are 
at complete liberty within the military environment.I Their 
freedom is a reflection of the congruency of their views with 
those of the SADF, rather than the consequence of a tolerant and 
self-critical attitude on the part of the armed forces. The 
obverse is also true in some respects. As we shall see, several 
chaplains whose views do not correspond to those of the SADF have 
on occasion had their freedom curtailed, if only until such time 
I 
as negotiation with higher authorities had set matters right. 
5.5. Curtailment of the freedom of chaplains 
Several instances have come to light which suggest that some 
chaplains, at least, do not feel themselves to be completely free 
to communicate the churcn's message of peace. For their own 
protection some of these chaplains will not be named. 
(1) Ecunews (29.10.1976) reported that Rev. Arthur Attwell stated 
to the Annual Conference of the MCSA in October 1976 that he had 
left the SADF chaplaincy because he could no longer identify with 
n the system n. He later commented: 
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN CHAPLAINS' SERVICE -196 
"By "the system" I meant the political set-up in the 
country. As a chaplain I received encouragement and 
cooperation from both the Chaplain-General and the Naval 
authorities, but one was conscious all the time of 
constraints one was placed in the invidious position of 
being part of a force whose task was to defend what was 
morally indefensible. I think this is what I meant by "the 
system" • I think this also answers your second question: 
was I able to give full expression to the Gospel without let 
or hindrance? In so far as we were under constrain~ with 
regard to the social aspects of the Gospel, the answelr was 
I 
"no"" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 25.9.1983). 
(2) A National Service chaplain of the 1981/2 intake, to whom I 
shall refer as Chaplain A for his own protection, was asKed to 
read a Code of Honour at a parade at which colours were being 
awarded by the State President. He found himself unable to 
comply, because of the Code's undue exaltation of country, 
military and nation, and because he felt unprepared to grant to 
these complete "loyalty, obedience and allegiance". The 
offensive sections of the Code included the following: 
"I declare my awareness of the worthy tradition of the South 
African Defence Force ••• 
"I accept ••• to live up to this awareness with the nighest 
standard of integrity, loyalty, obedience and allegiance ••• 
"I oelieve in God! I believe in my country! I believe in 
my nation! And I believe in myself!" 
He was suspended from all active duty at the unit concerned. The 
matter was taken up by his church authorities and was eventually 
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resolved. The chaplain resumed his responsibilities at the unit. 
(3) A Citizen Force chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain B 
for his own protection, was called up for a border camp. Although 
his views tended toward rejection of all participation in the 
SADF, he went, out informed his Officer Commanding that he held no 
brief for the SADF and would not condemn SWAPO. He was not 
permitted to preach and a few days later was dismissed from the 
camp. The fact that Rev. John Daines made inquiries and was told 
that a chaplain had stated that he supported SWAPO and was 
anti-SADF (Daines, 1983a:l0) does not diminish my point. Even if 
it was the same man, and even if he did support SWAPO (as do the 
leaders of· Namioia's largest churches -- see Appendix A), the fact 
that his message was censored confirms the view of some that the 
SADF grants only limited freedom to chaplains. They feel that 
theit freedom is limited to what promotes SADF morale, or at least 
to what does not seriously challenge it. 
(4) A Permanent Force chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain 
c ior his own protection, nad several clashes with tne SADF. One 
concerned a protest about torture. On another occasion he was 
interrogated by police over some remarks about black political 
discontent made during a chaplain's period. These incidents were 
later cleared up with the SAChS authorities. 
(5) A CF chaplain, to whom I shall refer as Chaplain E for his own. 
protection, wrote to his superior in the SAChS, saying that he 
could, as a minister of the church, no longer identify with the 
SAuF through uniform and reception of pay. A three-year conflict 
ensued, but did not resolve the matter. In fact, at a Chaplains' 
Conference, a member of the Chaplain-General's staff engaged in 
heated debate with him, whicn included a threat of prosecution. 
J 
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Clearly none of these isolated incidents "proves" anything. It 
could be argued that misunderstandings arise 
the mammoth size of the SADF, and the 
in any organization; 
I 
secrecy with which 
I 
operations have to be conducted, do not make for ~nooth running of 
a chaplaincy. In addition, isolated incidents do not prove that 
there is a policy of unfreedom; in any case the Chaplain-General 
has on numerous occasions said, and the official documents stated, 
that no restrictions will be placed on the chaplains' message. 
i 
On tne other hand, 
I 
one might suspect that human nature is such 
I 
I 
that for each person wno successfully resists authority there are 
I 
several who do not (14). The disincentives to complaining are 
considerable: peer pressure, the expectations of "loyalty", and 
tne threat of demotion, or court cases (e.g. for revealing a 
torture case after permission to do so has been denied) • Some 
Citizen Force and National Service chapains have the further 
problem that they fear that they might be deprived of chaplains' 
status and called up again as troops, in which case they would be 
forced into being selective or pacifist conscientious objectors. 
Whether these fears are justified or not is beside the po~nt. All 
' I 
these factors together suggest that the issue of freedom of the 
chaplaincy is not a closed one. It cannot be assumed without 
further ado that the SADF grants full freedom to all its 
chaplains; even less can it be assumed that the SADF would grant 
full freedom to chaplains if the churches were to intervene 
decisively in the "self-selection" process. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Chaplaincy and the needs of the soldier 
An argument regularly advanced for the maintenance of the military 
I 
I 
style of chaplaincy is that it is the only effective and 
practicable means of meeting the needs of soldiers. In this 
section I enter into debate about the nature of the needs of 
soldiers. I try to show that it is by no means obvious that 
soldiers' needs are best met by the current form of chaplaincy. 
In fact I suggest that certain needs are best met by civilian 
ministry quite unconnected with the military environment. 
To begin with, let us examine some of the needs of soldiers and 
inquire how the current chaplaincy system is responding to them. 
I 
Perhaps the needs which are most commonly identified by chaplains 
are twofold. First 1 there are specifically church-related needs. 
These include the eucharist, preaching, Bible study, prayer and 
counseling. Second, there are needs which arise from the strain 
of the military environment. The soldier is said to need comfort 
and consolation amid fear and tension; the soldier needs help and 
counseling when injuries are being suffered or lives are being 
lost; in the extreme case, the chaplain has to be present to 
administer the last rites. To this category some would add 
morale needs. ~ither they would point out, as Stiglingh did, that 
when a chaplain "imparts to soldiers a confidence thro~h faith in 
Christ", morale improves. Or (and this emphasis is more 
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connected with the Afrikaans churches) they would say that 
chaplains should raise morale in order to promote the SADF's 
struggle against communism. 
It is evident from the interviews conducted that these spiritual 
and pastoral needs of soldiers are catered for reasonably well 
under the present chaplaincy system. The chaplains have 
virtually unlimited contact with the men: being conscripts or 
military career men themselves they have a fine understanding of 
the pressures induced by combat. I For example, at least two of the 
I 
chaplains had undergone Parabat courses (Veldhuysen, Moore). 
However, these needs merit closer examination, along three 
lines: ( i ) their relation to the needs of the institution: (ii) 
their time scale: and (iii) their exhaustiveness. 
(i) It is apparent from the way chaplaincy work is presently being 
done, that to fulfil the above-mentioned needs of the soldier is 
simultaneously to satisfy the requirements of the military 
institution. For example, soldiers are less likely to be 
enthusiastic about their tasks if they feel that their religious 
needs are being ignored. Soldiers under tension perform less 
efficiently, and so the soothing words of a chaplain can 
contribute importantly to military efficiency. This ooservation 
raises the sociologists' question: For whom is pastoral work to be 
done? Whose needs is it satisfying? Thus Peter Berger, when 
analysing published materials of the US military chaplaincy, 
remarks that "what is therapeutically recommended for the 
individual turns out to be functional for the institution that 
sponsors the therapist" (Berger, in Cox, 1971:99). An American 
inquiry contends that the military expects the chaplain "to use 
counseling as a therapeutic device supporting the transformational 
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goals of the training" (MMP:43). A South African example of 
support for the transformational goals of training is given in the 
counseling work of a Baptist chaplain, Rev. Lucas Potgieter: 
"My office, however, is the place where most of the personal 
work is done. Here the men can cry, laugh or be in deep 
discussion. Problems that are most common are men who 
cannot adjust to the pressures and difficulties of hard 
training because their lives were too "soft" at home. 
may have never made a bed or ironed 
men hear the gospel really for the 
a shirt before •• ! 
I 
I 
first time from 




Hence the danger exists that if the needs of the soldier are 
defined in an uncritical way as outlined above, the chaplaincy 
could be manipulated to serve purely military aims. What is it 
about the above list of needs that lends itself to 
instrumentalization for military objectives? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the short-term nature of the second 
half of the above-listed needs -- and this raises (ii) th~ second 
point. Fear, tension, injury and death occur mainly during the 
(for conscripts) limited term of duty. The soldier's immediate 
need is tnat the chaplain alleviate these strains. The chaplain 
becomes a help in tne soldier's str~gle for survival in a harsh 
environment. The "tyranny of the present" can come to define the 
chaplain's task to the extent that the latter consists chiefly of 
helping soldiers to cope with the difficulties imposed upon them 
by the demanding military schedule. It became apparent from the 
interviews that South African military chaplains spend a good deal 
of their time attending to needs of this kind~ The danger exists 
that their urgency may preclude attention to deeper and less 
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obvious needs. 
This point brings us to (iii) the third point. Is the above list 
of needs exhaustive? It is worth noting that this list fits in 
with the narrow, pietistic understanding of evangelism and 
pastoral care that is evident particularly in the patriotic 
chaplains identified in Chapter 3. As long as evangelism is seen 
only as "saving souls", and pastoral care only as a process to 
help people overcome "personal" sins and failings, the prophetic 
and critical task of the church (and indeed of the pastor) is 
' 
I 
devalued. A pietistic understanding of evangelism and I pastoral 
care can then be married with a social ethic which bl~ndly and 
patriotically supports the military. In relation to the military 
chaplaincy it is important that the churches insist that the 
Gospel is far wider than this narrow theology of evangelism and 
pastoral care. In the light of their understanding of social 
process~s in South Africa and Namibia, and the rejection by some 
of them of the war on moral/theological grounds, an added list of 
needs can be identified. Some of these will not apply 
exclusively to soldiers, but they will all be mentioned, as they 
lead to a fundamental reappraisal of the task of the chaplain. 
They are: 
(1) The need of soldiers to know what they are being required to 
fight for, and how their participation in the war may be 
reconciled with, or is the outworKing of, Christian ethics. 
Conversely, the need to know what to do if they are unable to 
reconcile their participation with Christian ethics. 
(2) Arising from (1), the need to know that, should they die, 
their death would not be in vain: it would be for a just cause. 
This may be expressed as the basic human need for theodicy, i.e. 
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how to continue believing in a loving and just God amid the 
inexplicable suffering of the world. Conversely, this means the 
need to know how to take death if the military version of the 
"cause" is not credible. 
(3) The need of soldiers to know that they are working for the 
tiltimate, if not the proximate, good of all, i.e. that they are 
participating in God's work in the world. Conversely, if they 
are not convinced that they are working for the good of all, they 
I 
may need to be reconciled with Namibians, and especially' Namibian 
Christians, who feel that the soldiers' presence on Namibian soil 
is an aorogation of fundamental human rights and a henial of 
Christian charity. 
(4) Arising from (3), the need to be reconciled with people in 
south Africa who feel that the military apparatus is stifling 
their aspirations for freedom and dignity. This includes the 
need for r'econciliation with Christians and with members, of their 
own churches who believe that the military is the "protec'tor of a 
profoundly immoral and unJUSt social order". l 
1 
(5) The need of the soldier to know what actions may and what 
actions may not be required of him, in terms of international and 
domestic law, and to have the support of the chaplain if the 
actions required of him fail to meet the demands of the law or of 
his own conscience. These legal aspects are dealt with in 
Appendices C and D. 
This catalogue of needs brings us to the very heart of the 
questions of the ethics of war, of the individual's response to 
conscription, and of the chaplain's task • 
• 
Needless to say, this more critical understanding of the needs of 
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the soldier leads to a fundamental revision of the task of the 
chaplain as it is presently understood. This task would be 
conceived as much in terms of challenge as in terms of 
consolation~ it would focus on fundamental as much as on immediate 
needs~ and would in turn entail a revised conception of the nature 
of the church itself. Let us try, then, to comprehend th~ 
dimensions of a more critical style of ministry to military 
personnel. 
This will imply at the start a more critical view of the 
traditional notion of the chaplain as dispenser of consolation. 
This is, of course, not to imply that all South African chaplains 
have a role which is functional to military objectives. We saw 
in Chapter .3 that there is a significant group of "critical 
chaplains", who would not want their ministry to be utilized for 
military purposes. On the other hand, there is little doubt in 
the author's mind, and even less, it would seem, in the minds of 
senior Defence Force officers, that some chaplains contribute 
importantly to morale. Moreover, the point of Chapter 3 was to 
show now the current system of chaplaincy lends itself to this 
traditional understanding of the chaplain's role (1). Tna t the 
offer of consolation amid distress is an indispensaole ingredient 
of Christian ministry is uncontested. However, it has been 
pointed out above that if consolation is only reactive, i.e. if 
it responds to need only as it arises out of military pressures, 
then it can be instrurnentalized for military purposes (2). This 
is especially true at a time when tne church rejects the war in 
which the armed forces are engaged. For at such a time the offer 
of comfort and consolation can help men to be more effective 
soldiers. Obviously this depends on the sort of situation in 
which comfort and consolation are offered. If a man is deeply 
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shocked at having shot someone or having witnessed a death, and is 
offered comfort by a chaplain, which in turn enables him to go and 
shoot again, then the ministry of the chaplain has made a direct 
contrioution to military efficiency. similarly, if a man has 
moral doubts about the activities of the army, and the chaplain 
consoles him in his anguish by SU3gesting theological and moral 
reasons why he may participate in war, then a significant 
contribution to military efficiency has been made. Again, the 
essential point to be made here is not that all the chaplains are 
doing this, out that the present SAChS system lends itself to this 
sort of role (3). However, these forms of pastoral care may be 
distinguished from forms which, without any specific military 
reference, might be offered at any non-military parish. For 
instance, if a man distressed about his threatening divorce 
obtained comfort from a chaplain, one could hardly take umbrage, 
since this could have been done by any Christian engaging in 
ministry. Obviously there is a fine line between the former and 
the latter types of comfort. The one will sometimes shade into 
the other. For instance, a man on the border may need counseling 
for marital proolems which were already in existence before he 
entered the military, but which were exacerbated by his absence 
from home and the strains of border patrol duty. Obviously some 
contribution to military efficiency is made, but at the same time 
there is not much difference between this situation and any normal 
civilian parish situation. This discussion also raises the yet 
more thorny question: Can the church maintain its integrity and 
at the same time of fer comfort and consolation to anyone in any 
situation? For instance, what sort of comfort would the church 
offer to Franz Stangl, the Kommandant of the extermination camp 
Treblinka, who was convicted in 1971 for collaboration in the 
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death of 900 000 men, women and children? ( c f • Se re n y , 1 9 7 4) • 
Would one not have to insist that in this case the church would be 
primarily obligated to offer moral condemnation? To bring this 
discussion closer to home, we might consider the reaction of a 
17-year-old soldier, Rifleman Steenkamp, to the sight of his first 
dead en€my body: 
I 
"When you look down at the dead man, you think, it ,could 
I 
have been me. Being a Christian, you feel it's a lifJ lost 
I 
I 
but there again it could have been an innocent life, ajwoman 
or a child (that the terrorist killed]. Because they don't 
care who they kill. They kill their own people because they 
are brainwashed by the communists. somebody has to do it. 
I've got people I love at home and you are only doing your 
duty. You are not fighting for the white skin in South 
Africa, you are fighting for everybody. You are taken from 
school benches and expected to kill. People don't 
understand. They call you a racist. It's you or them" 
(Sunday Tribune 22/2/1981). 
In this case, it is submitted that it would be the chaplain's 
pastoral duty to challenge the young man, in as sympathetic and 
gentle a way as possiole, to reconsider tnis rationalization of 
his action. To leave him Justifying the death of "the enemy" on 
these dubious bases would amount to gross pastoral neglect. 
This discussion about comfort and consolation in pastoral care 
sets the background for discussion about the chaplain's task at a 
time when the church rejects the war. The church always has a 
duty to offer care and compassion, but this becomes problematic 
when it is offered in such a way as to contribute to military 
efficiency in an unjust war. . If it does this, the consolation 
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that the church offers is hypocritical and insincere. If, for 
instance, a young man were afraid to die in combat, the church 
would find it impossible to help him find a personal Jtheodicy 
without engaging in hypocrisy which would almost amount t6 deceit. 
Instead, the church would have to frame its ministry more in terms 
of challenge. The church would challenge young men to consider 
what they are doing~ as a CPSA resolution (Number 13, "Service in 
the SADF") put it in 1982, I 
I 
I 
"allegiance to Christ demands of every Christian that before 
i 
i 
he takes up arms for any purpose, or enters the military, he 
should face our Lord and ask him whether this is truly what 
he should do". 
This would involve a radical departure from one of the traditional 
functions of religion, viz. to integrate death into the system of 
meaning of society (cf. Berger, 1973:32f,62f). The church's 
questions, however gently and compassionately put, would intensify 
the anxieties of troops about the purposes for which their lives 
are oeing exposed to danger. Pastoral care of this kind can only 
be justified with the long term in mind. The church's priority 
is to attend to people's deepest needs, and these may sometimes 
conflict with their immediate perceived needs. For instance, the 
immediate or perceived need of a prostitute may be to find an· 
apartment where she can receive clients without incurring police 
detection. Care which took the form of adopting an uncritical 
view of ner needs by helping her find such an apartment would show 
little pastoral integrity, because it would involve avoidance of 
thJ confrontation with the truth which integrity demands. The 
pastor of integrity would strike the more challenging course of 
nelping her towards "health and strength of spirit" by prompting 
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her to discov~r a new self-concept and a new job, etc. In the 
military sphere, the_ immediate or perceived needs of a soldier 
I 
might be to find relief for his tensions or comfort: for his 
troubled conscience. If the c~urch sincerely believes the war to 
be unjust, it will not be able to offer these without a heavy 
sense of irony. Rather it would challenge the. you0g man to take 
the theological thinking of his church more seriously, to 
reconsider· his own respons_e ·to God's Word, and to reflect 
carefully on ·his own political role in the South African or 
Namibian situation. At the same time, the church would offer 
care by·supportirig him in a position which involved conflict with 
the armed forces. It goes without saying that if the church 
understands the soldier's needs in this way, its pastoral work 
Will be severely dysfunctional to th~ military organization. 
I 
The . question is whether the milita·ry would be willing to accept a 
'"~rophetic chaplaincy" (Ab~rcrombie, 1973:222~ 1979:48,54). Some 
b~lieve-·that the military 
·~laces greatest re~ponsibility 
woul.d respond positively. 
I 
for implementation of 
0 '·:Brien 
just-war, 
international law-of-war, and limited war prescriptions on field 
commanders. For this they need faithful subordinates and 
disciplined troops as well as courageous "whistle-blo~ers" 
(1981:302-317,326). If I in these circumstances, chaplains 
supported the commander, won the confidence of the troops, and 
carried out their ethical charge by reporting dishonourable 
behaviour, the military would welcome them. In similar vein, 
Abercrombie says that general~ need the chaplains' alternative 
information/communication sxstem because regular military command 
channels _harbour coverups. The generals would welcome the ,. 
/ 
chaplains 1 "renewed emphasis on the old ~ilitaiy virtue of 
integrity within ou~ Army" (1973: 228,231). 
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However, the military response would be different if chaplains' 
criticisms extended to doubts about or objections to the cause 
itself. Boozer resolves this problem in favour of 
I 
the armed 
! forces by contending that 
"it is unreasonable to expect the armed forces to sponsor or 
to allow within its domain any ministry which denies the 
moral legitimacy of a vocation which involves the 











"The professional soldier cannot wear the uniform iwhile 
a state policy which challenging the moral validity of 
involves the performance of military duty" {1968:43). 
The military would suffer inconvenience if the churches were 
continually requesting explanations about alleged atrocities, or 
if large numbers of conscientious obje~tors had the chaplains' 
support, or if the chaplains dissociated themselves from military 
propaganda, or if they stressed the biblical teaching that the 
duty of obedience to human authority is not absolut~. Moral 
inquiry could have a dispiriting effect on soldiers. Inquiry 
"inhibits the feeling of conviction so necessary for the high and 
sacred moments of practice. For practice is politics: and 
politics is, in the end, killing" {Gouldner, 1976:xv). It is 
true that "moral sensitivity is not the same as recalcitrance" 
(Boozer, 1979:75), but it would be short-sighted to think that the 
military would not identify the two. Maintaining morale in the 
face of a prophetic chaplaincy would become difficult and the 
chaplains could be perceived as sUbversives: in fact, the support 
that West German chaplains offer to conscientious objectors has 
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led to precisely this charge·(cf. Gramm, 1975:52). Distrust of 
the chaplains' security status would follow. In arr extreme case, 
commanders would be forced to demilitarize the chaplaincy or limit 
the chaplains' contact with the troops in some other. way. 
Figinski argues for military chaplaincy with screening procedures 
to exclude usubversive" chaplains (quoted in "The 
constitutionality suit":SO). O'Brien recognizes the problems of 
soldiers being taught the "w:t:_ong" values: 
"Ultimately, responsible commanders cannot exact disciplined 
responses ~rom troops encourage~ by society to defy 
authority and. scorn the virtues that are necessary for a 
soldier" (1981: 359). 
Benedict Reid contends that the chaplain should support everyone 
i 
in their~ position of conscience and help soldiers to pray, work 
for peace, and love the enemy; but wonders whether the ·military 
'""-.- I 
would tolerate cha.plaincy under these conditions (EC:81). 
Specifically, in south African militafy law there are several 
,\ 
provisions which could be used against chaplaihs who offer 
challenge instead of consolation. . Anyone who "improperly delays 
or discourages any actibn against the enemy", or who, "in action, 
or ~rior to going intG action, acts in a manner or uses words 
calculated to create alar~ or despondency" can be imprisoned for 
ten years (Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule, 6) • The 
chaplain might not intend to delay action against the enemy, nor 
want to create ... despondency., but it would. be foolish to think that 
the offer of challenge would not be seen to have.these effects. 
These reflections about what the military would do.to a chaplaincy 
exercising a more critical style of ministry, are pure speculation 
at this stage. However, they do yield a few .insights, as they 
..: ... 
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bring us back to reconsideration of what the church really is. 
Theologically this might be expressed as follows. I have tried 
to show that the chutch cannot content itself with the military 
definition of what the needs of soldiers are (viz. needs are 
functional to institutional needs) or with the military definition 
of what the chaplain is (a morale-booster). But then this 
suggests a break with the traditional notion of the social 
function of the church (i.e. 'the bulwark of the state). To use 
Barth's terminology, the church should come into its own by 
ceasing to understand itself in terms of the world's 
I 
misunderstanding. Positively speaking, the church should then 
relate the needs of people to the acts of God in Christ 
(reconciliation, e.g. with those oppressed by the military); and 
seek its own definition of the chaplain (a "sign of contradiction" 
amid the powers). These can only occur if the church sticks to 
its own definition of what it is (viz. the "alternative society"), 
and of what its ministry is (viz. the full-orbed ministry of the 
community of God, not the service of a particular human 
institution). 
2. Military status and rejection of the war 
Let us proceed at this point to take up the argument of Chapter 3 
about uniform and military status of chaplains, and relate this to 
the fact of the rejection by some churches of the war in Namibia 
and South Africa. 
If, as has been supposed above, the uniform and military status 
are symbols of identification of the church with the military, and 
if they confer a certain religious endorsement upon the military, 
then there would be a strong argument for the chaplaincy to divest 
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itself of all accoutrements of military life (4). This should be 
done for two reasons. First, the church would want to avoid all 
suspicion in the minds of its members, troops, chaplains, the 
armed forces and the general public, that it in any w~y supports 
SADF activities in South Africa or in Namibia. second, the 
church would for pastoral reasons not want its chaplains to have 
military uniform or possess military status of any kind, for fear 
that soldiers would misunderstand its convictions about the 
activities of the SADF. The chaplain in uniform cannot avoid the 
fact that "the medium of the chaplain is also his first message" 
( MMP: 43) . This argument carries especial force in view of the 
fact that among the soldiers are young men with developing 
convictions of conscience. If the church believes (i) that both 
pacifism and selective conscientious objection are theologically 
defensible positions, and (ii) that the SADF is engaged in 
activities which are questionable at the least, then it would not 
want these promptings of conscience to be repressed. But they 
are likely to be repressed if the chaplain is a full me~ber of the 
military (5). 
There is, however, an additional problem with the position of 
chaplains who minister to soldiers in Namibia. Even if they had 
no military status (viz. uniform, rank, pay, etc.), and even if 
they agreed fully with, say, the SACBC view of the SADF's presence 
in Namibia, they would still be seen to be associated with the 
SADF in a foreign policy exercise that has met with almost 
universal international censure. Furthermore, the very fact of 
being under SADF auspices is seen as a problem by the Council of 
Churches of Namibia (cf. interview with Pastor Zeph~nia Kameeta, 
Appendix H). Bishop James Kauluma of the CPSA in Namibia (see 
Appendix G) insists that "the church cannot provide ~ chaplaincy 
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to a foreign and colonial army The decision of the South 
African churches who send their chaplains to Namibia cannot and 
shall not be understood in any other way, but as a clear siding 
and support of their national army" (Letter to P.G. Moll, 
2.7.1984). That is why the Council of Churches of Namibia has 
said that it will not send any of its pastors to minister, even in 
a part-time capacity, to soldiers in SADF camps. However, it has 
stated that soldiers are welcome to attend services in local 
churches. One part-time chaplain of the MCSA decided, 




I It may be 
J 
similar argument might be made with noted in passing that a 
respect to part-time ministry to SADF members within South Africa. 
Thus one part-time chaplain quit this ministry because he believed 
that the SADF was engaged in maintaining the very injustice which 
his regular parishioners suffered (.Maree) • 
This point should be taken seriously; it is an indication of the 
deep distrust, even anger, with which the SADF is viewed by 
Namibians. On the other hand, this situation might bel compared 
with that of the Red Cross. The Red Cross has to secure the 
permission of an army to operate within a war zone. If any 
organization is careful not to compromise itself by association 
and identification with the political purpose of a warring nation, 
it is this one. Tightly controlled from Geneva, it enters any 
area on its own terms, and has thus far succeeded in avoiding all 
suspicion of collaboration or support for a particular side. It 
might be argued that chaplaincy services could oe organized by 
local churches in Namibia along these lines. An important 
condition of this service would be its "all-or-nothing" policy 
with respect to personnel. This means that the churches would 
submit to the SADF a list ot ministers who would be willing to do 
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part-time chaplaincy work, but would authorize those ministers to 
go ahead only if all of them were accepted simultaneously. If 
this were done, it would be difficult to see how this form of 
ministry could be seen to be compromised. 
A shade more ambiguous is the position of South African clergy who 
accompany the SADF. They have to work under SADF auspices for 
much 
be. 
longer periods, on foreign soil where they have no right to 
They are in Namibia solely for the benefit of troolps, in the 
\ 
SADF; they are not linked, in the first place, with the local 
Namibian churches. Even if they were, on paper, under civilian 
control and dir~ction, this would of necessity mean little because 
they would be in the SADF environment for a long period of time, 
with little contact with the church at home, and subject to 
military rulings on such important matters as transport. In 
this case, a non-compromised ministry is more ·difficult to 
imagine. 
It is at this point that the theological values of ministry to all 
versus ministry with integrity can start to compete. In the end, 
the church may not be able to avoid a position of painful 
ambiguity with respect to its ministry to soldiers on foreign 
soil. However, there is one final consideration. If the war is 
wrong, then the church has a duty to inform its members that this 
is so, and sympathetically minister to them in such a way that 
they are enabled to understand their church's position and respond 
conscientiously. It might be argued that to send a chaplain of 
any description to accompany an army of occupation would be to 
belie this ministry of the church. Conversely, it may be that 
this ministry of challenging Christians to reconsider their stance 
on the military would best be furthered by refusing to provide any 
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ministry at all, should this require association with an army of 
occupation. It might be that the absence of a chaplain is the 
only way to jolt young soldiers into the realization that their 
church is entirely serious ih its condemnation of the war. 
Perhaps ministry should not be restricted to a ministry of 
presence; it might be that a ministry of absence would serve 
better, in some cases, to press home these crucial moral issues. 
It might be that the church has no choice but to d. I istance itself, 
I 
since to associate with the in Namibia is, in SADF some way, to 
legitimize the presence of the SADF in that area. This ~uggestion 
i 
I 
is offered only tentatively, though, because it tends to conflict 
with the church's duty to minister to all. It would be foreign 
to the notion of ministry to offer pastoral care selectively, or 
to offer it only to those who are thought to be in the right. 
However, this concern for ministry to all is likewise not an 
absolute; it should be held in tension with other aspects of the 
church's work~ e.g. its ministry of prophecy, its task of peace, 
and its concern for pastoral integrity. In other words, I am 
unaware of any theological reason why either principle -"ministry 
to all" or "ministry with integrity" -- should override the other. 
With respect to the position of chaplaincy to soldiers in Namibia, 
we are left with an inconclusive picture. This is hardly 
surprising, given the highly questionable nature of the South 
African involvement in the territory. What is clear is that, in 
view of (i) the moral and theological rejection of the war; and 
(ii) the present hierarchical structure of the chaplaincy, the 
churches should make an effort to demilitarize the chaplaincy. 
This could be done along the following lines. 
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3. The process of demilitarization 
The church could start by informing the military, the public and 
its own members of its principles of ministry. Then i t co ul d 
compile a statement of intention, detailing how those principles 
may be enacted in reality. Finally, the church could embark on a 
series of concrete steps 
suggested statement of 
toward demilitarization. Here follows a 
pr{nciples and a statement of J~tention. 
' ' 
It will be noted that the statement of principles is e~sentially 
an affirmation of a Reformed doctrine of minis t rY:, as is 
especially clear from points 3 and 5. l 
3.1. Statement of Principles 
1. The ministry of the chaplaincy should both express and remain 
true to the Gospel in its fullness. 
2. It must ensure that the pastoral and prophetic. witness of the 
church is not compromised. 
3. The chaplaincy should not be controlled by the military in a 
way which undermines the freedom of the church to present the 
breadth and richness of its teaching in regard to the implications 
of the Gospel in this situation of conflict. 
4. The chaplaincy should be sensitive to the inherent danger of 
allowing the ministry of the church to be used to give legitimacy 
to an unjust cause, and should be structured in such a way as to 
prevent this from occurring. 
5. To enable this, the chaplaincy should be responsible to the 
local church, and come under the authority of the local church 
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leadership. 
3.2. Statement of Intention 
In order both to express and to safeguard the above principles, 
the present form of chaplaincy should be changed along the 
following 1 ines: 
I 
1. Chaplains should not remain permanently in this mintstry. A 
limited term of office will help to ensure that the ~haplaincy 
remains free of undue influence by the perceptions, policies and 
t 
ethos of the SADF. 
2. Chaplains should be directly responsible to the leadership of 
the local church. This will ensure a form of chaplaincy more in 
keeping with the church's understanding of ministry and authority 
within the Body of Christ. 
3. Chaplains should not wear the uniform of the SADF. The 
wearing of the uniform manifestly identifies the chaplain with the 
SADF and its cause. 
4. The chaplaincy should be demilitarized. This is the best way 
to safeguard what has been agreed to in the Statement of 
Pr i n c i pl e s • 
3.3. Concrete steps towards demilitarization 
Issuing statements of principle and intention could be the start 
of a process of negotiation with the military. The initiation of 
dialogue with the military would itself be warmly applauded by a 
significant constituency within the churches, who have.noticed the 
j 
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contradiction between the churches'· anti-war stance and their 
retention of military chaplaincy. Negotiation and dialogue are, 
then, the precondition for taking concrete steps toward 
demilitarization. The situation is one of nothing ventured, 
nothing gained. Only when the negotiations are over will the 
churches have a clear idea of their ability or otherwise to 
persuade the military to accept their chosen style of ministry. 
It would be abdication of responsibility for the churches neither 
to state their position nor to initiate negotiatio~s, merely 
because they suspect that the military would not entertain their 
requests. In any case it would be ridiculous that a !church be 
' 
forced into compromised forms of ministry by a confessedly 
Christian state one whose constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion and professes allegiance to the Christian God. Let us 
now examine some concrete steps that can be taken. 
3.4. Alternative non-military ministry 
Military disapproval cannot prevent the church from instituting 
its own alternative non-military ministry to people who are 
involved in the conflict, both in South Africa and, in 
collaboration with the CCN, in Namibia. Some of the US church 
commissions recommended alternative ministry (e.g. EC:20ff, 
MMP:103f). This ministry would be in a strategic position to 
help recruits and chaplains come into contact with that sector of 
their church which perceives the military to be in alliance with 
apartheid. Its effectiveness in some areas would, of course, be 
partly dependent on the military attitude towards this form of 
ministry~ the military could make efforts to limit the church's 
access to troops and chaplains. However, if the military were 
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reasonably flexible, the "parallel chaplains" could provide 
theological input at retreats for chaplains which could serve as 
an alternative to the SA Chaplains' Service conferences which are 
usually run by Dutch Reformed Chur~h ministers. They could also 
help alleviate the difficulties that recruits suffer, arising from 
dislocation, transience, and sudden removal from their mode of 
life. On the other hand, much of the ministry of the "parallel 
chaplains" would be performed in realms where the militaJy has no 
I 
I 
influence. For instance, they could provide a much-needed 
alternative to military propaganda by running courses foJ recruits 
I 
prior to their entering the military. They could minister to 
conscientious objectors in a variety of ways: visits to prison, 
writing letters, running seminars, helping them compile their 
dossiers for presentation to the Board for Religious Objection, 
etc. They could help young men find employment after army 
service, or after community service, or after imprisonment. They 
could spread their activities further by seeking to help the 
victims of the conflict by chapneling aid to them. This could 
perform the important task of bringing about reconciliation 
between Christians in South Africa and Christians in Namibia. 
They could also be assigned to work as chaplains to soldiers on 
the "other side", to the extent that this is possible. However, 
all this would also require reformulation of the concept of 
ministry during war-time. Perhaps the title "military chaplaincy" 
has always been a misnomer, suggesting that ministry be confined 
to ministry under military auspices. A broader notion would be 
"full-orbed ministry during a time of social conflict", which 
would encompass ministry to military personnel on "both sides", a 
witness of prophecy to the military institutions concerned, and 
relief to the victims of the conflict, wherever they might be. 
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3.5. Church-based chaplaincy within South Africa 
Church-based chaplaincy can be arranged with relative ease within 
the borders of South Africa, through limited-term and part-time 
chaplaincy. Limited-term chaplaincy could serve as a bridgehead 
to fully church-based chaplaincy. There are good reasons, even 
during peace-time, for having chaplains do limited 
armed forces, because full integration can lead 
can in any secular institution to vested 
terms in the 
-""" as I indeed it 
. I d interests an 
I 
ideological acquiescence. In We st Germany chaplains serve for a 
maximum of six to eight years. Ignoring temporarily (s1e below) 
I 
the the moral difficultues involved, it could be reasoned that 
civilian status and state pay could be combined by appointing 
chaplains as Department of Manpower officials relating to the 
Defence Force as civilians. For this extraordinary kind of 
arrangement, the SADF has several equally extraordinary 
precedents: the secondment of national servicemen to Internal 
Revenue, the consignment of conscientious objectork to the 
i 
I 
Department of Manpower, its use of black civilian workers, white 
civilian secretaries and civilian managerial staff in Armscor and 
SADF Institute (for the latter, see the biographies of SADFI 
personnel, in Para tus (July 1983) , pp 2 5-32) • 
It should not be overlooked that the current chaplaincy 
arrangement already has a church-based aspect in the form of 
part-time chaplains. The numbers of these could be extended; the 
church could grant them supplementary allowances to release them 
to perform this ministry. 
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3.6. Ministry in the operational area 
A possible strategy of ministry in the operational area is to 
facilitate peer group ministry (cf. Clarke, 1982) and to extend 
the National Service chaplaincy. Since national servicemen have 
to be in the army anyway, their exercise of ministry as laity 
might not connote church sanction to the same degree as a military 
I 
chaplaincy would, because, in the theology of many 'churches, 
parishioners do not represent the church in the special and 
visible way that a minister or priest does. One of the chaplains 
I 
I 
interviewed felt that peer group ministry was probably the most 
effective form of ministry available (Ashby). 
The extension of the current National Service chaplaincy, as an 
interim measure, can be accomplished without significant 
structural changes. This could be done by having all National 
Service chaplains spend most of their time at the border, leaving 
civilian chaplains to minister to soldiers within the borders of 
So u th Af r i ca • Steps would have to be taken to ensure the 
i 
independence of National Service chaplains from SADF and DRC 
control. This would entail renegotiation of the form of the 
current three-week chaplaincy course, as well as revision of the 
National Service chaplains' use of rank~ the motives for these 
moves have been explained in a previous chapter. 
The disadvantage of this strategy of up:irading National Service 
and peer group ministry is that the church's ministry is still 
fitted to military structures to a large extent. Though this 
method might not connote religious legitimation of the military 
effort to the same extent as does the present form of military 
chaplaincy, it is nevertheless deeply implicated within military 
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structures. 
At a lesser level of ambiguity, a church-based ministry could be 
run in the larger bases near towns in Namibia e.g. at 
Grootfontein and Oshakati. Prior understanding would have to be 
reached with the Namibian churches to enable Namibian and South 
African ministers to do this, and it would be limited to ministry 
outside the military bases themselves (see Appendices~ and H). 
However, one chaplain said that even this would be imipossible, 
I 
since, in his view, the people would "run a mile" becaus~ they are 
I 
come into their churches with rifles (Voegel). 
want troops to 
I 
scared of troops, and in any case they would not 
The possibility of an alternative uniform could be considered with 
a view to satisfying SADF requirements in the operational area. 
It should not be forgotten that the dress of South African 
chaplains has been changed repeatedly during this century 
(Po tg ieter, 1971: 176-238). For instance, it was decided in 1955 
to give the chaplains a distinctive dress which would clearly 
I 
indicate their relationship with the church. In accordance with 
this principle, it was decided that Afrikaans chaplains would wear 
black shoes and socks, and a white shirt with a black tie~ English 
chaplains would wear their customary clerical dress. However, 
this arrangement was only partially successful (Potgieter, 
1971:228). Interestingly, during the Anglo-Boer War some 
chaplains on the British side wore military uniform, while others 
did not, but all used the Red Cross armband (see photograph of 
chaplains of the Natal army, in Watkins, 1901). An example of a 
successful attempt by a non-military agency to retain its 
distinctiveness, was that of the Friends Ambulance Unit, whose 
members wore a civilian khaki uniform which carried no military 
J 
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insignia (Davies, 1947:12,14). Another alternative is the 
selection of a type of "Red Cross" uniform. As is explained in 
Appendix B, there is no legal barrier to prevent the church from 
negotiating with the military to grant these chaplains full 
protected status in terms of the Geneva Co nven ti on. Be fore all 
hope of ministry to soldiers in Namibia is abandoned, some or all 
of these models should be tested. However, as has been said 
I 
above, the church may not be able to avoid a position of painful 
I 
ambiguity with respect to its mi,nistry to soldiers bn foreign 
soil. This is one of the unfortunate, but, it would seem, 
inevitable consequences of a stance which questions the,ethics of 
a particular war. 
3.7. Long-term financial planning 
It is a complex question whether money should be accepted from the 
SADF. On the one hand, it is only because of conscription ·and the 
separated nature of military life that the occasion has arisen to 
provide ministry to military personnel. Therefore the military 
is obligated to see to the bodily needs (foud, recreation, etc.) 
of its soldiers under these separated conditions. It follows that 
it should foot the bill for their spiritual needs as well. This 
is the argument used by ·chaplaincies throtJ3hout the West (cf. the 
discussion on this in MMP:l8ff). Worth noting is that this 
argument i's also employed by the West Germans, who are more 
scrupulous than most in their concern for the .independence of the 
chaplaincy from military control. 
On the other hand, dangers arise when the military interprets the 
power to pay as the power to control. An American study 
concluded that "the Government care of religion may be a benefit 
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offered the church at the high cost of its singular purpose and 
the perversion of its unique mission. Government will regulate 
what it subsidizes" (MMP:36f). Suspicions can easily arise 
concerning the motives which the state has in paying chaplains. 
At its most crass, this can take the form of threats of withdrawal 
of pay. These suspicions are exacerbated when chaplains have 
higher salaries than their civilian counterparts. To people who 
believe that the military is supporting apartheid, and that the 
military chaplaincy is a compromised form of ministry, the 
conservative attitudes of the patriotic chaplains and their 
reception of military pay are two sides of the same coin. 
i 
Hence 
the feeling that there should be a complete break with the 
military. A leaf could be taken from the government's book: if 
the state holds as an article of faith that the USSR controls the 
ANC by funding it (cf. White Paper 1984), and that foreisn 
churches influence the SACC by underwriting the organization (cf. 
the discussion of this in the Eloff Commission), could it not be 
argued that the SADF is doing the same to the chaplaincy? This 
argument would b.e decisive, were it not for several complicating 
factors, which other writers have raised. 
First, the church receives a subsidy from the state to the extent 
that it is tax-exempt (cf. Cox, 197l:xi). Second, other officers 
in the church receive state salaries, e.g. lecturers in 
theological ~epartrnents at universities. Third, even if chaplains 
were paid by the state, they would still have to have an office at 
the military base and be dependent upon the military for transport 
in the operational area (Abercrombie, 1979:50). The first t~ 
are minor points. Tax exemption is granted to all non-profit 
organizations across the board~ there does not appear to be be any 
threat of withdrawal of tax-exempt status in order to enforc~ 
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state control. The church-state problem with r~spect to 
educational institutions is similar to· that relating to! military 
' ' 
chaplaincy, as has been observed above. Here, too, vigilance has 
to be maintained to ensure that the university does not abuse its 
financial powers. Yet the crucial difference -- at pres~nt! -- is 
that the university is looked upon as a benignly tolerant 





ideological perspective, and to be a major 
injustice in Southern Africa. 
The point about accommodation and transport of chaplains is more 
serious. However, if ministry is to be meaningful, some kind of 
arrangement regarding accommodation and transport is un~voidable: 
to reject these is to admit that ministry to military pe~sonnel is 
impossible. If ministry is desired, then some . residual 
ambiguities will have to be borne. It could be reasoned that it 
is the greater matter of stipends that is decisive: to moralize 
about accommodation and transport borders on tokenisn. I However, 
consider paying for these services in the same the church might 
for land or administrative officls. 
I 
In way as it pays 
conclusion, it would seem wiser for the church to shun military 
pay. But then the financial burden looms large. What is 
important is that a start be made • 
. Rome was not built in a day. The church could adop~ a long-term 
staggered programme of· change, starting by putting money aside 
(mainly for a housing programme) for small nunbers of chaplains at 
first. In time, nunbers of church-finance.d chaplains could grow, 
depending on the strength of the church's commitment tio civilian 
ministry and the success of its parallel ministry. 
If due to budgetary constraints it were accepted that a more 
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have no assurance of being able to slot into senior church 
positions. Thus an\immediate transition to a 6- or 8-year term of 
I 
chaplaincy would be stormy and could be marked by intense personal 
tragedy arising from feelings of rejection by the church and from 
feelings that their own personal and pastoral integrity was being 
questioned. Once a limited term chaplaincy was in place, 
however, there would not be the same problem of vested interests. 
It would be easier to introduce a limited-term chaplaincy 
gradually, by appointing all new chaplains on that basis. This 
would, however, fail to come to terms with the central problem 
that the current military style of chaplaincy is out of step with 
the church's commitment to social justice in South Africa and 
Namibia. 
A related problem during transition is that the chaplains, and 
especially the Permanent Force chaplains, might feel that they are 
duty bound to resist the dictates of a church which in their 
opinion has lost sight of the gravity of the communist 'onslaught 
and is contemplating an unworkable concept of chapla~ncy which 
could only result in abandoning its own parishioners in their most 
need. The angry reaction of Rev. J. Voegel at a consultation in 
May 1982 suggests that the possibility of resistance of some kind 
is not far-fetched. On that occasion he said, 
"If provincial synod were to decide that chaplains should be 
withdrawn, the chaplains would have to get together and 
decide what action they would take in the matter" (See~, 
July 1983, p7). 
Again, the attempted renegotiation of the MCSA chaplaincy in 
1977-8 caused great unhappiness, as is apparent from the 
interviews. One chaplain left the church to join the 
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Congregational Church (Pretorius). The churches would be faced 
with an extremely perplexing situation if many chaplains were to 
refuse to comply with the instituted changes or to leave to join 
other churches or to leave the ministry and join the military. 
More conservative churches which support the military style of 
chaplaincy could easily be found: the Church 
;v .s,,...,~,,·~ 
of Englan~ the 
Baptist Union (cf. the issue on Baptist pastors in uniform which 
shows virtually no awareness of the ethical dilemmas faced by 
chaplains, South African Baptist (October 1983)), and the 
Pentecostal churches (cf. the Pentecostal' Commission's 
pro-military statement, "Declaration of Policy ••• ", which 
Pentecostal National Service chaplains were required to sign 
(January 1981)). 
It might be mentioned in passing that this issue of vested 
interests might itself constitute a reason for the church to avoid 
a military style of chaplaincy, for the system makes it extremely 
difficult to modulate.or alter the form of the chaplaincy in 
' 
response to changing circumstances. It can inhibit ·the church 
from inquiring too far into how to change the system so that it 
may best meet the needs of its parishioners. 
It is therefore submitted that the church's severest problems in 
renegotiating its chaplaincy are internal to itself. It is here 
that the concept of a "confessing church" becomes relevant. The 
famous 1934 Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church against 
Hitler was a statement of theological principle, but it divided 
the German church between those who supported the "Fuehrerprinzip" 
from those who opposed it. It might be that,'in the South 
African context, the suggested statement of principles above might 
have a similar winnowing effect, as it would separate those who 
I 
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are strongly opposed to having their chaplaincy confer religious 
legitimacy on an unjust cause from those who are not. In the 
end, this could amount to a call for radical • I obedience to God. 
Karl Barth's call, born of his experience in the Confessing 
Church, has great significance in South Africa: 
"No sentence is more dangerous or revolutionary than that 
God is One and there is no other like Him. All the 
permanencies of the world draw their life from ideologies 
and mythologies, from open or disguised religions; and to 
this extent from all possible forms of deity and divinity. 
It was on the truth of the sentence that God is One that the 
"Third Reich" of Adolf Hitler made shipwreck. Let this 
sentence be uttered in such a way that it is heard and 
grasped,, and at once four hundred prophets of Baal are 
always in fear of their lives. There is no more room now 
for what the recent past called toleration. Be side God 
there are only His creatures or false gods, and beside faith 
in Him there are religions only as religions of 
superstition, error and finally irreligion" (CD II/1:444). 
In addition to the probability of resistance on the part of 
chaplains, there is the certainty of divergent church opinions as 
to what is to be done. The divided state of the church in South 
Africa makes the formulation of proposals for consideration by the 
armed forces very difficult. Perceptions about the war differ in 
content and intensity. For instance, the MCSA has requested the 
withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia, but in nothing like the 
insistent tone of the Catholic Bishops. The CPSA has verbalized 
a position on the war on South Africa's borders; none of the other 
churches have done so. The Congregational and Presbyterian 
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churches have far fewer men in the chaplaincy and hence might not 
view the problem with the same urgency as the other churches. The 
Ba pt is t Ch u r ch es' strong commitment to their particular style of 
evangelism and their pietistic/conservative position on social 
questions make participation by them unlikely. Disunity enables 
the SADF to play one church off against another, and subtly 
~f the deal 
I 
exploit the fact that if one church pulls out 
I 
altogether, other churches could step in 
stealing". 
and engage 1 in 
I 
"sheep 
Perhaps the most promising alignment would be a combined 
MCSA-CPSA-SACBC effort. Their members combined represent over 
half of the English-speaking National Servicemen: hence these 
churches would be able to pull considerable weight with the SADF. 
However, even here many theological difficulties would have to be 
ironed out. For instance, the MCSA would probably go along with 
the above criticisms of the hierarchical rank structure of the 
chaplaincy, but the other two churches , with their own extended 
hierarchies, might not perceive this in so serious a light. 
From this point on, our thinking is necessarily more speculative: 
but it would be profitable to consider what would happen if these 
three churches were to overcome their internal difficulties and 
seek renegotiation with the SADF, perhaps along the lines of the 
June 1984 call for demilitarized chaplaincy by the SACC National 
Conference (6). Would the SADF agree to a more civilian- or 
church-based chaplaincy? In one sense the SADF cannot afford not 
to agree. It cannot afford to be seen in the posture of 
dictating to the churches how their ministry should be conducted. 
Nor can it afford to be seen as an "unchristian army", as it no 
doubt would if there were a high-decibel pull-out by the churches. 
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If this happens, the SADF would lose face among Christians in 
South Africa, and the government would lose the last shreds of 
legitimacy that it might still have among churches overseas; this 
could push the latter in the direction of support for the 
Programme to Combat Racism. These considerations would urge the 
SADF in the direction of honouring the churches' requests for a 
demilitarized chaplaincy. In another sense, though,! the SADF 
could also lose a great deal by accepting demilitarized 
chaplaincy. For this, too, would create by-products which involve 
a considerable loss of legitimacy for the SADF. If the 1974 
Harnmanskraal statement and subsequent church s ta temen ts on 
conscientious objection signified the first open break between the 
military and the churches, there is a sense in which demilitarized 
chaplaincy would constitute a final break with the institution. 
The new system would be a symbol of the church's new understanding 
of itself as a "sign of contradiction" amid the powers, and would 
signify a break with the traditional concept of the church as the 
mainstay and legitimizer of the state. It would perhaps be the 
churches' clearest statement of their dissatisfaction with the 
role of the SADF in South Africa and Namibia. In this way it 
would tend to undermine the bases of legitimacy of the apartheid 
state itself. The desire of the churches for demilitarized 
ministry to military personnel would no doubt be perceived, as was 
the 1974 Hammanskraal statement, as an attempt to "discredtt the 
SADF and bring it into disrepute" (Eloff:l91) by "strik[ing] at 
the root of a system on which the SADF is dependent for its 
existence and performance" (Eloff:l99). But here the analogy 
ends. Conscientious objection can, in a sense, be "co-opted" by 
both the church and the state: the church can claim to uphold the 
right of conscientious objection while supporting all those young 
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men who do cooperate with the conscription system. In the 
absence of any definite challenge by the church, most young men 
would probably end up cooperating. The state, for its') part, can 
co-opt the phenomenon by, on the one hand, providing (rather 
unattractive) channels for limited forms of conscientious 
objection, while on the other hand pu~ishing other forms of 
conscientious objection heavily and preventing debate about the 
subject by law. The small nunber of conscientious objectors that 
there have been in south Africa "have had no significan~ effect on 
the military capability of the SADF", as the El off, <;::ommission 
noted (Eloff:l99). 
Not so with demilitarized chaplaincy. In this case, the change 
is long-term and structural, and would of necessity involve every 
single chaplain. Its symbolic meaning before troops, members of 
the church, the military, and opponents of the regime would have 
its own ripple effects. It would prompt a great deal more 
questioning among chaplains themselves, and- mo~e critical 
a t tit ud es wo ul d be the probable res ul t. Fo r yo u n g w hi t e men i t 
would exercise a ministry by prompting them to question their 
participation in the military; this could in turn result in a much 
wider movement of conscientious objection than has been witnessed 
hitherto. It would mean that the church would take a firmer 
stand against torture, as chaplains are freed of the institutional 
bonds that inhibit protest. It would strengthen the hand of 
young men who are conscience-stricken about their own or their 
unit's participation in torture. A demilitarized chaplaincy 
would involve an admission by the church that its own form and 
ministry have to change in order to respond to changing 
circuns tances. Just as the conscientious objection issue was the 
catalyst which led to closer investigation of the chaplaincy, so 
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the chaplaincy issue would be a catalyst for other social 
questions. For example, if it is admitted that the church should 
not advance troop morale when it opposes the war, might it not be 
thoUJ ht that the church should encourage its members not to pay 
that portion of their taxes which supports the military? 
All of these by-products of demilitarized chaplaincy would be 
teared by the military. Particularly offensive would be the 
I 
thought that a demilitarized system of chaplaincy Jould permit 
ministry by people who did not support military aims, or who were 
frankly opposed to them. It would be difficult for the military 
to accept that there be an "alternative society" in its midst 
which would not offer the military its unqualified loyalty, and 
i~deed might consider the role of the military to be that of 
"protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order" .r Such 
a chaplaincy could be likened to a "Trojan horse". The military 
bosses might therefore .feel inclined to resist renegotiation, or 
at least make the terms of any renegotiation so unatttactive and 
restrictive that the hand of the conservatives within the churches 
would be strengthened. The alliance between the state and the 
conservatives within the church would be cemented. Bo th would 
emphasize, as they have done in the past, that military chaplaincy 
is the only practicable solution, and that the churches have to 
choose between that and nothing at all. It would be in the 
interest of both to deny that any "middle road" is possible. 
Implicit in this is a veiled threat by the military that if the 
churches refused to bow to its terms, the military would refuse 
them all entry. The real situation, however, is not an 
"either-or". The military could easily create middle pat~s which 
the churches would find effective, as the churches in Germany have 
found over a period of nearly thirty years. 
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However, it is not only the military that stands to lose. 
The 
churches' strongest "bargaining chip" is the military' s fear of 
being labelled an "unchristian army" if the chaplaincy were dis-
continued: the military's strongest "bargaining chip" is the 
churches' fear of losing contact with young men of impressionable 
age. P.W. Botha was not so wide of the mark when he made the 
grandiose claim that "national service is the Church's last hope 
in south Africa" (Hansard (29.10.1974) :6850). Thousands of young 
I 
men have their only meaningful contact with ministers of religion 
when they are doing national service. Of course this observation 
begs the questions (i) whether the church should use the 
instrunents of state to further its growth, and, if the answer is 
in the affirmative, (ii) what sort of instrunents and under what 
conditions it may use them. Nevertheless the fact of the matter 
is that many of the English-speaking churches, which are suffering 
from declining attendance and inadequate nunbers of clergy, 
consider themselves deeply dependent on the opportunities provided 
b'y the mi 1 i tary. 
I have tried to show in this thesis that there are important moral 
and theological considerations which urge that the churches 
themselves set the conditions for ministry, and that, in South 
Africa's current political climate, those conditions should take 
the form of demilitarized chaplaincy. How the negotiation 
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In this appendix I take up the argument of Chapter 2 dealing with 
the ethics of the conflicts in which the SADF is engaged, both 
domestically and in Namibia. Ideally this would require a full 
analysis of just war theory and of South African and Namibian 
history, politics and economics, but this would take us well 
beyond the limits of this thesis. Accordingly I have chosen the 
more modest course of giving an exposition of the stance of some 
churches and assessing their validity, by examining their internal 
consistency and their essential correspondence to social reality. 
This is not to suggest that these are the only positions which the 
church could possibly adopt. In fact some of the English-speak-
ing churches have n6 explicit position, and it is possible that 
some of them, like the Baptist Union, would adopt an attitude 
supportive of the SADF if required to choose (cf. van den Aardweg, 
quoted in EP Herald (2.5.1983)~ and South African Baptist (October 
1983)). However, 
consequences only 
e_xpl ici tly. 
1. NAMIBIA 
of 
my limited objective 






1.1. Church positions 
1.1.1. The Roman Catholic Church 
On 14 May 1982, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference 
released a "Report on Namibia" wh-ich had been compiled after 
meetings with some 100 people who formed a representative sample 
of black Namibian opinion (Report:l06). 
most black Namibians 
The bishops stated that 
(a) consider the present regime a South African imposition, 
still "blatantly geared" to apartheid (Report:l09)~ 
(b) do not fear the SWAPO guerrillas but the South African 
security forces, viewing the latter as an army. of 
occupation~ 
( c) support SWAPO, viewing it essentially as a national 
liberation movement. 
After listing several SADF atrocities, and conceding that SWAPO 
also commits atrocities, the bishops concluded that 
"there is a universal consensus, with South Africa virtually 
the only dissenting voice, that South Africa has no right to 
be in Namibia ••• the great majority of Namibians have one 
overriding desire and that is the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 435, resulting in a ceasefire, 
the withdrawal of the SA Security Forces and the holding of 
elections under UN auspices" (Report:ll4). 
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1.1.2. The CPSA 
Following a study of the Namibian situation made by a delegation 
of Episcopal Synod, the bishops of the CPSA concluded, like the 
Catholic bishops, that 
"the 
SADF 
large majority of 
in the land, nor 
the people there neither want the 
regard the SA Government as 
representing their best interests, welfare, or ~rotection" 
(Cape Times, 19.4.1983). 
On the basis of this conviction, the bishops called for "urgent 
and immediate steps" toward independence by all parties involved 
(Cape Times, 19.4.1983). 
1.1.3. The MCSA 
A statement issued on 5.5.1983 by the President of the MCSA 
Conference, chairmen of districts and departmental heads, pointed 
out that 
"a significant proportion of the population in Ovamboland 
regard the South African armed forces as a source of 
insecurity and fear" (Statement:!). 
Like the Catholic bishops, the Methodist representatives observed 
that both the SADF and SWAPO are responsible for the "needless 
suffering" of the Namibian people, and called on both parties to 
suspend military operations and to enter into urgent negotiations 
with each other and other interested parties, on the basis of UN 
Security Council Resolution 435 (Statement:2). 
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1.1.4. Discussion 
These statements do not imply unanimous support within the three 
churches for the withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia. Large 
numbers of lay white people in South Africa, perhaps a majority, 
might disagree. Yet these statements issued by ecclesiastical 
authorities do represent a significant body of opinion, and 
especially black opinion, within the churches. In the case of 
the CPSA, that body of opinion appears to be fairly large: by 165 
votes to 6, the Provincial Synod of the CPSA passed a resolution 
to the effect that the vital function of the SADF had become "the 
protection of unjust structure~ in both Namibia and South Africa 
(P. Russell, 1983). It therefore seems reasonable to accept as a 
working hypothesis that the overall opinion of these three 
churches is that South Africa should cease its unjust occupation 
of Namibia. 
I now proceed to examine briefly the validity of the call that 
these churches have made. 
legitimately adopt? Or 
Is it a position which Christians can 
is it a maverick and hopelessly 
idealistic position which ignores the historical, political and 
legal dimensions of the Namibian problem? To beg in w i th , I 
examine the Namibian question in light of international law. 
1.2. South Africa's presence in Namibia: Legal or illegal? 
A strong case can be made that South Africa's presence in Namibia 
is a contravention of international law. The case rests upon the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice handed down 
in 1970. Because certain aspects of the Court's judgment are 
controversial, some explanation of the process leading up to the 
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events of 1970 will be necessary (cf. Landis, 1982). 
In 1884 Germany declared a protectorate over the area now known as 
Namibia, naming it German South West Africa. When World War I 
broke out, the British government urged South Africa to invade 
South West Africa so as to place it "at the disposal of the 
Imperial Government" after the war. South Africa complied and in 
July 1915 the German forces in south West Africa surrendered. 
After the war the League of Nations established al system of 
mandates in accordance with President Woodrow Wilson's insistence 
on a "peace of no annexation~. SWA became a C class mandate 
which South Africa, as mandatory, could administer as an "integral 
part" of the Union. It was the dissolution of the League at the 
end of World War II that gave rise to the legal wrangles which 
eventually issued in the 1970 ICJ opinion. 
After World War II all former League mandatories were invited to 
submit their mandates to the United Nations,trusteeship system on 
a voluntary basis. All but South Africa agreed. In due course 
the mandates were given independence. South Af r i ca so ug ht the 
approval of the General Assembly for the incorporation of SWA as 
part of the Union, claiming that the people of the territory 
desired it. The falsity of the claim was established later, but 
the Assembly, without the evidence, dismissed the South African 
case on the grounds that the Africans were not prepared to make 
the choice. South Africa submitted one annual report on its 
administration of the territory to the Assembly, but then, in 
reaction to criticism, discontinued the practice. The National 
Party argued that the dissolution of the League terminated the 
mandate, and South Africa now ruled by right of occupation 
(Hansard 19.3.1947, column 1327: 11.4.1947, column 2588). south 
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Africa had some justification for this view, in that no agreement 
had been entered into at the formation of the League as to the 
rights and duties of member States at its dissolution. On the 
other hand, the absence of law regarding the succession of 
international bodies was due to the novelty of the League concept; 
South Africa could not expect the League to anticipate its 
imminent dissolution, and should have been prepared for innovative 
legislation. In the event South Africa went ahead and attempted 
to incorporate the territory piecemeal, starting by ~ranting it 
representation in the South African parliament. SouJh Africa's 
motives were deeply distrusted when the Prime Minister indicated 
that this was to knit SWA constitutionally closer to South Africa 
to inhibit its secession from the Union. 
An advisory opinion of the ICJ in 1950 held that the functions 
previously exercised by the League now vested in the UN, but that 
South Africa was not obliged to submit SWA to the UN trusteeship 
system. The court was unanimous in finding that the right to 
modify the status of SWA lay with South Africa acting with the 
consent of the UN. 
In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia, both former League members, asked 
the ICJ to confirm, among other things, that South Africa was 
obliged to submit to UN supervision, and could not modify the 
mandate. They alleged moreover that south Africa had violated 
the mandate by attempting to modify the international status of 
the territory and by introducing apartheid which failed to promote 
the social progress of the inhabitants. South Africa raised a 
variety of preliminary objections, among others that the SWA 
mandate did not fall within the ambit of Article 37 of the Statute 
of the ICJ. The Court overruled the objections and commenced to 
APPENDICES -241 
hear the merits of the case in 1965. South Africa submitted that 
she was not bound by the mandate because it was extinguished after 
the demise of the League; alternatively, if the mandate was still 
in force, the UN had not succeeded to the League. However, the 
Court announced in 1966 that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the 
necessary locus standi to obtain a decision. 
The Assembly passed Resolution 2145 (XXI) in 1966, declaring that 
since South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations, the 
mandate was terminated and SWA came under the direct 
responsibility of the UN. The "Coun.cil for Namibia" was 
established as a kind of government in exile. In 1968, as a 
result of• the "terrorist trial" of 37 South West Africans, the 
Security Council endorsed GA 2145 (XXI) and asked South Africa to 
withdraw before 4 October 1969. South Africa refused, whereupon 
the Security Council passed Resolution 276 which deemed South 
Africa's continued presence in the territory illegal. France and 
the United Kingdom abstained on the grounds that GA 2145 (XXI) was 
legally suspect. To remove all doubt, the Security Council asked 
the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the following question: 
"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued 
presence of south Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding SC 
Resolution 276 (1970)?" 
The personnel of the ICJ had changed considerably since 1966, just 
as it had between 1962 and 1966. It returned to the jurisdiction 
of the 1950'~, which the 1966 ruling had appeared to disavow. I 
briefly s~marize the 1970 proceedings before returning to discuss 
their innovative character in the context of international 
jurisprudence and the historical developnent of the Court. 
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South Africa raised a host of preliminary objections, of which 
three were weightiest. First, South Africa submitted that the 
abstention of t\olO permanent members from the Security Council 
resolution could not be taken as a concurring vote as required by 
Article 27( 3) of the Charter. However, this argument ran counter 
to long~standing Security Council procedure. Second, South 
Africa required the recusal of three·members of the Court because 
they had revealed their antagonism to South Africa. Third, South 
Africa suspected that the Court would be subject t6 political 
I 
pressure. The Court tersely overruled each of these jobjections. 
Proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court found that the UN 
succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League: since the 
League had an implied right to revoke the mandate unilaterally in 
the event of a material breach of its obligations, the UN was 
similarly entitled. South Africa contended that she would have 
.been able to veto revocation under the unanimity rule. The Court 
in turn dismissed this objection because it would run counter to 
I 
the general principle of law governing termination on account of 
breach. The brusqueness of this dismissal of the unanimity rule 
is retrieved, however, by the separate opinion of two judges that 
the veto had not been used by the League respecting mandates 
(Dugard, 1971:465). 
The Court doubted, however, that GA 2145 (XXI) was legally 
binding, and found that the Assembly enlisted the cooperation of 
the Security Council. The Court then noted that SC 276 was not 
legally binding under Chapter VII of the Charter dealing with 
enforcement measures, but deemed it binding under Article 25 of 
the Charter. South Africa was therefore obliged to withdraw from 
SWA, and members of the UN were to refrain from actions which 
J 
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would seem to support or to recognize the legality of the South 
African administration. Eleven of the fifteen members backed this 
part of the ruling. The security Council adopted Resolution 301 
(1971), which accepted the Court's ruling without endorsing its 
reasoning, whose most revolutionary aspect was that Article 25 of 
the Charter made the Security Council resolution binding even 
tho~h it was not taken under Chapter VII. 
The ICJ case appears to hinge on the question of UN succession to 
the League. As if to emphasize the validity of its jukisprudence, 
the Court spent much of its time discussing the UN succession, 
even tho~ h sou th Africa had acknowledged it by its s ta temen ts and 
submission of a report on the territory to the Assembly in 1946. 
The Court had, moreover, insisted on UN succession in its 
judgments of 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1962 (Dugard, 1971:464). The 
succession question was treated by the Court in the same way as 
the question of the continuity of the mandates system. The Court 
was impressed by the overriding purpose of the system, viz. to 
ensure a "peace of no annexations", and argued that the system 
should not fall in to desuetude only because of the d if f icul ties of 
setting up a new international body on the demise of the League. 
Dugard shows that the !CJ, in contending this, typically employed 
a "teleological" approach, focussing on the objectives and 
purposes of a legal instrunent (1971:471-474). For instance, the 
Court defended the view that the concepts "well-being and 
developnen t" in the Covenant should, fifty years later, be 
interpreted as "self-determination and independence" (1971:472). 
Thus the Court's legal orientation allowed simultaneously for the 
continuity of the mandates system, for the validity of the UN 
succession, and for innovative interpretation of the clauses of 
the mandate. 
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By contrast the South African legal system tends to favour the 
British tradition of positivisn or formalisn, which focuses on the 
literal meaning of a legal text. Hence Pretoria's contention 
that incorporation of SWA was valid because the mandate was in 
practice not far removed from annexation (Dugard, 1971:473). 
However, the teleological approach cannot lightly be disnissed by 
South Africa, because it is so central an aspect of the 
international legal order, having been employed by the ICJ during 
I 
most of its history and having regularly appeared in its advisory 
opinions. 
South Africa had a strong case for two of its preliminary 
objections to the 1970 procedure. Both concerned the personnel of 
the Court. First, south Africa had requested the recusal of Judge 
Morozov, who had helped formulate the Security Council resolution 
condemning the "terrorist trial". The strength of the case is 
indicated by the 'dissent of four of the fifteen judges from the 
majority decision. Second, south Africa had also requested the 
appointment of an ad hoc South African judge to the Court. This 
request was also turned down, with five of the judges dissenting. 
However, Dugatd is convinced that even i.f these requests had been 
granted, the ICJ opinion would not have been very different 
(1971:470). 
More substantially, Dugard finds that Article 25 could not be used 
to evade the regulations of Chapter VII of the Charter. On this 
view SC 276 is not legally binding but recommendatory. 
Nevertheless he finds that the combined effect of GA 2145 (XXI) 
with subsequent Security Council resolutions is sufficient to 
impose a legal obligation upon South Africa to withdraw 
(1971:466,468). 
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In conclusion, it is submitted that South Africa's preliminary 
objections were either weak or would not have made a significant 
impact on the final decision. Al thoUJ h there are difficulties 
with the legal force of SC 276, a combination of the Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions is probably enough to render the 
South African presence in Namibia illegal. Thus the case is 
strong, even though it is not overwhelming. It appears that the 
only alternative to accepting the 
, require the Court to overturn 
ICJ ruling is anarchically to 
all its findings fbom 1950 and 
I 
I 
reform the entire system of international law in terms of South 
African and British positivisn. 
1.3. Namibia: Apartheid and resistance 
By agreeing, in 1920, to administer South West Africa as a "sacred 
trust of civilisation", South Africa had undertaken to "promote to 
the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social 
progress" of the inhabitants of the territory. Neve~theless, the 
' ' 
interests of whites were paramount from the start. By the 1922 
Native Administration. Proclamation, Africans were confined to 
reserves and subjected to police checks and pass laws (CIIR, 
1981: 10) • This action was 8enounced by the Mandates Commission 
but the machinery did not exist to prevent it. With the 
electoral victory of the National Party in 1948, Namibia was made 
de facto a fifth province of South Africa. Apartheid was 
gradually extended in the terriorty. The 1954 SWA Native Affairs 
Administration Act empowered Pretoria to administer the affairs of 
black Namibians directly (CIIR, 1981:11). The 1964 Odendaal 
Commission Report suggested the implementation of the homelands 
policy in Namibia. 
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Colonialist and apartheid rule drew forth resistance from the 
1 ocal po pul a ti on. Chiefs and church leaders made representations 
to the government in the decades prior to the 1950s. In 1958 the 
first mass political organization was formed, called the 
ovam~oland Peoples' Organization, to combat racial discrimination. 
It was renamed the South West Africa Peoples' Organization in 
1960, to underscore its national as opposed to tribal character, 
but most of its members have nevertheless been Ovambos, who 
comprise about half of the population. 
Sou th West Africa National Un ion. 
Herero speaker• formed the 
At first both organisations 
worked within the existing political order so as to change it. 
However, the South African government and the white inhabitants of 
Namibia showed no willingness to negotiate. The non-violent 
protest of the parties and the churches was met with the violence 
of arrests, imprisonment and torture (CIIR, 1981:13ff~ cf. UN 
International Conference, A/CONF.120/5, n.44-66). For instance, 
police killed eleven people when they fired on 'a crowd protesting 
the forced clearance of the Windhoek suburb of Piohierspark in 
1959 (CIIR, 1981:14). 
employment of force, 
Despite his initial opposition to the 
the founding president of SWAPO, Hermann 
Toivo ya Toivo, came to believe in the moral right of Namibians to 
engage in armed resistance against the oppressor. 
guerrilla war began in earnest. 
In 1966 
During this period, the churches of Namibia adopted an ever 
stronger stance against the South African occupation. A turning 
point occurred in 1971 when the boards of the Evangelical Lutheran 
OWambo-Kavango Church (ELOC) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in SWA (ELC) sent a memorandum to Mr B.J. Vorster, protesting the 
"race pol icy" , Group Areas legislation, job reservation, the 
contract system, and the "huniliating espionage and intimidation" 
APPENDICES -247 
used against those who expressed their thou:;J h ts openly 
(Statements: l f) 
During the subsequent decade a series of statements, petitions and 
open letters; docunented in Statements:2ff, were issued by 
representatives.of the ELOC, the ELC, the Anglican church, the 
Methodist church, and the Catholic church, who together represent 
some 70% of the Namibian population (Statements:S). For instance, 
in an open letter to or Henry Kissinger in 1976, church leaders 
I 
expressed their conviction that "the vast majorityf of black 
j 
Namibians wanted south Africa to leave the territory because of 
South Africa's "ever-increasing role of terror". They were 
/ 
convinced that the South African armed forces 
"are not in our country with the free consent or at the 
spontaneous request of the black population. The South 
African Army is forcing a civil war on this country, and 
every South African soldier Ou:;Jht to be made aware j that he 
is taking part in this imposed civil war" (Statements:Sf). 
l 
I 
Aware that internationai and Namibian opinion was turning against 
occupation, the South African government attempted to outflank 
SWAPO and other resistance groups by instituting the Turnhalle 
constitutional conference in 1975. However, this did not find 
favour with the United Nations. A five-member We stern Con tact 
Group was formed to mediate in negotiations to gu~de the country 
to independence. Nor did the Turnhalle exercise find favour with 
the churches in Namibia, who dismissed it as being "without any 
moral or legal standing", and in any case it could "only maintain 
power with the might of the South African forces" 
'· 
(Statements:9). 
The churches continued to protest the presence of the SADF and 
demand a democratic, internationally-supervised election. For 
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instance, in 1979 1 they drew the attention of the 




"frequent interruption of Church activities in our inorthern 
areas by the 
destruction of 
South African security forces 
Church property by those 
i 






forces: the intimidation and arbitrary arrest qf church 
I 
workers and other innocent citizens" (Statements: 31)
1
. 
The same theme was repeated by.the Council of Churcheslof Namibia 
I 
' i 
in 1981 in its appeal to a visiting US delegation. The CCN 
1 
requested that Security Council Resolution 435 be jimplemented 
immediately, because 
"it is our continued conviction and confidence that the only 
the UN" practical peaceful solution lies in the hands . ' of 
(CI IR, 1981: 80) • 
In light of this brief historical overview, it appear~ that the 
South African churches were justified in calling for withdrawal of 
I 
the South African security forces. Their reasons. fot doing so 
I 
were first, the· illegality of the South African prese~ce: second, 
I 
the immorality of the apartheid practices introduced t~ere: third, 
; 
the unpopularity of the security forces and the pbpularity of 
I 
i 
SWAPO, as indicated in repeated statements by churches which 
I 








and finally, one could not expect either of· the ~~lligerents 
(South Africa and SWAP9) to administer democratic elec,tions in the 
territory. This must be done by an outside parti. ~he party 
I 
which most Namibians seem to want is the UN, ) w~ich . has 
I 
historically carried high pre,tig~ in the territory ev~r since its 
i 
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should be seen in the context of the Soviet-funded military 
buildup in the subcontinent, by which the USSR "is disturbing the 
military balance in respect of the availability of military equip-
ment in Southern Africa" and making the possibility of a 
conventional attack on the RSA more likely (White Paper, 1984, 
n. 9) • The interests of both the RSA and Namibia would suffer if 
the SADF were to withdraw from Namibia without an equivalent 
withdrawal by Cuba of her troops from · Angola. so far from 
occupying Namibia, the security forces are doing a peace-keeping 
and holding operation, to prevent communist tyranny, and to make 
Namibia safe for genuine self-determination. The forceful 
military action of the SADF has created a successful strategy of 
\ 
deterrence which has made it possible "to conduct future 
negotiations in a calm and relaxed atmosphere, thereby gaining 
more time in which the negotiating process can develop, until 
lasting peace and prosperity is attained in the entire 
subcontinent" (White Paper, 1984, n.12). Contrary to those 
international observers who feel that negotiation should take 
place on United Nation terms, the south African government sees 
the United Nations as the "single most intimidating factor" in 
Namibia: such is its partiality towards SWAPO that UN-supervised 
elections would be farcical (Report:ll2). 
The third component relates to beliefs about the sincerity of- the 
government's intentions to negotiate. In this respect, the 
government argues that racial discrimination has been removed from 
the Namibian statute books in preparation for transition to 
self-rule (Report:ll2). Therefore, in the government view, the 
churches' efforts should be concentrated, not on urging South 
Africa to leave Namibia, but on exposing SWAPO's communist and 
undemocratic views, condemning the violence of SWAPO, and 
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emphasizing the "positive aspects of.the security force presence" 
like the Civic Action Programme (Report:ll2f). 
1.5. Reply to the government view 
However, this sort of riposte to the churches' position on Namibia 
is scarcely tenable. In the first place, it ignores the fact 
that, since the International Court of Justice ruling of 1970, 
South Africa has had no legal right to administer the territory. 
Accordingly its actions in the area should not be judged as though 
Namibia were an integral part of South Africa. They should be 
assessed against the background of the illegality of South 
Africa's presence in the region, in the same way as one wo ul d 
judge the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan or those of Japan in 
Manchuria in 1938. 
Second, the government view is hypocritical in its attempt to 
justifX its presence by fastening upon SWAPO atrocities and its 
own ill-starred efforts to outmanoetNre SWAPO. It ignores 
SWAPO's twenty-year history of mass political activity~ the moral 
bankruptcy of the racial order imposed by South Africa on Namibia; 
and the unwillingness of the South African government over many 
years to heed the protests against this racial order by Namibians 
and the UN. Hence the third defect, viz. that the South African 
government refuses to recognize that SWAPO has more support among 
the local population than any other party. The unwillingness of 
. 
the South African government to accept a UN-administered 
transition should be read against the background of its intense 
fears of an electoral victory by SWAPO. As far as SWAPO' s 
chances of victory are concerned, the government has good reason 
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for apprehension. The largest churches reject violence of all 
kinds, but they are in firm support of SWAPO. (The Lutheran 
leader, Bishop Dumeni, thinks that SWAPO is "more Lutheran than 
' 
mar x is t" ! ( Time, l 7. 1 0 • 1 9 8 3, p6 5) ) • This support suggests that 
in an election SWAPO would probably gain at least enolJ:3h votes to 
form a government with the help of an alliance. The church 
leaders are aware of SWAPO's marxist leanings (mariist rhetoric, 
some would say, looking at still-capitalist Zimbabwe); but/ feel 
that SWAPO is in the first place a national liberation movement 
which has every right to govern Namibia should it prove its 
popularity at the polling booth (So Kameeta, Interview at SACC 
National Conference, 28.6.1984). 
The fourth drawback in the government view is its omission of the 
extent of atrocities by the South African security forces and its 
recently-established domestic collaborators. These have been 
cited repeatedly in statements by Namibian church leaders. They 
have been documented in publications like Hunke and Ellis (1978)~ 
Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen (1981)~ and CIIR (1981). 
One of the characteristics of this warfare is that all security 
forces "kills" are called "terrorists", whether proof of this fact 
is supplied or not (perhaps on the telling assunption that the 
whole population supports the guerrilla forces?) A dead body 
cannot protest its innocence! So it is generally believed that 
"many of the so-called SWAPO "terrorists" are in fact Ovambo 
civilian men, women and children" (quoted in J/R News, April 
1981:5, from a Council of Churches in Namibia Newsletter of 
February 1981), and an estimate of the number of civilians among 
SADF "kill" figures is as high as 60% (CIIR, 1981:45). Two recent 
incidents deserve·special mention. One is that of a 63-year-old 
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Kavango man, Ndara Kapitango, who was spit-roasted by t WO 
soldiers. He ~uf fered third-degree burns and had to have hi~ 
right arm amputated. The two soldiers were fined RSO each by a 
court-martial (cape Times 1.3.1984). The other concerned a 
series of rape and murder crimes of which Koevoet ~embers were 
found guilty. Curiously, one of the pieces of evidence offered in 
mitigation of their crimes of murder was that they had been 
trained as "killing machines" for the "elimination" of guerrillas 
(Cape Times, 1.10.1983). Koevoet, according to evidence led, 
employed skilled interrogators as well as "specialists in 
extermination" (cape Times, 10.10.1983). Among other things, 
Koevoet members had impersonated SWAPO guerrillas (cape Times, 
29.9.1983). The result is that it is no longer possible for the 
government to claim that all atrocities are committed by SWAPO. 
The upshot of this evidence is that the South African government 
cannot view itself as the unselfish benefactor of the Namibian 
people. It is obviously impossible finally to judge whether the 
security forces (to use the government's euphemistic title for 
these entities) or SWAPO are the greater cause of atrocities; but 
this brief survey seems to indicate that the security forces have 
done at least as much damage as SWAPO. Certainly the image of 
the security forces has suffered damage; repeated CCN statements 
and the Catholic bishops' "Report on Namibia" suggest that most 
Namibians view the security forces with greater suspicion and fear 
. '-
than they do the SWAPO guerrillas. 
The fifth defect in the government view is its belief that it has 
prepared for the transition by removing apartheid. Officially, 
apartheid is dead (Simon, l984:lf). The lifting of racial res-
trictions has benefited a small coloured and black middle class 
and is used to justify claims that freedom of opportunity now 
I 
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exists (Simon, 1984:22). However, thro~h the ethnic structure of 
the second tier authorities, the moral equivalent of apartheid 
persists. Simon shows the continued segregation of social 
services like housing, health and education, and the persistence 
of a racial class hierarchy (1984:3). 
In sunmary, the view that the three South African churches took 
with respect to Namibia seems amply justified. It is in 
I 
accordance with the conclusions of an internatio~al Anglican 
delegation which visited Namibia in October 1983. The group, 
which included four bishops, referred to alleged SADF atrocities: 
to opposition by the local black population to the presence of the 
South African Army and the ethnic form of government: and to 
widespread support for SWAPO (Ecunews 10 (November 1983) :14). The 
South African churches, after examining the South African presence 
in terms of its legitimacy (in the minds of Namibians, as far as 
this can be assessed), its history (viz. the imposition of 
apartheid), and its legality (in the eyes of international 
jurists), have justly concluded that South Africa's hold on the 
territory is both illegal and immoral. 
2. SOUTH AFRICA 
There is little doubt that in the past most English-speaking 
churches in South Africa have exhibited an orientation of support 
for the conscription system and the armed forces as a whole. They 
have not necessarily made their positions explicit: rather they 
have evinced this attitude of support thro~ h their prayers for 
the "boys on the border", their concern for young men doing 
national service, and their willing provision of chaplains., 
However, the 1980s have witnessed a gradual alteration of the 
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position, due to growing opposition to the apartheid system 
combined with a deepening suspicion that the origin of the 
guerrilla war lies in that system. 
The only church which has made its new standpoint explicit is the 
CPSA, whose Provincial Synod has adopted a stance strongly 
critical of the SADF. A lengthy resolution (Number 13, "Service 
in the SADF") was passed, by 165 votes to 6, in November 1982. It 
points out that South Africa lacks democratic procedures which 
might allow for 
Si~ce the majority 
peaceful evolution towards a more just society. 
I 
I 
of people in South Africa suffer "gross 
oppression and exploitation", and are unable to bring about 
peaceful change, a conflict has resulted which essentially stems 
from the determination to maintain this unjust society by force. 
Therefore the Synod expressed its "serious doubts about the 
legitimacy of a military system whose role is increasingly seen as 
the protector of a profoundly immoral and unjust social order". 
Finally, the Synod said that this judgment has implications for 
the church as a whole and for individual Christians who are faced 
with compulsory military service. The Synod insisted that the 
church should speak of these matters and "endeavour to spell out 
the implications". In this thesis I attempt to carry out the 
Synod's proposal by exploring the implications of its convictions 
in the are~ of the church's ministry to military personnel. This 
must be preceded by an inquiry similar to that regarding Namibia. 
Is the view of the CPSA tenable in light of the history and 
politics of South Africa? When discussing this question I do not 
assert that the CPSA's is the only tenable view; my modest 
intention is only to show that it is a position whic~ a reasonable 
person could adopt. 
~ 
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2 .1. Apartheid 
The social problem to which the churches have applied their mind 
is the system of racial separation that came to be known in the 
1950s as apartheid. It may briefly be described as follows. The 
grand apartheid scheme demarcates Bantustans where African people 
may live, while leaving whites, coloureds and Asians in so-called 
"white" South Africa. Only a few Africans, namely those with 
Section 10 rights, are permitted to remain in "white" South Africa 
' 
' 
on a permanent basis; others are allowed to work in "~hite" South 
I 
Africa temporarily; and the rest are confined to the homelands. 
Within "white" South Africa, most areas of life are racially 
segregated: education, housing, transport, entertainment, to name 
but a few. A large proportion of the items of legislation 
constituting the apartheid system were passed at the behest of the 
National Party in the 1950s. The system was strengthened by 
nun erous i terns of "internal security" passed in the 1960s and 
1970s. However, the roots of racial domination go back to the 
period of conflict and conquest by white settlers from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. For instance, the first 
pass law system, which regulated the movement of the Khoi, was 
created in the Cape in the form of the "Caledon Code" of 1809 
(Newton-King, 1980: 176f). Parry examines the ideological shifts 
at the cape from 1854 to 1890, during which period the 
"amalgarnationist" policies of Grey were set aside in favour of the 
"segregationist" policies of Rhodes (1983: 377-391). The 
process of racial demarcation of areas began in 1894 with Rhodes' 
Glen Grey Act, and continued with the Land Act of 1913 and the 
Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. Segregation was gradually 
enshrined in law over a period of decades: housing segregation, 
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by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, the Native Building 
Workers' Act of 1951, and the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1957; 
job segregation, by the Factories, Machinery, and Building Works 
Amendment Act of 1960 and the Physical Planning and Utilization of 
Resources Act of 1967; union segregation, by the Industrial 
Conciliation Acts of 1924 and 1956: educational segregation, by 
the Bantu Education Act of 1953: and social segregation, by the 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, the Po_pulation 
' Registration Act of 1950, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
I 
of 1949, and the Immorality Act of 1927 (cf. the thoroUJh 
I 
treatment of apartheid legislation in Horrell, 1982}. Growing 
segregation was combined with disenfranchisement of the black 
majority. The African vote in the Cape, which dated from 1853, 
was gradually whittled down until it was abolished in 1936. 
Coloureds were finally removed from the common voters' roll in the 
1950s. Thus the system of racial discrimination was introduced 
in the period from, roughly, 1890 to 1960. 
The English-speaking churches reject this arrangement essentially 
on two theological grounds. First, the system is based on the 
assunption of the fundamental irreconcilability of races. 
However, if God has reconciled .the world to himself, and if 
reconciliation among people is both possible and constitutive of 
Christian faith, then the policy of apartheid is found to be 
incompatible with the very essence of the Gospel. And so the 
Message to the People of South Africa warned: "A thorough policy 
of racial separation must ultimately require that the Church 
should cease to be the Church" (Message to the People of South 
Africa:4). 
The second reason · for the rejection of apartheid by the 
jC 
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English-speaking churches is that this form of racial separation 
has caused enormous injustices which are contrary to those,A 
churches' ethical notions of equity and fairness. Among these 
injustices may be mentioned income inequality, land inequality, 
inequality in state spending, influx control, migratory labour, 
forced removals, and repression by detention, banning and torture. 
I shall explain in a moment why many Christians consider the 
combination of these injustices to amount to a situation of "gross 
oppression and exploitation". However, an important lbjection to 
l 
this procedure should be dealt with immediately. · It rnig ht be 
expressed like this: "south Africa is in the process of adopting 
a new constitution, which includes Indians and Coloureds, and this 
will soon iron out many of the injustices in South African society 
injustices of which the National Party itself is well aware. 
Besides, many items of racial discrimination have already been 
removed since the advent of P.W. Botha's enlightened rule; 
therefore to characterize south African society as "profoundly 
immoral and unjust" is not merely incorrect but anachronistic". 
However, to adopt a view of this kind is to see the problem of 
South African society in narrowly racial terms; to ignore the 
interaction of racism and capitalism; and hence to fail to come to 
grips with the profundity of the racial problem in South Africa. 
As will emerge from the ensuing discussion, this view arises from 
a shallow perception of South Africa history -- one arising from 
liberal historiography. A more inclusive view is given by the 
growing school of "revisionist" writers of South African history, 
who are turning to a "class analysis" to understand the dynamics 
of racism and apartheid. A useful but critical sunmary of this 
developnent is given by Wright (1977). In the revisionist 
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understanding, racism and responses to it are interpreted in the 
total context of all the institutions of society, and in 
particular its economic institutions. For instance, Newton-King 
finds that Ordinances 49 and 50 of 1828, long hailed by liberal 
historians as a hunanitariqn triumph, may better be seen as 
instances of state regulation of the Cape labour market arising 
out of the acute labour shortage of the time (1980:200). 
Similarly, Crehan finds that the early mission institutions, 
Christianity, civilization 
I 
about the indissoluble link between 
I and capitalism, and hence about the 
because of their convictions 
I 
necessity for a "free" labour market, facilitated the 
incorporation of blacks into the market economy of the Cape 
(1978:159f). This approach S1.l3gests that, in a capitalist society 
like South Africa, race relations are a class question, into 
which, as Genovese has shown in his work on slavery, 
"the race question intrudes and gives··~· a special force 
and form but does not constitute its essence" (1969:7). 
St rue tural, and not merely psychological and cultural, 
explanations of racism and segregation are being offered (cf. 
Ad am, 1979:24). These writers break with the view, recently 
expressed by O'Dowd, that with economic growth, 
"South Africa will follow the normal pattern of political, 
social and economic developnent from minority rule, thro1.l3h 
a liberal era, to a welfare state, and that in the process 
the "race question" will be solved" (1977:37). 
Apartheid is no longer seen, in the liberal vision of the Oxford 
~ 
History of South Africa, as fundamentally irrational, and hence 
doomed to extinction under pressure of economic growth. Rather 
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racis:n and its institutional form of apartheid are seen as 
functional to capitalis:n and economic growth. This explains its 
persistence and entrenctunent during the 1960s, during which period 
growth rates were higher than ever before or since (Houghton, 
1976:40-44). 
The revisionist writers have tried to show how, under economic 
pressures, racial legislation was enacted. With 
industrialization in the late nineteenth century, and expanding 
markets in food and labour, white farmers resorted tJ preventing 
competition by black farmers by limiting African landholdings and 
raising peasants' taxes (Bundy, 1972: 382ff). In the early 
twentieth century, the labour contract system and the pass law 
system were refined to ensure adequate supplies of labour both to 
the mines and to white commercial agriculture (Greenberg, 
1980:39lf~ Morris, 1976:24f). Simultaneously the contract system 
provided mining and industry with a rationale for paying lower 
wages than otherwise. State power was employed to destroy African 
unions. Wilson shows how, through manipulative legislation, the 
gold mining houses were able to keep African wages constant from 
1911 to 1969. During the same period the ratio between white and 
black earnings increased from 9,0:1 to 17,9:1 (1972:66). The 
revisionist writers argue that racism in South Africa must be seen 
as an "ideology which sustains and reproduces capitalist relations 
of production" (WOlpe, 1972:454). Apartheid is not merely the 
result of racist attitudes. However, this does not mean that the 
question of racism should not be addressed directly: it means that 
when this is being done, its profound economic significance should 
be kept clearly in mind. 
If the capitalist pattern of economic growth is an important cause 
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of twentieth century racisn, how do these writers explain the rise 
of Afrikaner nationalisn and its theories of apartheid? Apartheid 
is seen as a legitimizing ideology which uses modern philosophical 
traditions, especially German idealism, to play down the 
individual and uplift the "volk" or nation (Greenberg, 1980:393). 
T/h us the revisionists are concerned with "decoding the 'reality' 




Controversy still rages about precise periodization and about 
I 
the 
exact definition and influence of the various "class actor~ 
involved (e.g. white farmers, mining capital, industrial ca pi ta!, 
monopoly capital, white workers, the state bureaucracy, etc.) 
There is still disagreement about whether racism is wholly 
attributable to capitalism (which few writers would maintain): or 
in large part attributable to capitalism, while having in addition 
a life of its own. Furthermore, there is still disagreement on 
the extent to which ethnic mobilization is able independently to 
explain the current structure of society. For instance, Adam 
points out that class analysis fails to explain "why ethnic 
symbolism so easily succeeds in obscuring its beneficiaries ••• 
even though the mobilization goes against their real interests" 
(1979:50). The classic treatment of ethnic mobilization as the 
cause of Afrikaner power is Moodie (1975): but this work, too, has 
received its revisionist reply in O'Meara (1983). 
H~wever, broad consensus has been reached on the essentials of the 
revisionist interpretation of South African history as explained 
above. Regrettably the conservative-liberal-revisionist debate 
cannot be entered into any further in this work. I have tried 
briefly to illustrate its explanatory power. While recognizing 
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that other approaches may lead to different ethical conclusions, I 
shall henceforward adopt the revisionist understanding of South 
African history. The significance of doing so will emerge more 
clearly once we have looked into the racial question and the 
involvement of the SADF in it. I shall enumerate the problems in 
the following order: inequality in land ownership and political 
representation; disparities in welfare; malnutrition; unequal 
state spending: influx control and relocation: and repression. 
(a) Land ownership and political representation. Apartheid has 
come to mean gross inequality in land ownership and, parallel with 
I 
i 
this, inequality in political representation. White people in 
South Africa constitute about 17% of its population. The 
government regards the black population as divided into three 
g r o ups: Af r i cans ( over 7 5 % ) , ' Co loured s' (a bout . 6 % ) , and As i ans 
(about 2%). Africans are further arbitrarily classified along 
supposedly tribal lines, and each of the ten 'tribes' is deemed to 
be a separate nation, whose rights are confined to the ten 
I 
'homelands'. The 'homelands' together comprise a paltry 13% of 
south Africa's land area. All African people within the 
remaining 87% of the country are there on sufferance and to serve 
white needs; none of them may vote or participate in government. 
A 1977 estimate puts their number at 9,5 million, i.e. about half 
of all Africans in South Africa (Horrell, 1982:79). 
(b) Disparities in welfare. The racial form of economic and 
political developnent in South Africa is marked by large 
inequalities in welfare. Perhaps the most basic of these is the 
historically unequal distribution of land cited above. Income 
I 
distribution figures, though imprecise due to paucity of data, are 
another telling indicator of disparities in welfare. McGrath 
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shows that, in the period 1917 to 1970, whites, who constitute 
approximately 14% of the population, received approximately 73% of 
all personal income, while all blacks together received the 
remaining 27% (1977:152). The income disparity ratio between 
whites and Africans has gradually widened, from 10 1 6 in 1946/7 to 
12,9 in 1980 (McGrath, 1984:24). 
showing that South Africa is 
inequality league (1978:177). 
Archer has collected evidence 
one of the leaders bf the world 
These conclusions should be 
treated with care. Persistent or growing inequal~ty does not 
I 
necessarily imply that levels of welfare are falling in absolute 
I 
terms. McGrath indicates that real incomes of Africans rose by 
1, 5% per annum between 1946/7 and 1980; in the same period those 
of whites rose by ·2% p.a. (1984:24) Thus McGrath's data suggests 
that, on average, incomes increased all r.ound, but inequality 
grew. Budlender et al. show in their research on Industrial 
Council wage rates, that real wages of labourers rose by some 
12,8% over the period 1973 to 1982, i.e. by slightly less than 1% 
blind one 
I 
to p.a.; however, this gradual improvement should not 
the fact that-most rates remain very low indeed. Only one of the 
scores of wage rates exceeded the Supplementary Living Level 
(1984:5). These measures of inequality do not purport to show 
that blacks in South Africa are all worse off than blacks 
elsewhere. Politicians are wont to point out that in income terms 
they are better off than, say, people in Upper Volta. This, 
however, is as true as it is irrelevant. Black people compare 
themselves, not with alien peoples of whom they know nothing, but 
with that small and visible group, comprising white people in the 
main, which enjoys a disproportionate share of the country's 
resources. 
{c) Malnutrition. The results of South Africa's extreme 
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inequality are well known. Prof. John Hansen estimates that 6005 
black children died from malnutrition in 1970 (1984:2)~ using 
Department of Health and Welfare data, he shows that some 2,25 
million out of 9 1 75 million children are u'nderweight for age in 
South Africa (1984:4). While there has been improvement in areas 
where incomes have risen, as for "coloureds" in Cape Town, ~n 
other areas, like the Ciskei, 60 to 70% of children are 
underweight (1984:7). The problem does not lie with kgricultural 
I 
supply. It is easy to show that enough food is produc~d in South 
I 
I 
Africa to provide every man, woman and child in the ?ountry with 
more than double the recommended daily allowance of calories 
I 
(Moll, 1984:4,29). The malnutrition problem arises from sheer 
lack of resources which is in turn a function of access to land, 
employment and the state coffers. Some reply that a prime 
' strategy cgainst poverty is a national po pul a ti on control 
programme (e.g. Demographic Trends: 206-212). Others feel that , 
fertility decrease is the result of urbanization and income growth 
rather than its cause (Grant, 1984). I shall not deal with this 
J 
vexed question here except to repeat Prinsloo's warning that in 
black urban households in Cape Town and Durban, the average 
proportion of adults is sufficiently high to render population 
control an insignificant issue in the improvement of their 
economic status (1984:9,56). 
(d) Unequal state spending. Beside inadequate land and low 
incomes, black people, and especially Africans, are faced with 
racially disparate state expenditures. Education spending is a 
case in point. In 1979-80, per capita expenditure on school 
pupils was Rll69 for whites, R390 for Indians, R234 for 
"coloureds", and R91 for Africans. Similar d~sparities are 
observable in the years before and since (Pillay, 1984:2f). Low 
j 
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black educational funding is reflected in South Africa's high 
black pupil-to-teacher ratios, which are poorer than those in 
several Third World countries, including Algeria, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Brazil (Pillay, 1984:16). 
Nattrass has shown that the ratio of state assistance to white and 
black farming was a massive 197: 1 between 1910 and 1936; sub-
I 
sequen tly it improved to 14: l in the 1950s, and 2:1 by 1973. 
i 
However, if the aid is reckoned in 
I 
per farmer rather than in total 
I 
terms, the gap is considerably wider because there are many more 
black farmers than white (1981:120). 
(e) Influx control and forced removals. Other soc~al problems 
arising from the powerlessness of black people are influx control 
and relocations. Africans in the "common area" who do not have 
section lO(a) or (b) rights are treated as temporary migrants. 
However, poverty in the rural areas is so great that migration 
continues unabated. As a result tens of thousands of Africans 
are prosecuted for offences under the pass laws eac~ year. For 
instance, in 1979 the total number of pass law arrests by the 
South African Police in the whole Republic was 99 660 males and 20 
209 females (Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980:302). 
Indeed, the migratory labour system has been condemned by almost 
all the churches, including the white Dutch Re formed Church (Human 
relations and the South African scene:74-76). The history of 
forced relocation ("resettlement" in officialese) has been solidly 
documented by the Surplus Peoples' Project (1983), and summarized 
in "Re locations: The Churches' report on forced removals". So 
far some 3,5 million people have been removed, some more than 
once, in the government's effort to create the Bantustans. An 
estimated 2 million people are still to be moved. Th is is larger 
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than the forced migration of various Soviet peoples by Stalin 
(Relocations: l 3f) • The disruption of stable communities and the 
systematic destruction of family life caused by force~ relocation 
has been roundly condemned by many of the English-speaking 
churches. 
(e) Repression. These glaring inequalities have engendered protest 
I 
an¢ resistance. To keep the system intact, the state has resorted 
to many techniques of repression. Ba nnings and det~ntion.s are 
used against political organizers, churchmen and trad~ unionists. 
The government justifies these extraordinary measures by claiming 
that the people involved are either "terrorists" or 11 hommunists" 
or their suspected supporters. However, these definitions are 
arbitrary and the means used subject to abuse. The Detainees' 
Parents' Support Committee has periodically submitted evidence 
suggesting that "systematic and widespread torture" has been used 
on deta_inees (e.g. Survey of Race Relations in· South Africa 
1982:253). Several scores of people have mysterio.usly died in 
I 
detention, one vivid example of this being the white poctor Neil 
Aggett. Many detainees are released months after their arrest 
without charges being laid. Censorship laws prevent the 
distribution of "undesirable" political literature. No reporting 
may be done on conditions inside prisons, and the Defence Force 
may inhibit the printing of anything not perceived to be in the 
interests of "national security". The former military 
intelligence chief Lt.-Gen. H. de v. du Toit has, along with 
opposition spokesmen, criticized the government's "almost total 
ban" on information to the public about military actions in Angola 
(Argus, 10.1.1984). Young men who feel that they cannot in 
conscience defend the system or participate in the occupation of 
Namibia have in the past faced prison sentences of normally a 
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year. The sentence was raised in 1983 to a period of 6 years, 
the same as that in the USSR ("Conscientious objection to military 
service in Europe", p70). 
For many Christians, these injustices add up to a situation of 
fundamental injustice which may aptly be described, as it was by 
the CPSA, as a situation of "gross oppression and exploitation". 
Let us now consider the relation of this social injust~ce to the 
guerrilla which the and the south f . I Police war SADF A rican are 
I 
engaged in repulsing. How did the war come abou~ Did it 
originate in the perceived injustice of apartheid? 
2.2. The roots of the conflict 
The current conflict cannot be viewed outside the context of the 
history of resistance by black South Africans to the system 
imposed upon them. When the war is seen in this light, it is 
apparent that the forces that the SADF is called upon to fight 
against have made strenuous efforts to 
I 
bring about change by 
peaceful means. On the other hand, the state has repeatedly 
demonstrated its readiness to use violence to crush peaceful 
opposition. In the light of this history, which I shall deal 
with briefly, it also becomes clear why the black opposition came 
to feel that they had little hope of bringing about fundamental 
change without recourse to violence. 
From the Act of Union in 1910 until the late 1940s, the ANC, the 
largest black political organization, had been dominated by small 
groups of intellectuals. They hoped, by means of petitions and 
deputations, to persuade the government to extend the franchise to 
blacks. In 1949, under the influence of its Youth League, the ANC 
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adopted a more militant Programme of Action. The Programme 
declared that the primary vehicle of s tr1..J3 g le should be mass 
action. There was still a strong and explicit commitment to 
non-violence. 
The next decade saw the passage of a barrage of discriminatory 
laws, and in response strike action, non-collaboration and 
I 
boycotts. On May 1, 1950 a stay-away was called to protest 
I 
against the racial policies of the government. Throughout the 
I . 
country, there were work stoppages and peaceful demonstrations. 
But at Alexandra township the police opened fire, kill~ng 18 and 
wounding 30 people. The following month, a strike called to 
mourn the dead resulted in a nation-wide display of unity. 
In 1952 the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the ~NC 
launched the "Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws". 
Volunteers broke discriminatory laws and then offered themselves 
for arrest. When the number of arrests exceeded 8500 and the 
jails were full to overflowing, the government passed j 1egislation 
making it a serious criminal offence to break a law by way of 
protest against that or any other law. With the Defiance Campaign 
abruptly halted, even Albert Luthuli (later to win the Nobel Prize 
for Peace) came to question the path of moderation: 
"Who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent 
knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly at a 
closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of 
moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest 
nunber of laws restricting our rights until today we have 
reached the stage where we have almost no rights at all" 
(quoted by Stanbridge, 1980:73). 
~ ... 
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The decade of mass action also saw bus boycotts, education 
boycotts and the Congress of the People (at which the Freedom 
Charter was drawn up, pointing the way to a non-racial future for 
South Africa) 1 and ~ame to a head with the pass campaign of March 
1960. On the 21st, Pan African Congress (PAC) supporters at Langa 
I 
and Sharpeville left their passes at home, presented themselves to 
I 
' 
the nearest police station and demanded arrest. The events that 
' 
followed are now history. The police opened fire, killing 59 
people and wounding 178. Of those killed or wounded, 155 were 
shot in the back. A week later, a general strike was called to 
I 
' mourn those killed. The economy was paralyzed for almost three 
weeks. 
Sharpeville marked the end of the commitment to non-violence. On 
April 8, the ANC and the PAC were declared unlawful organizations 
and their leaders went underground to prepare for an armed 
struggle. Nelson Mandela, when tried in 1963 for sabotage and 
conspiracy to overthrow the government, justified the formation of 
the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in these terms: 
(On legal advice this passage was excluded. 




Whatever hope was left of the developnent of the African tradition 
of non-violent change had been officially snuffed out. 
In contrast to Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the PAC, Poqo, 
6id not restrict its activities to sabotage. In the early 1960s 
a number of civilians died as a result of their attacks, but by 
the end of the decade Poqo had been almost entirely crushed. 
From the nature of the activities of the ANC since 1960, it seems 
that until recently its policy has been to avoid acts of random 
terrorism. Its attacks have mostly been directed at symbols of 
oppression or towards installations of strategic and economic 
significance. My purpose 
resistance is not to show that 
in discussing this history of black 
the violence of the resistance 
movements is justified. That would require an investigation which 
would take us far beyond the narrow limits of this thesis. 
Moreover, it is important to recall at this point the theological 
assumption made at the start of this work: since violence is the 
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tragic consequence of sin, one should not attempt to justify its 
use. Rather, my purpose in discussing this history is to point 
out that among black people there is massive dissatisfaction with 
the injustices of apartheid, and that it is primarily this 
dissatisfaction which has led to the war. In fact there is 
fairly w~de agreement that the war may accurately be characterized 
as an internal and civil war. 
2.3. Civil or external war 
The state would have us believe that South Africa is involved in a 
defensive war against an external aggressor. It stresses the 
idea that South Africans are "defending our border~ against "the 
\ 
total onslaught" being waged by "terrorists" armed with Russian 
weapons. The external threat argument figures as the major 
motivation for present defence policy in the 1984 White Paper: 
"The major threat to world peace remains the USSR's pursuit 
I 
of world domination. This is reflected in that country's 
purposeful exploitation and/or instigation, either directly 
or indirectly, of conflict in all the strategically 
important parts of the world One of the major 
' considerations of soviet strategy with regard to Southern 
Africa is the control of the subcontinent's riches in 
strategic minerals and the denial of these to the West 
Indirect action in the form of a revolutionary onslaught 
serves to establish Soviet influence in Southern Africa. 
The South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African 
National Congress (ANC), which, for all practical purposes, 
has been integra~ed into the SACP and acts as its military 
wing, are the major elements of the Soviet plan to obtain 
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control of the RSA" (White Paper, 1984, nl,3). 
" However, this view ignores two important factors. The first is 
that military and financial support does not necessarily imply 
ideological subjection. That it may do so does not imply that it 
does in every situation. Indeed, if one took this:argument to 
its logical conclusion one would have to insist thatl the chap-
is in the pay of the military, is itself laincy, because it 
· 1 · I h pursues mi itary rather t an church 
f . I . d imp or tan tly, though, A r ican countries, an 
beholden to the military and 
objectives! Mo re 
notably Nasser's Egypt, have shown their strong desires for inde-
pendence by instructing the Soviets to leave when their services 
were no longer wanted. 
The second criticisn to be made of the White Paper view is that it 
fails to grasp the significance of alliances and the complexity of 
foreign aid. When Stalin ~upported the We st in overcoming 
' 
Hitler, the west was not widely accused of being beholden to the 
i 
Soviets. Th us i t is not view 
I . . 
activity 
I 
to USSR necessary in 
Africa as evidence of a specific drive for domination. That the 
USSR is pursuing its own interests is clear and to be anticipated. 
Nevertheless many analysts reason that Soviet foreign policy with 
respect to South Africa is opportunistic rather than specific 
(e.g. Dr. T. Millar, an Australian strategist, in Cape Times 
19.7.1984). If it is opportunistic, the root causes of the war 
must be sought elsewhere: in factors internal to the South African 
situation, rather than in factors external to it. Thus it has 
been argued that the war is at heart a civil war, the casus belli 
being the oppression to which black people have been historically 
subject. Let us examine some of the evidence. 
The former CPSA Archbishop, Bill Burnett, showed deeper insight 
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than did the White Paper into the origins of the "total 
onslaught". He said in his enthronement'sermo~: 
"We need to grasp the significance of the fact that some 
black South Africans, many of whom are Christians, are 
outside the country seeking to change our power structure by 
force" (Seek (September 1974) :8). 
He later warned, in a statement to the press on 16.2.1977, that 
"the society we have created for ourselves is morally 
indefensible. This is very serious at a time when we are 
asked to def end it" (Church and Conscience: 8) • 
Gerald Shaw, political correspondent for the cape Times, in an 
_/ 
article entitled "Call-up. Who is the enemy?" came to the 
conclusion that: 
"The truth is that we are sliding into a civil war, albeit 
one of low intensity. The enemy is not some faceless 
communist horde from behind the Iron Curtain. The enemy 
are our own people, fellow South Africans, a guerrilla army 
of young people who fled from South Africa after the Soweto 
unrest of 1976 in their thousands and were recruited into 
the army of the African National Congress" {cape Times, 
26.3.1982). 
Court statements of ANC guerrillas captured over the past few 
years confirm Shaw's statement (e.g. WIP 29 (October 1983), PP 
53-58; 
I 
WIP 27 (June 1983), pp 57-58; WIP 11 (February 1980), pp 
45-48; etc.) Far from being regarded as a "peoples' army" (Steyn, 
1980:63-78 passim), the SADF is seen by organizations like the 
United Democratic Front and the Azanian Students' Organization as 
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~ defender of the racist system in South Africa, and as an 
obstacle to freedom and democracy in Namibia {Grassroots {January 
1~84) :3,5). This perception of the role of of the SADF extends as 
far as conservative black 'homeland' leaders 1 ike Chief Ga tsha 
Buthelezi: 
"our oppression is maintained b'y Whites and all Whites 
inside and outside the Churches through the South African 
Defence Force, of which all Whites up to the age of 60 are 
members, willy-nilly" {ABRECSA Newsletter 4 {March 1984) :8). 
Ironically, the state-appointed Rabie Commission of Inquiry into 
Security Legislation also provides confirmation of the fact that 
South Africa is involved in a civil war: 
"After the riots {sic) in Soweto and else~here in the 
Republic in 1976 and 1977 many Black people -- mostly young 
people -- left the country. The South African Police 
believe that the nunber who had left the Republic up to the 
end of 1979 might be as high as 5000 or perhaps even 6000 
Ab·out half probably about 2000 men -- of these people 
were recruited by the ANC" {p 58). 
An opinion poll by the newspaper The World revealed that an 
overwhelming majority of blacks have no interest in fighting what 
they see as a "white man's war". This was the answer given by 
some 203 out of a total of 241 letters received in a letter 
competition in which the readers were asked whether they would 
fight for South Africa in the event of an attack by Angola 
(Rapport, 14.3.1976). 
In its essence the South African conflict is a low intensity civil 
war. Mr Justice van Dyk said, in the Barbara Hogan case, that 
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the ANC is waging a "minor civil war" (Argus 21.10.1982). The 
guerrillas do receive training and aid from Eastern European and 
other African states; but this does not alter the fact that the 
people the SADF is called upon to fight are South Africans. There 
is also evidence that these "enemies of South Africa" have 
considerable support among the South African people. 




It is difficult to assess the support of the black population for 
the guerrilla forces, but the evidence indicates that it is 
considerable. Thousands of people have attended the funerals of 
guerrillas and activists, e.g. an estimated 20000 turned out to 
bury So 1 om on Mahl ungu. The Rabie Commission quotes an opinion 
poll conducted in Soweto shortly after the ·silverton bank· siege 
which showed that three out of every four black people had strong 
or qualified sympathy for the gunmen (p 69). Th i s sympathy i s 
reflected in the black press. After the Silvertbn incident, 
Post editorialized: 
"On the one hand, the white community and its newspapers 
regard these people as nothing else but mere terrorists. 
The black community on the other hand continues to vocally 
acclaim these men as heroes as was demonstrated at the 
funeral of all three" (11.2.1980). 
The well-qualified Buthelezi Commission observed, on the basis of 
attitude surveys, that most of their respondents thought that ANC 
guerrillas would receive sympathy and cooperation "from most or 
very many black South Africans". In addition, it found that 
"the overwhelming majority of Black respondents 
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spontaneously predicted violence or social unrest on a large 
scale if meaningful policy reform did not occur in the near 
future". 
The Commission found that on the Witwatersrand the ANC receives 
more popular verbal support than any other political grouping, and 
in Natal, after Inkatha, it is the only body with significant 
support ( I : 1 O 1) • 
2.5. SADF involvement in civilian actions 
Those who are conscripted into the SADF cannot escape the fact 
that they are putting themselves in a situation where they can be 
commanded to act against South African civilians. The military 
have been used on a nunber of occasions to assist the police in 
"resettling" people at gunpoint. The two best known examples of 
this are the removal of more than 3000 people from Ditakwaneng to 
Deerward (Star, 16.11.1973) and the resettlement of 20000 people 
from Gatlhose-Maremane to Bo phu tha tswa na (Diambnd Fields 
Advertiser, 2 8. 1 2. 1 9 7 7) • 
In the 1976/7 student uprising, troops were used to protect key 
installations and placed on standby for deployment in the 
townships (Rand Daily Mail, 17.6.1976). Since then, soldiers 
have been used· on roadblocks outside black townships, as well as 
on "open roads" • Dur'ing the s~hool boycott in June 1981, troops 
were used in "coloured" townships (Bosmont and Eldorado Park) 
along with the SAP to carry out house-to-house searches. 
Financial Mail noted that army personnel were increasingly being 
used in aid to the civil power, often in areas with direct 
security and political connotations. For instance, road blocks 
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were as likely to be manned by the army as by the pqlice 
(24.9.1982). General Magnus Malan stated in Parliament in 1984 
that 27 000 troops had helped man road blocks in South Africa in 
the past year. He emphasized that it is not only in Namibia but 
also in South Africa that "security force operations" are being 
conducted (cape Times 18.5.1984). 
2.6. The SADF as foreign aggressor 
Under what General Constand Viljoen calls a policy 
defence", south Africa seems to have claimed the 
~ f I "of f~nsive 
right to invade 
I 
I 
neighbouring countries at will and to destabilize foreign 
economies. The objective of destabilization is to preoccupy 
neighbouring states with defence and internal security, and, to 
prevent economic growth that might lessen dependence on South 
Africa. A second goal is to discourage support for the ANC, PAC 
and SWAPO. 
As we have seen above, South Africa's presence iJ Namibia is 
illegal, and it has become clear that most of the people there 
regard the SADF as a force of foreign occupation. Of the other 
Southern African states, Angola has suffered most at the hands of 
the SADF. In 1975, South African forces invaded almost as far as 
Luanda. American officials have estimated the total damage done 
to Angola since 1975 at over $7 billion (Jenkins, 1983:121). In 
August 1981 South Africa invaded again and remained in permanent 
occupation of large parts of Southern Angola until 1984. 
President dos Santos claimed that two brigades of South African 
troops (5500 men) were permanentiy stationed inside Angola and 
that 500 people had been killed since the time of the invasion 
(Africa Now (October 1982) ). The most important aspect of south 
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Africn involvement in Angola was the practice of economic 
disruption, carried out largely by support for UNITA rebels. The 
intention was to prevent any normal life or economic activity. 
Traffic was strafed, bridges bombed and towns and communities 
reduced to rubble. In the South, UNITA operated in unison with 
regular South African forces, and was trained and supplied by 
them. In other areas, UNITA was engaged in sabotage with direct 
logistic support from the South Africans. The destabilization 
policy successfully disrupted the Benguela rail link w~th Zaire, a 
I 
key transport link for the Angolan economy (Jenkins, 1983). 
I 
In Mozambique a similar pattern was followed. There were raids 
on Matola (January 1981), Ressana Garcia (July 1982), and Namacha 
(August 1982), but the principal means of destabilization was 
thro1.l3h support for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). The 
objective was tY.C fold. First, to spread chaos thro1.l3h as much of 
Mozambique as possible, giving the impression that the country was 
unstable, discouraging foreign aid and accentuating the country's 
economic crisis. The second objective was to disrupt transport 
links and the Beira-Dmtali pipeline. 
In Zimbabwe, South African forces operated in support of the 
Muzorewa forces in the final stages of the guerrilla war. Since 
independence, the Zimbabwean Army intercepted a SADF raiding party 
in the Sengwe communal area (August 1981). Three of the four 
raiders killed were identified as former Rhodesians serving in the 
SADF. The SADF claimed the men were on an unauthorized mission. 
The Zimbabwean economy has suffered from MNR sabotaging of oil and 
rail links with Be ira. In 1981 South Africa acted more directly 
by withdrawing badly needed locomotives from Zimbabwe Railways and 
ending the preferential trade agreement between the twc countries. 
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Both the locomotives and the agreement were restored in 1982, 
reportedly as a result of United States and British pressure 
(Jenkins, 1983: 125). 
Lesotho has not gone unscathed. The raid on Maseru (December 
1982) resulted in the deaths of at least 30 refugees and Lesotho 
civilians. Chief Jonathan has also repeatedly claimed that South 
I 
I 
Africa shelters and supports the Lesotho Liberation Army, which 
has been responsible for a nunber of attacks in rural areas, acts 
of sabotage and assassinations. 
Finally, there was the attempted Seychelles coup. The government 
holds that the mercenaries, who obtained their arms from the SADF, 
planned the coup without the knowledge of either the head of the 
SADF I the Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister or the 
intelligence services. The fact that no disciplinary action was 
taken against those involved in the issue of weapons suggests that 
the affair• had been authorized from the top (cf'. ·cape Times 
editorial, 3.2.1983). 
2 • 7 • Conclusion 
Now if it is true that apartheid is evil, that peaceful means of 
opposition to it are prevented by repressive legislation and 
state-sponsored violence, and that the war is being waged 
essentially against other South Africans, far-reaching conclusions 
follow. It means that the activities of the SADF are preserving 
the existing unjust structures of apartheid society. To put it 
bluntly, the SADF is defendirtg apartheid# General Magnus Malan 
admitted as much in 1979 when he addressed a seminar in Port 
Elizabeth: 
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"Die We ermag steun die regeringsbeleid en is veran twoordelik 
vir vrede, reg en orde in die land. Hierdie beleid is 
dieselfde as wat dest}'Us deur dr. H.F. Verwoerd neergel~ is, 
naamlik veelvolkigheid en die selfbeskikking van volke. Met 
die ontwikkeling van die tuislande moet die volke die kans 
kry om hulself te beskerm" (Die Burger, 23.10.1979). 
In slightly more sophisticated language, General Constand Viljoen 
stated that the SADF 1 while impartial to party politics, "is never 




the crux of the matter is that, at present, "national objectives" 
are set by the National Party, in just such a way as to prevent 
the majority of South Africans from helping to formulate those 
objectives: thus to admit that the SADF promotes "national 
objectives" is tantamount to an admission that the SADF promotes 
the most prominent of the ruling group's objeciives, namely 
apartheid. 
Mr Beet Botma, a National Party candidate in Walvis Bay, was asked 
by the Cape Times about his party's contribution towards achieving 
peace in Namibia. His reply was as follows: 
"The ruling party is the only party which can make a 
contribution on a day-to-day basis, throtgh its military 
wing, with its civil action programmes and so on, and 
thro1..1gh the Department of Foreign Affairs and their work for 
an internal settlemen~. 
His claim that the SADF is the military wing of the National Party 
might not be startling: but it is startling that the Ministers of 
De fence and Foreign Affairs refused to repudiate these statements 
( Cape Times 3. 11. l 9 8 2) • 
1-------~=--·-----_· __ -_-·-_---_-~-----·--_· -_---·-------=--=--------·----·---=-------· --_---_----_-_--_-_--_----_ ___J 
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amount of deracialization and a certain extension of the 
franchise, it is at bottom an attempt to restructure the state and 
extend its political base of support to ensure the long-term 
survival of the system as a whole (Moss, 1980:10f~ O'Meara, 
1982:18). The state is attempting to foster its alliances with 
industry, and to create a black middle class which will mediate 
be tween the state and the majority of the populat~on (Glaser, 
I 
1984:13f). Crucial to this process is that the Defence Force 
wi 11, in due course, have much more manpower avJilable when 
conscription is extended, which will play its part in shoring up 
the system. 
It therefore appears that the CPSA is substantially correct in its 
conviction that a vital functio~ of the SADF is the protection of 






For purposes of determining their 
medical 
international legal status, 
personnel, who are not chaplains are subsumed 
considered part of the 
under 
fighting forces, but are designated as 
"protected personnel". In terms of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, chaplains are expected to carry an identity card and wear an 
armband with the Red Cross (cf. Final Record). In the event of 
capture, chaplains are 
least benefit by all the 
not deemed prisoners of war, but will at 
provisions of the Geneva Convention 
relating to prisoners of war. Under capture they can continue to 
carry out their religious duties, and cannot be compelled to 
perform any other kind of work (Coursier, 1963:45f). 
Some chaplains have argued that, since the Geneva Conventions 
require chaplains to be officially attached. to the armed forces, 
they should be full uniformed members of the SADF in order to be 
granted immunity (J. Daines, Letter to Seek, Feb. 1984~ Permanent 
Force Chaplains' Statement). This view tends to identify 
official attachment on the one hand with full membership and 
uniform on the other. If they are not identified, quite 
different conclusions follow, as we shall see. 
In the West, chaplains have traditionally been full members of the 
armed forces, and therefore subject to certain conditions with 
' 
APPENDICES -284 
regard to military uniform, rank, pay and discipline, which derive 
from domestic law. Barring the necessity for the protective sign 
of the Red Cross and the Geneva identity card, Art. 24 of the 
First Convention does not lay down regulations respecting dress 
and comportment, nor does it explicitly oblige religious personnel 
to wear military uniform (de Preux). 
I 
Hence by taking Art. 24 of 
i 
cannot insist that the the First convention at face value, one 
Conventions themselves require uniform, since it is domestic law 
that governs the formation, structure and organization of the 
armed forces -- and domestic law can be changed if necessary. In 
I 
any case, though, Art. 24 is not the only basis 1 upon which 
chaplains can be appointed to the armed forces. A legal expert 
I 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross notes, 
"It is quite conceivable that a State might, on the basis of 
Art. 26 of the First Convention, and by official mandate for 
example, allow in its armed forces religious personnel not 
subject to the usual constraints" (de Preux). 
He adds that, as far as uniforms are concerned, the "Wounded and 
Sick" Convention of 1929 openly envisaged alternatives, but that 
these provisions were not incorporated into the First Convention 
of 1949, probably because the problem of uniform did not arise at 
that time. He infers that article 26 of the First Convention 
"a !lows for other solutions to be negotiated with the competent 
authorities, while respecting the conventional provision~ (de 
Preux) • It seems safe to conclude that the church could 
negotiate with the SADF to authorize the presence of chaplains 
without military uniform and other accoutrements of military life. 
As an example of this, the West German chaplaincy is, for the most 
part, under civilian direction, and does not in the normal course 
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use military uniform or rank, but nonetheless acts within the 
terms of the Geneva Conventions ("Military chaplaincy service": 
and a letter of 20.11.1983 to P.G. Moll, from retired chief 
chaplain (Dekan) Konrat Weyrnann). 
A more serious point mentioned by Rev. Da in e s ( l 9 8 3a : 6 ) : i s t he 
dilemma surrounding "official a ttachrnen t" • The phrake arises 
I 
from a commentary on the Geneva Conventions: 
-0Like medical personnel, [chaplains] must obviously abstain 
from all hostile acts. On the other hand, chaplains, I to be 
accorded immunity, must be attached to the armed forces. 
They do not attach themselves. The decision will rest with 
' 
the competent authorities and the relation must be an 
I 
official one. Ac cording ly, ministers of religion who wish 
to serve in a non-official capacity, are not covered by the 
Convention, and, until such time as they have been regularly 
appointed, act at their own risk and peril" (from Pictet, 
"Commentary, Convention I", p220: quoted by ICRC, "Military 
chaplains and the bearing of arms", p3). 
It could be argued that official attachment implies all that rank 
and uniform imply: how could one therefore reject rank and 
uniform, alleging compromise, but blithely accept official 
attachment? Conservatives could allege insincerity at this point 
because of the simultaneous disregard- for South African tradition 
about chaplaincy and the reverence for international tradition 
about chaplaincy. Radicals could allege breach of principle due 
to an unwillingness to make a final break with the military 
machine. 
In answer to this, t~ alternatives to official attachment might 
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be considered. The first is to surrender the ideal of immunity 
for chaplains, by having them minister in a non-official capacity. 
Some might favour · this approach on the grounds that chaplains 
should not compromise themselves by relying on the protective 
umbrella of the Defence Force; on principle they should be willing 
to minister "at their own risk and periln, as in the 





such an arrangement, or lack of it. But if it did grant its 
approval (e.g. on the grounds that if any danger befell the 
I 
! 
chaplains concerned, it would clearly be the chaplains' fault and 
not that of the SADF), there would still be the problem of the I 
' 
disincentive inherent in the potential danger to the chaplains in 
the event of capture. However, this disin~entive should be seen 
in its due perspective. It wo ul d on 1 y be opera ti v e in the 
operational area, which constitutes only a small part of the work 
which chaplains do. Furthermore it seems that, to deduce from 
the opinion of the Chaplain-General, a chaplain operating iri a 
non-official capacity would not be in any more or less precarious 
position that military chaplains. This is because the SADF is 
' ' 
itself pessimistic about the value of the Geneva co1nventions' 
assurance of immunity in the present conflict with SWAPO. The 
Chaplain-General has stated: 
"You may rest assured that the SA Defence Force and the 
Chaplains' Service subscribes (sic) to the Geneva Convention 
at all times even al thoUJ h our enemy certainly does notn 
(Letter to P.G. r-bll, 30.9.1983). 
One chaplain said that the chaplains informally take a cynical 
view of what would happen if they were captured they do not 
think that they would be treated as prisoners of war. He added 
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that medics do not wear any identifying mark, at least on the 
border, for fear of being shot up; thus the medics' tents have a 
cross but with a speci-al flap to cover it if necessary. In 
addition he personally turns down his chaplain's insignia beneath 
the epaulette when walking between camps in the operational area 
(Middlemost). Actions of this kind, in turn, make it impossible 
for the "enemy" to abide by the Geneva Convention, because they 
are unable to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. 
Th us the assunption that the "enemy" w i 11 not abide by the Geneva 
Convention could be used as an excuse for the SADF not to abide by 
the Convention itself. It is noteworthy that South Africa has not 
always taken care to abide by Convention, as was most dramatically 
illustrated in the Mariental incident. A US State Department 
human rights report noted that the South. African Government had 
confirmed that it held 146 prisoners, including 14 Angolans, at a 
detention camp near Mariental, most of whom were captured in a 
raid on SWAPO bases near Cassinga, Angola, in 1978. Since the 
South African Government did not accord those persons prisoner of 
war status, and yet could not convict them of ordinary crimes, 
they remained in indefinite detention as political prisoners (cape 
Times 2.5.1984). 
This pessimism of the SADF and the SAChS about the value of Geneva 
Convention immunity suggests two conclusions: (i) that on the 
presuppositions of the chaplaincy itself, very 
anything, would be changed if the chaplaincy were not 
little, if 
officially 
attached to the armed forces; (ii) that it would be strange, per-
haps hypocritical, for the SADF and SAChS to insist that all 
ch~plains be appointed in terms of the Geneva Convention. 
Thus the first alternative, namely to surrender the ideal of 
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immunity for chaplains, though unsatisfactory, seems to be a 
viable alternative at present. It is important to note that 
surrender does not imply violation. A chaplain who surrenders 
immunity through not making any claim to official status may still 
regard the Geneva Conventions in a positive light; it is merely 
that he or she personally does not want to lay claim to its 
protection. 
The second alternative is to assign chaplains to an international 
body I independent of the SADF, with its own insignia and 
I 
logistical capability. This international body would then see to 
the spiritual needs of soldiers on both sides of the conflict, in 
a similar way to the medical service performed by the 
International Red Cross. A pacifist movement among the American 
churches prior to the Korean War called for the replacement of the 
traditional chaplaincy with a "supra-national ministry to all men, 
friend and foe alike" (Venzke, 1975:126). The US Lutheran pastor 
Richard John Neuhaus expressed the view, at the time of the 
Vietnam War, that clerics in military service exposed themselves 
to "spiritual prostitution"; he said he would pref er to see 
military chaplains replaced by civilian clergy accredited to the 
armed forces like Red Cross personnel (Time (30.5.1969):50). 
Note, once again, that this arrangement would apply only to the 
operational area. At base camps at Windhoek and Grootfontein, 
and within the borders of South Africa, there is far less need for 
Ge n e v a - s t y l e i m mun i t y , d u e to the sm a 11 l i k e 1 i hood o f g u e r r i 11 a 
activity there. Thus this second alternative is really a com-
bination of (i) surrender of immunity in non-operational areas~ 
and (ii) a supra-national chaplaincy in the operational area. 
Th is arrangement could, however, not be effected in the short 
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term. To have a chaplaincy of the desired scale would call for a 
major international effort which would probably not be 
forthcoming, as the chaplaincy has not been so strongly contested 
an issue in most Western countries as it has in South Africa. It 
I 
seems that this alternative is less satisfactory than the first. 
I 
I 
This argumentation leads back to the original position of official 
I 
attachment. What would this imply, and would the co~promise be 
as serious as has been Su:J gested? 
A chaplaincy arrangement under Art. 26 allows the armed forces 
considerable leew~y in prescribing conditions of attac~ent, while 
fulfilling the usual Geneva Convention requirements of carrying 
the prescribed identity card and the red cross on the arm. Art. 
26 does, however, say that the staff of societies so attached "are 
subject to military laws and regulations" -- which is precisely 
the problem with rank and uniform, as dealt with in detail above. 
But this is to misconstrue the position. Anyone, whether 
civilian or military, who enters an area controlled by the 
military, is subject to the laws of the military; for example, 
they may be tried by court martial if they engage in disorderly 
behaviour (Clauses 45 and 46 of the First Schedule of the Defence 
Ac t, No. 4 4 of 19 5 7) • Furthermore, anyone, whether civilian or 
military, who in any part of the country encourages conscientious 
objection, can be charged under Section 121 of Defence Act No. 44 
of 1957. It is in this sense that a society which is attached to 
the military in terms of Art. 26 is "subject to military laws and 
regulations" • It is a very different matter to be attached as a 
full member of the military, which implies voluntary assent, not 
only to the general laws which apply to everyone, but also to 
specific rules about behaviour, dress, military secrets, command, 
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etc., which are peculiar to military people. Th us at tac tin en t in 
terms of Art. 26 entails no more compromise or identification with 
the military than does, for instance, the presence of a foreign 
journalist 
J 
in a military-controlled area. This form of 
attachment would best be compared with the formal accred,itation of 
Red Cross units, whose internal policy is strictly controlled by 
the International Committee in Geneva, but who nonetheless have to 
seek the armed forces' permission to be in a particular ~rea. On 
the other hand, some may consider even this form of a~sociation 
with the military to entail compromise; but this aspect has been 
dealt with in Chapter 4. 
The moral dilemma of attachment may also be viewed from another 
angle, that of the minimum requirements of safety. Now there has 
to be a certain regularity in international combat so as to limit 
the destructiveness of war. If, then, immunity is desired by 
chaplains, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. The minimum 
condition, as set out by the Geneva Conventions, is official 
attachment to the armed forces concerned. The only reason why 
this is done is for personal protection. It has nothing to do 
with tacit compacts or understandings with the armed forces; still 
less does it have to do with identification with the armed forces. 
The only regulations to which the chaplain voluntarily assents are 
those which spring from international agreements which constitute, 
the absolute minimum consistent with personal safety. It would 
be difficult to label this as compromise. In the event it 
i n cl ud es a red cross , a card, and an official communique or 
statement by the armed forces that the chaplain is thereby 
authorized to claim immunity in terms of the Geneva Convention. 
Since this implies no rank, uniform, membership, military status 
or control, it would be the purest tokenisn to insist that 
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attachment in terms of Art. 26 has moral or theological drawbacks. 
What might, as SU3 gested above, have moral or theological 
drawbacks is the very fact of association with the military, at 
least in the eyes of those who believe that the only moral option 
at present is total boycott of the military (see Chapter 4). 
Rev. John D. Daines made the further assertion that, since the 
·Geneva Conventions permit medical and religious personnel to carry 
arms for their own defence and that of the wounded and sick, these 
personnel should be full, uniformed members of the armed forces 
(Letter to Seek, July 1984). ThoU3h plausible at first sight, 
this argument would not have been used at other periods in South 
African history. During World War I, South African chaplains 
were not permitted to bear arms (Potgieter, 1971:185); during 
Wo r .ld war I I they we re noncombatant and did not possess or handle 
weapons (Potgieter, 1971:221). More importantly, thoU3h, the 
Geneva Conventions do not require arms-bearing by chaplains; they 
a 11 ow for i t • Therefore this line of reasoning does not overturn 
the observation made above, viz. that the Geneva Conventions do 
not require uniform. Nevertheless Rev. Daines is correct to the 
extent that the practice of the time was to appoint uniformed 
military chaplains who had the option of bearing arms. This 
custom persists today in Western countries. 
The question of arms-bearing by chaplains deserves closer 
scrutiny. Why would chaplains carry arms at all? To the extent 
that chaplains are on the same footing as medical personnel, most 
chaplaincies in the West permit arms-bearing. The US Navy is an 
exception to this rule, and forbids its chaplains to carry weapons 
because they must 
"be engaged exclusively in religious duties an 
APPENDICES -292 
individual chaplain who violates this noncombatant status by 
carrying a weapon endangers the noncombatant status of other 
chaplains, offering the enemy an excuse to treat all 
chaplains as combatants" (Chaplains' Manual, n.1204). 
Now it is unlikely that chaplains would have to use weapons, as 
medics may, for the "maintenance of order" among the units to 
which they are assigned, for much of their work is with combat 
troops and to presuppose indiscipline among them would be serious 
(cf. ICRC:3), apart from raising acute theological problems. It 
i 
is also unlikely that a chaplain, being vested with officer rank, 
would in an extreme case need a weapon to protect the authority of 
that rank, for this too throws up theological difficulties. It 
is further unlikely that chaplains would use a weapon to fight off 
the enemy or to resist capture, for this would make them 
combatants and involve loss of immunity. Why , then, m i g ht 
chaplains need weapons? 
There seem to be only three possible, but not necessarily 
convincing reasons. The first possible reason for arms-bearing 
is for pure self-defence, neither amidst an enemy attack on a unit 
':-
nor in resistance to capture, but only when a chaplain is 
separated from the rest of the men and cannot be protected by 
them. This improbable situation might occur if a sniper gained 
access to the military camp. Returning fire under these 
conditions would not jeopardize a chaplain's immunity, because an 
attack directed specifically at a chaplain is a violation of 
international law. The second possibility is for protection of a 
medical unit, for, again, an attack on a medical unit is a 
violation of international law. However, it is not clear that 
chaplains should be engaged in defence of a medical unit, since 
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structurally they do not fall under medical staff. Thus a Red 
Cross monograph concludes that 
"It is doubtful whether the First Geneva Convention entitles 
chaplains to bear arms ••• The right to bear arms isl in fact 
restricted to the personnel of a medical ulit or 
establishment" (ICRC:7). 
I 
The third possible reason is to protect themselve~ from wild 
animals or reptiles like snakes or crocodiles on the bo~der. This 
was mentioned by at least one ch~plain (Wittstock). I 
The difficulty with all three of these reasons is that they 
violate the non-combatant status of chaplains. A chaplain who 
carries, say, a 9mm pistol in order to return sniper fire is no 
different, in the eyes of the enemy, from a chaplain who carries a 
rifle with the intention of engaging in combat. Clearly a pistol 
can less easily be used in long-distance combat than a Rl rifle~ 
but the problem is that it can nevertheless be used. The crucial 
difference here is that between being armed and being unarmed, not 
that between sizes of weapon or intentions. Thus an excuse is 
offered to the enemy to treat all chaplains as combatants if any 
one of them uses a weapon. In fact the frequent use of arms by 
SAChS members on the border might be construed as a tacit 
recognition that the Geneva Conventions are not expected to be 
operative~ however, this would be very serious in light of the 
fact that South Africa is a signatory to the Convention. In 
conclusion, it seems that the overriding consideration in 







General von Moltke believed that prohibitions of means of war 
merely drag out hostilities, while "the greatest kindne~s in war 
is to bring it to a speedy conclusion" 
i 
I 
(quoted 1 in Walzer, 
1977: 131) • However, international consensus that the 
destructiveness of war should be limited has led to a series of 
multilateral agreements from the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law to the 1981 United Nations Convention. Concerning 
Conventional Weapons which have Indiscriminate Effects (reprinted 
in Roberts and Guelff, 1982). Most scholars (e.g. Nagel, 1974; 
O'Brein, 1981), feel that these regulations do have a basis in 
. I . arb1trar1ness they 
. I Davis comments on 
morality because, despite their incoherence and 
have a record of saving lives. For instance, 
the enormous numbers of soldiers taken prisoner in the world wars. 
During the first world war between 7 and 8,5 million, and in the 
second world war between 12 and 35 mill·ion soldiers were captured 
(1977:623f). Against this Wasserstrom submits that considerations 
of military necessity commonly override the laws of war (1972:13), 
and that that code of behaviour is "genuinely odiou~ (1972:19) 
because its defeasibility legitimates killing and maiming in the 
mind of the soldier (1972:18). This unfortunate consequence of 
the weakness of international law must readily be acknowledged; 
but what is the solution~ In Wasserstrom's own words, the 
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i 
solution is not the abandonment of the laws of war but ~ different 
concept~on of th·e~ which "re.Juses t~'· re;~-~d1 as -~mJtable the 
' t- , ; ' ... , 
character of contemporary warfare and we~ponry, and that requires 
.... ; l1 ~ '' c -~ , • .., '\~ ....... 1~·,~· ::~I·: . ._,, ~J.'j • .~ t ' 
instead that war itself change so as to conform to the demands of 
, ~ , , , 1 • ~ l . ~ .... r 1 ! ..- .: ~ · ~· l u ~ .... ·~ t~ 
morality" (1972:19) •.. : I~,~~~,e):~~.:~~time ~ .1~~,~- _ambit;o~~jcours·e _has 
to be struck -- that of working within the current international 
t -! - .J - ' . ' - ' t ' 
system of law, imperfect as it is. 
I 
1 f d , -· - · 1 t t - · d l · 1-a · · Te or Tayl"or-- ,suggests- ·that the aw o - ·,war can a1 nso - iers in 
learning the d istincti6n bet we er'l' 'kil 1 i'ng -.for reasons of state and 
killing for its·- -own sake or for ·revenge. t · If' they do not learn 
- - I 
the disti'nction, lthey can retutrf' to society as p6tentiall. ·murderers 
( . - I 7 17) - ~,. h' . " • -ft h ll . 'f quoted in Wa sserstr6mr ·19 2: • - 1T e .. concern o c ap a ins or 
the moral rectitude •of soldie!rs·<should ~-l'ead·~ them ·to accbpting ·. the 
task of instructing ·them,•in the i.1aws of--war<:a-s .:1ri~integla1 'part of 
their p·astoral. care ('Bailey, ·1972:2'0) •' -
... - .• ., ) /~. :""1. 
The Nuremberg Principles 
' -~ I : \ ~· . .J. i ~ , " • i .. , 
Despite Churchill's initial intention to shoot the Nazi offenders 
_. . ~ ~ '. " ;.---: J ~ l....' - ' ~ 
"quickly and humanely as 
~ ' - ~· i . 
mad 
' t 
dogs" ( P-a skins and Doc.krill, 
1979:266), the German generals were tried in an unprecedented 
series of war crimes tribuna\.'s~· of ~~
1
i~h t~~._ ~-~·s·t ~nb~n is that 
which occurred a-~ Nuremberg • ., . The Nuremberg Tr ibuha1 had a 
, c •.· • / -~ L • l .i. .. -- i' ·~-: I\' 1 
lasting impression on Allied countries because it rea~serted the 
1 ~ 
con:duc t. It 
I • r 
Western tradition of moral values in international 
was the c~l.~i·n'a,~~on' of'~ centurie~~lo~~ effor,' to es)t~~lish the 
principle of natural law (cf. Stanley, 1980: 12-16). I 
i 
i 
With the chaplain's counseling con~erns in mind, I sha~l focus on 
the aspect of. i."n\di~idual ·~esp~~sti~ili\~·Y ~f \'h~1:-s.oldiJr as it was 




victors' "jungle justice". Nevertheless for the chaplain there 
are important elements to be salvaged. First, the Tribunal has 
been defended by' among others, Pa skins and Dockrill 
( 1979: 262-277). Se con d, w hi 1 e i t s 1 e g al force i s i n do ub t i ts 
moral force remains: jurists did not question its assertion of 
individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. O'Brein reasons that the Tribunal's lasting con-
tribution was not 
"the negative point that war criminals should be punished 
but the positive assertion that it is men, working in 
governments and military forces, who make the decisions and 
take the actions attributed to states" (1981:356f). 
In similar fashion Falk contends that the essence of the Nuremberg 
tradition is 
"The conviction that individuals of conscience are the most 
reliable check upon the war criminality of governments, 
I 
given the contemporary world political setting" (19:74: 136). 
I 
i 
While the punitive scope of the Tribunal was limited, in practice, 
to very senior German officials, its moral scope encompasses 
soldiers of all ranks. We might conclude that chaplains should 
assume as one of their tasks the duties of teaching soldiers the 
Principles, attempting to define the moral responsibility of 
soldiers, and encouraging soldiers to assune personal 






May a South African chaplain urge a soldier to disobey immoral 
instructions? The costs would seem to be high. The penalty for 
disobeying a lawful command is a stiff five years' imprisonment 
(Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule 19(1) ). Encouraging 
someone to disobey a lawful command can receive the same penalty, 
viz. five years (First Schedule, 48). Moreover, any person who 
"causes actual or potential prejudice to good order and military 
I 
discipline" can be sentenced to a year's im~risonm~nt (First 
Schedule, 46). 
However, there is an important exception to this rul J. In 
f d. Id. o,r isobe ience 
most 
We stern countries, legislation provides of 
"illegal" commands, i.e. those which entail the commission of an 
offence. This SU3gests that a chaplain may, without fear of 
prosecution, advise such disobedience. 
Unfortunately the problem is not so easily solved. What 
constitutes "illegality" is not always clear, especially under 
conditions of emergency (Keijzer, 1978:14lf). He nee the 
definition of an "illegal" order is often left to the courts 
(Stanley, 1980:6). 
A further difficulty is that in South Africa this duty to disobey 
is rather more circunscribed than in other Western countries. 
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Whereas, in the USA, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
one has a duty to disobey orders whose execution implies the 
commission of a punishable offence, in Israel the order has to be 
"manifestly unlawful" before one has the duty to disobey (Keijzer, 
1978:221). Manifest illegality is defined as such illegality as 
would be obvious to an ordinary man (Keijzer, 1978:215). The 
situation in South Africa is similar/to that in Israel. 
emerges from the following considerations. 
This 
In a leading case which arose during the Anglo-Boer War, Justice 
Solomon ruled that a soldier is protected from liability for acts 
done in obedience to the orders of a superior, if the orders are 
not so manifestly illegal that the soldier must or OUJ ht to have 
known them to be so, 
doing his duty in 
( 1900) I pp• 561-568. 
if the soldier honestly believes that he is 
obeying them R. v. Smith, s.c. Vol. 17 
Cf. another similar case in Kaplan v. 
Hanekom, S.C. Vol. 20, p.53ff. These cases are also sunmmarized 
in Bisset and Smith, under: "Criminal and Civil Liability for Acts 
Done in Obedience to Orders of Superior Officer". 
Hence we may conclude that a South African chaplain may with 
impunity counsel disobedience of "manifestly illegal" orders. 
Other adjectives used in these cases in place of "manifestly" are· 
"obviously" or "grossly". But may a chapla~n go further than 
this? It is submitted that the chaplain can. Th is is because 
t he r ul e o f " man i fest i 11 e g a 1 i t y" 
reasons. 
is unsatisfactory, for two 
(i) Ignorance of the law. Watermeyer, in R. v. Werner and 
Another, ruled slightly differently from Solomon (S.A. Law Reports 
1947 (2), pp. 828-838). He qualified Solomon's judgment, as that 
suggested that ignorance of the law was an excuse. He noted, 
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however, that the conditions of the two cases were different. 
Solomon's involved military operations~ Watermeyer's, a more 
settled prisoner-of-war camp. Hence Watermeyer felt justified in 
requiring greater responsibility of the accused. They we re men 
of keen intelligence and ought to have known that the relevant 
order was illegal (pp. 833,834). Furthermore, he ruled that the 
fear of punisl'Inent or reprisal which existed in the minds of the 
accused was not a justification (p. 837). 
(ii) Military discipline. Burchell and Hunt contend ~hat simple 
I 
is not enough to establish a duty to illegality of an order 
disobey, because, concurring with Solomon, they argue that 
"soldiers would be hesitant to obey doubtful orders, which would 
be subversive of military discipline" ( l 9 7 0: 3 0 0 ~ c f • a s im i 1 a r 
argument by Williams, 1961:297). This is poor reasoning: 
(a) Would not the action of drawing the line at "manifest 
illegality" also subvert discipline, though admittedly less often? 
(b) This is a curious way to solve the problem of discipline. 
Would not the problem be better solved by giving soldiers more 
information about what they may or may not do? Morally speaking, 
if a soldier really thinks an act is legal when it is in' fact 
illegal, should not the military be held responsible for not 
informing him in advance, as well as this may be done? 
(c) Other Western military systems do not seem to have suffered 
for having drawn the line at simple illegality. 
(d) It is increasingly accepted that the modern soldier is 
sentient and discerning as he must be, given that military 
systems are becoming more technologically sophisticated (cf. 
Keijzer, 1978:45ff). 
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It is therefore submitted, for these two reasons, that legislation 
regarding illegal commands should be modified to suit modern 
conditions. Soldiers should be taught to distinguish legal from 
illegal commands. In turn, then, a chaplain may, without 
overstepping the law, help to prevent atrocity and to limit the 
destructiveness of war by counseling disobedience to illegal 
commands. 
Boozer, writing of the US chaplaincy, concurs: 
"the authority which I obligates every person t~ ob~y every 
' I 
legal order of a commander also obligates every person to 
disobey an illegal order" (Boozer, 1979:64). 
Therefore, Boozer continues, the chaplain is 
"both free and obligated to inform ~nd sustain a person who 
i 
is struggling in conscience with the legality of an order 
and is seeking the courage to act on the promptings of his 
or her conscience" (Boozer, 1979:74). 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX E: 
STATEMENT ON THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY 
ADOPTED BY 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 
AT ITS NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
BOSMONT 1 JULY 1984 
"33.l The Conference, affirming 
-303 
33.l.l that the church has a responsibility to ministe·r to 
people in all circunstances 
33.2 and believing 
33.2.l that the theological justification of apartheid is a 
heresy 
33.2.2 that apartheid is morally indefensible 
33.2.3 that the SADF is engaged in an unjust war in Namibia 
33.3 and noting 
33.3.l that the churches' ministry to military personnel is 
carried out primarily through military chaplains, who are 
full members of the SADF with rank, uniform and military pay 
33.3.2 that this identification with the SADF may be taken 
to confer religious legitimacy on the institution 
33.4 therefore urges its member churches 
33.4.l to persevere in their combined efforts to renegotiate 
the status of their chaplains with the SADF 
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33.4.2 to participate in these efforts if they have not yet 
decided to do so 
33.4.3 to demilitarize their chaplains by relieving them of 
the symbols of military status like rank and uniform 
33.4.4 to undertake all training and financing of their 
chaplains 
33.4.5 to bring their chaplains under church authority, 
thereby releasing them from military influence". 
This resolution was adopted, after discussion in plenary, by 49 




AND CHURCH OFFICIALS 
CONSULTED 
1. Chaplains with whom interviews ~ere conducted 
.. 
Permanent Citizen National Part-
I 
Denomi- Force Force Service time 
nation _Ch apJ, a ins chaplains Chaplains Chaplains 
'·· 
I 
CATHOLIC R. ca wc utt 
I 
H. Hovers P. Fa' hey 
.\ J. Rodrigues 
B. Royston 
CPSA M. Moore R. Horrocks D. Hart G. Ashby 
s. Mi ddlernost B. Wittstock 
J. V<?egel 
LUTHERAN c. Maree 
PRESBY- J. Gray -:- 8. Boyd 
TERI AN R. Bo tsis 
J. ·Dixon 
... s. Henderson 
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CONGRE- M. Pretorius 
GATIONAL 
MCSA E. Hymer J. Anderson A. Brews 
R. Lax ton J. B:l sset 
BAPTIST A. Erasmus J. Thomas G·. Miller 
ASSEMBLIES G. west T. Long 
OF GOD D. Veldhuysen 
P. Naude -
I D. Lawrie -"' 
NGK 
NGSK 
J. Re tief 
2. Church officials who were interviewed 
z. Kameeta, M. Aitken, P. Storey, C. Langeveld, M. Malherbe, J. 
Moulder, M. Nash, A. Nolan, R. Namo, S. Pitts, N.R. campbell, H. 
Steegman, J.A. Wolfaardt. 
3. Chaplains with whom corresporidence was entered into 
A. Attwell, K. Clack, A. van den Aardweg, J. Daines, D. Williams, 
R.H. Moore, C. Stiglingh, c. Naude, J.F. Potgieter, D. Lawrie, R. 
Ca wc u t t , G. Mi t ch e 11. 
4. Interviews with foreign chaplains or church officials 
H.Schaeufele (West Germany), A. Reid (canada), D. Arther (United 
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THE RT. REV. JAMES H. KAULUMA, BISHOP OF NAMIBIA 
TO P. G. MOLL, 
2 JULY 1984 
Dear Peter, 
-308 
Thank you for your letter of 2nd May, 1984. Please pardon the 
delay in replying. Concerning your question, both the Diocese of 
Namibia and the Council of Churches in Namibia hold the position 
that the SADF and the local recruits in Namibia as (sic) a foreign 
army fighting against Namibians. Its aim is to deny Namibians 
their national independence and freedom. 
As such, the Church cannot provide a chaplaincy to a foreign and 
colonial army. Furthermore, the Diocese cannot licence foreign 
chaplains who come here to serve in their colonial foreign army. 
The decision of the South African churches who send their 
chaplains to Namibia cannot and shall not be understood in any 
other way, but as a clear siding and support of their national 
army. 
Wishing you God's blessings in your studies. 
Yours sincerely, 
APPENDICES 
(signed) James H. Kaulurna 





EXCERPTS FROM A PUBLIC INTERVIEW 
WITH 
PASTOR ZEPHANIA KAMEETA 
OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF NAMIBIA 
AND THE NAMIBIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 
-310 
(This interview was conducted by a journalist, Mrl. Hennie 
Se r f on t e in , a t t he Na t i on a 1 Co n fer enc e o f the . So u th Af r i can 
Council of Churches, at St. Barnabas, Bosmont, Johannesburg, 
28.6.1984). 
Serfontein: What is your attitude to the military chaplaincy? 
Kameeta: The churches belonging to the (Namibian) Council of 
Churches have taken a clear stand on chaplaincy. We do not want 
to give credibility to an army which is for apartheid -- for the 
1
apartheid god who is preaching a gospel which is contrary to the 
true Gospel of Jesus Christ -- a god who is dividing people, while 
Christ is reconciling people. Sending your pastors to serve that 
kind of an army is to say yes to the defence of that god. And 
that's why we took a clear stand rejecting that. We have been 
requested, asked back by the people responsible, but we told them 
clearly that we're not going to send our pastors as chaplains into 
that army. We cannot refuse to serve the people. We are 
inviting them, saying, "You are welcome to come and worship in 
your churches where you are members". But we are not going to 
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send our people there to serve in that army, wear that uniform, to 
be given rank. It is just unthinkable you know, "Major 
Kameeta" ! (mirth) And I just want to say that in that stand we 
have been encouraged by the resolution of the SACC in 1974 on 
conscientious objection. Well, what is horrifying to us is to 
hear that there are some chaplains from those churches, belonging 
-- I hope I am wrong belonging to the SACC! That's our 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
(1) Long before this, the Gereformeerde Kerk had, on several 
occasions, clashed with the SADF regarding military coJtrol over 
chaplains (see the historical account in van Wyk, 1984:J09f). In 
l 
' 
1979, the Gereformeerde Kerk complained that the authorities, 
among other things, determined the duties of chaplains; it 
therefore called for a thorough review of the agreement between 
the Defence Force and the church (Argus 24.1.1979; Star 
16.1.1979). Finally, in 1982, it issued a long docunent, which 
inter alia rejected the use of rank, warned that all remuneration 
should come without strings attached, and questioned the use of 
non-ordained theological students as chaplains (Handelinge van die 




CHAPTER 2: THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
(1) The following is a sampling of the recent and growing 
literature on the church's task of peace: Yoder, 1971 and 1972: 
I 





politics: Peace on earth: Der Friedensdienst der Christen: Sider 
I 
' and Brubaker, 1982: Das Bekenntniss: Nash, 1982: Deile, 1982. 
( 2) The Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Congregational, 
Presbyterian, and Baptist statements during the past decade are 
docunented in "Church and Conscience". More recent Presbyterian 
and Congregational material is reproduced in "Study material on 
war, revolution, military service, conscientious objection" 
( 1982) • A further resolution was adopted by the CPSA1Provincial 
I 
Synod in 1982 (Resolution 13: "Service in the SADF"). The 
Catholic rejection of the new legislation of 1983 emerges in a 
letter written by Archbishop George Daniel to Colonel de Kok 
(Chief of Staff, Personnel) on 11.1.1983. The Ba pt is t re j e ct ion 
emerges in a letter from the Baptist Union Citizenship Committee 
(to the Minister of Justice, 31.3.1983). The CPSA, Presbyterian, 
Methodist, and Congregational rejection emerges in a combined 
statement by representatives of these churches who met with ds. c. 
Naude on 5 January 1983 ("Response to the proposed legislation 
regarding conscientious objectors, as given at a briefing of the 
churches by the SADF on 5 January 1983"). The SACC rejection 
emerges in Resolution 39 of its National Conference of June 1984. 
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It should be appreciated, incidentally, that ecunenical concern 
about conscientious objection in South Africa goes back at least 
as far as 1952. In January of that year, the Christian Council 
of south Africa endorsed a wee resolution to the effect that 
"conscientious objectors have the right to have their opinions 
respected" (CCSA Minutes 22/23 January 1952). In January 1957, 
the CCSA "strongly urged" that the Defence Act be amended to 
provide for conscientious objectors (Minutes of the Executive 
Committee of the CCSA, 10/11 January 1957). 
( 3) Sou th African OU tlook, February 1983: 24. "It is the 
magistrate's duty to tender the liberty of men's consciences 
without which all other liberties would not be worth the naming 
But if any man shall impose on us anything that we see not to 
be commanded by our Lord Jesus Christ, we should rather ••• die a 
thousand deaths, than do anything against the light of our own 
consciences" • In this spirit, the Baptist Union of South Africa 
resolved in 1912 that the "principle of compulsion" should be 
removed from the recently passed Union Defence Act (South African 
Outlook, February 1983:24). 
(4) Aquinas is a fair representative of the various theologies of 
conscience which made their appearance during the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. He states that a correct conscience binds 
absolutely and in every circunstance. Thus 
"anyone upon whom the ecclesiastical authorities, in 
ignorance of the true facts, impose a demand that offends 
I 
against his clear conscience, should perish in 
excommunication rather than violate his conscience" (IV·. I 
Se n t • , d i st • 3 8 , a r t • 4 , e x po s • t ex t • Quoted by Rudin, 
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1973:110). 
To Aquinas a mistaken conscience is also binding . I 1 in genera , 
I 
because one incurs sin if one does not satisfy ~onscience 
("Debated questions on truth" 1 7 .4. Translation in Potts, 
1980:135). Aquinas takes this assertion to its logical 
conclusion: 
"Belief in Christ is good in itself and necessary for 
salvation. But if a Christian who held it wrong to :believe 
he would commit a sin" I (Summa in Christ were to do so, 
theologica, I/II, 19.5. Quoted by Rudin, 1-973:109). 
However, Aquinas does not hold the anarchic view that it is always 
wrong to act against one's conscience. A mistaken conscience is 
excused only if it arises from factual error: if the error is one 
of law, then it is no more excusable than a plea of ignorance of 
the law is excusable in the courts (cf. Potts, 1980:56-59). 
The Spanish nee-scholastic, Francisco de Vitoria, asserted that if 
a sub j e c t i s con v i n c e d o f t he in ju st ice o f a w a r, " he o ug h t no t to 
serve in it, even on the command of the prince" (quoted by Bailey, 
1972:11). 
(5) This accords with its programmatic statement in 1948 that 
"War as a means of settling disputes is incompatible with 
the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ. The 
part which war plays in our present international life is a 
sin against God and a degradation of man" (PD:l5). 
(6) 1~69:414. According to the maxim of Frederick the Great, a 
soldier must fear his officers more than his enemies (Keijzer, 
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1978:36). Basic training is the means used to create this 
disposition of respect, obedience and submission. 
training, recruits are stripped of their identity 
ou·r ing basic 
I 
and forced to 
accept new military roles even if those violate some of their 
basic values (Keijzer, 1978:50f). An American study expressed it 
this way: "The purpose of basic training, other than learning new 
skills, is conversion. This transformation consists of replacing 
the identity of the civilian youth with that of the soldier. The 
means used to achieve this change comprise a carefully :programmed 
I 
I 
sequence utilizing the following: total control involving recruit , I . 
independence and deprivation of all rights, a mortification 
process in which the old self is stripped, verbal depredation and 
coerced obeisance, a rewarding of soldierly skills only, ••• Basic 
training is the only radical and coerced change of identity 
and behaviour that youth can be legally subjected to for other 
than medical or punitive reasons, in comparable totalist 
institutions such as prisons or mental hospitals. We find the 
whole process disturbing the military inversion of many 
traditional Christian values fostered by church education and 
youth ministry" (MMP:4lf). 
It is interesting that, despite the military traditions of 
obedience, loyalty and duty, significant numbers of senior 
military officers have, on occasion, disobeyed or resigned when 
instructed to perform actions which ran counter to conscience. 
Some of these instances have been recounted in Denton's (1980) 
fine book: in it, Hoffmann (1980) shows how Beck and other German 
generals plotted against Hitler, Gruber (1980) shows how British 
officers refused to fight against the Americans in the war of 
Independence, and Stanley (1980) discusses the conscientious and 
ethical. issues involved. 
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(7) A naval officer told a cape Town magistrate that it was not in 
the public interest to tell the court about detentio~ barracks. 
The punisl'Inent given there was "far greater than wi 111 ever be 
received in any jail. The fear of God is put into one when one 
hears about what takes place in detention barracks" (Rand Daily 




CHAPTER 3: CHAPLAINCY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
-318 
(1) It emerges from the "Handbook for Chaplains", the "SADF Order 
on Religion" 1/21/78 1 the "Information Brochure", and the SADF 
submission to the Eloff Commission. The "Handbook" appears to 
have been compiled in 1979 or later (HB:25). The SADFO referred 
to was issued in 1978. The "Information Brochure" was compiled 
in 1978 or later, to judge by its use of 1978 budget figures. 
Thus these sources are some six to seven years old. Nevertheless 
they illustrate SADF expectations at a point in time. These 
expectations do not appear to have changed substantially since 
then, as we shall see from statements of senior SAChS officials 
and the Eloff Commission. 
(2) Some churches do not have such "Agreements". The Baptist 
Union and the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches have only a 
United Board Free Churches which is charged with 1 iaison, but 
which has no constitution or written terms of reference (Letter 
from Rev. A • w • v an den Aa r dw e g to P • G • M:> 11 , 1 4 • 2 • 1 9 8 4) • The 
Roman Catholic Church has no written agreement with the SADF 
(Letter from Archbishop G. Daniel to P.G. M:>ll, 6.6.1984). Other 
churches do have written "Agreements". That of the MCSA is 
recorded in the Minutes of the 98th Annual Conference, pp 215-222. 
several clauses indicate a concern to protect the freedom of MCSA 
chaplains. For example, it is stated that chaplains, while 
responsible to the Chaplain-General, are under the oversight of 
FOOTNOTES -319 
their Circuit Superintendent (Section B(d) ). Furthermore, the 
I 
Connexional Committee on Military Chaplaincy is charged to 
that chaplains "represent clearly the essential elemeits 
ensure 
of the 
Methodist witness, and that they shall not be the subject of 
training not in harmony with Methodist convictions" (Section 
C(h)). The Connexional Committee is also charged to "make 
representations to the Military Authorities concerned in respect 
of all actions which may be contrary to Methodist convictions" 
( Se c ti on C ( j ) ) • 
The CPSA docunents, ("Agreement" and "The Prin-cipal Chaplain, CPSA 
1 
SADF") insist, in a similar way to the MCSA docunent, that clergy 
be "as fully integrated as possible into their diocese" and that 
no lectures or courses be given without the approval of the 
English Language Literature Commission. They include a strong 
emphasis on consultation and liaison, and allow no hint of control 
or authority by the Chaplain-General. 
On a superficial examination, therefore, it might be tholl9ht that 
the freedom of the MCSA and the CPSA is guaranteed. 
I However, two 
I 
' 
points should be mentioned in this regard. First, nothing in 
these documents rescinds the official SADF docunents like the 
"SADFO on Religion", or the very clearly expressed expectations of 
the politicians, senior Defence Force personnel, and chaplains' 
conferences. Second, even tholl9h these churches may have fine 
intentions of maintaining their denominational independence and 
identity, the point of this chapter is to show that the crucial 
factor is full military membership, which entails uniform, rank, 
security clearance and training, together with the various forms 
of legal and informal control that accompany these. Third, these 
docunents do not amount to a "Chaplains' Bill of Rights". They 
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do not explicitly guarantee the free expression of conscience, as 
has been done by the USA military chaplaincy, in its docunent 
"Chaplains' guidelines for free and responsible expression of 
conscience in the military" (1970). 
(3) This is hardly a startling statement, in view of the 
dependence of war machines everywhere on sound troop morale. To 
this there is abundant testimony. Co n s id er, for 
diverse sources as Martin Luther (as quoted in 
I 
1973:89), Judge M.T. Steyn (Steyn Commission, 








( 1983) • 
I 
' 
' Why are military commanders tempted to use religion to promote 
morale? This is because of the motivating force of religion. 
Expressing this in sociological language, Peter Berger asserts 
that religion plays a strategic part in the human enterprise of 
world-building (1973:30ff). It forms, according to Berger, an 
important part in the creation and maintenance of institutions. 
This central aspect of Berger's thought may be applied to the 
military as an institution. Viewed in this light, it is not 
surprising that religion should play a part in creating attitudes 
that enable the military to function -- e.g. patriotism, the 
willingness to surrender one's life for one's country, etc. 
Famous commanders have paid tribute to the contribution to morale 
made by chaplains, e.g. Field Marshal Montgomery (quoted in 
Wilkinson, 1981:254f) ~ Dwight D. Eisenhower, US Army Chief of 
Staff Omar Bradley, and the US General of the Army John J. 
Pershing (quoted in Venzke, 1975:58f). A representative of the 
German High Command told chaplains in 1942: "The primary task of 
the military chaplaincy is and remains to be a vital means of 
strengthening the fighting strength of the troops It can 
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never be to represent the special interests of the church" (quoted 
in Wilkinson, 1981: 2 55) • Conversely, in Germany in 1936 ministry 
to troops by local pastors was forbidden by the war ministry, so 
as to forestall the inroads that Confessing Church ministers might 
make on morale (We ymann, 1970: 121) • These expectations of 
morale-building are sometimes made official by their inclusion in 
military publications, e.g. in German chaplaincy materials both 
I 
before and since World war II (quoted by Huber, 1973:247,261). 
I 
The us Army Field manual 16-5 (published by the Department of the 
Army) conveys what was required of the US chaplain: 
"It is the responsibility of the chaplain to make every 
effort to assist the soldier to perform a creditable service 
to the Army. He should be returned to civilian life 
strengthened in his religious outlook, more devotedias a 
citizen, and even more faithful to the flag he has served" 
(The Chaplain (Dec. 1967), p.8, quoted by Rimlinger, 
1974:353). 
Ag a in, the US Army defence in the famous suit about the 
constitutionality of the chaplaincy was that the chaplaincy 
"is a valid and necessary exercise of Congressional war 
power ••• raises the morale and increases the effectiveness 
of our fighting force .•• the presence of the chaplain and 
his enheartening effect on the troops is an essential 
ingredient to the successful conclusion of a war" ("The 
constitutionality suit", Chaplaincy IV (1981), pp. 12-61, at 
48). 
It hardly seems necessary to defend the view that chaplains should 
resist these efforts to make them into "morale officers". 
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Nevertheless it is instructive to quote some American studies on 
the question. 
effect of a 
Price, £or example, contends that the morale 
military chaplaincy would be endurable if! the cause 
were just (EC:67), but the question may be asked whether the 
chaplain should ever be used as a morale agent, even in a "just" 
war: 
"The controlling identity of the chaplain is that1 of a 
person of righteousness, compassion and peace. The 
chaplain cannot bear arms, nor allow himself 
be 
or herself to 
. I . organ1za
1
t1on or used as a morale agent for the military 
I 
for the accomplishment of a specific military objective" 
(Boozer, 1979:72). 
Clearest of all on this point is the UCC study: 
"Turning the cflaplain into a morale officer is an abuse of 
his or her clerical calling ••• Here there is a danger of 
using religion as a rationale for the righteousness of our 
cause, sacrificing faith to the fighting spirit" (MMP:74). 
(4) The UCC ~tudy feared that the military chaplaincy structure 
would "play one denomination off against another" (MMP:84). 
(5) "His dual role under two completely separate and disparate 
systems of authority, both claiming his loyalty and exercising 
discipline over him, brings into focus the dilemma of the 
chaplaincy and the problem for the church. To whom does he 
really belong? Where is his primary loyalty?" (MMP:67). 
(6) "The caste system in the military is assiduously cultivated 
and rigorously preserved by the rites of obeisance and the symbols 
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o f superiority" ( MMP : 4 3) • The rigidity of rank is emphasized by 
the fact that if any person holds himself out to be the holder of 
I 
a rank other than his own rank, he can be sentenced to six months' 
imprisonment (Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, First Schedule, 43) •. 
(7) An American study concluded that "inclusion as an officer is 
also the military absorption of the clergyman, 
alien and prophetic calling by identifying 
sacrificing his 
with th~ military 
I 
establishment and its upper class at the expense of the enlisted 
personnel" (MMP:89). 
(8) It is argued that rank "gives the chaplain clout with the 
commander, enabling him to humanize the military and forestall 
immoral or illegal actions" (MMP:75). 
(9) Note a similar case where a RlOO fine was given, in Cape Times 
14.11.1980. The maximum sentence is RlOOO or 5 years, ibid. 
(10) The military chaplaincy tends to 
"lock the church into an implicit legitimation of the' war 
policies of the state, both the just and the unjust wars" 
(MMP:ll2). 
(11) Regarding identification, an American study insisted, "In the 
military caste system, rank is the definitive divider. Rank is a 
real barrier, which some are able to overcome since they are the 
only officers even allowed to associate with enlisted personnel ••• 
rank is a hindrance to be overcome rather than a facilitator of 
the ministry to military personnel ••• the benefits seem to advance 
the chaplain's personal interests more than his ministry, to 
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further the ends of the military more than the purposes of the 
church. Rank identifies the church with the powerful instead of 
the powerless" ( MMP: 8 9, 90) • 
(12) Chaplains in other countries have a mixed record with respect 
to conscientious objection. On the one hand, some have been 
apologists for the military. The US Army Chief of Chaplains, 
I 
Maj. -Gen. Gerhardt w. Hyatt, justified his own participation in 
I 
the military on traditional "just war" grounds, and opposed church 
I 
support for selective conscientious objectors during the Vietnam 
War (quoted in A Proposal: 4) • In a 1966 resolution, th~ Mi 1 i tary 
I 
Chaplains' Association of the United States declared that 
chaplains who served in Vietnam were 
"unanimous in their agreement that they, with the men they 
are committed to serve, are where they o~ht to be, that our 
mission is just and that the need of the people there for 
our support, military, financial and humanitarian, is real 
and urgent" (quoted in Zahn, "What did you do during the 
war, Father?", pl96). 
There are some recorded instances in the USA, in which a chaplain 
has "grossly violated the counseling process and the integrity of 
a youth, abusing his own clergy office" in the treatment of 
conscientious objectors (MMP:45). For example, a chaplain 
interviewed one Moroney, a conscientious objector, during the 
Vietnam period, and concluded that his objection was on 
"political" grounds. The man was consequently refused 
conscientious objector status. Subsequently a US magistrate found 
that Moroney was indeed a conscientious objector on religious 
grounds (cf. Moroney v. Lai rd, No. CA- 6-2 6 0 ( N. D. Tex • June 9 , 
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1972.} For a contrast, see Silverman v. Laird, No. 71-92-J 
(D.Mass. March 15,1972} ). On the other hand, a serving 




supportive of both pacifist and selective conscientious objection, 
whether on religious grounds or not (Arther}. 
Bamberg quotes the Italian military chaplains as saying in 1965 
i 
that conscientious objection was anti-Christian and an "insult to 
I 
the Fatherland and its war heroes". They demanded that there be 
an end to "all discrimination against soldiers on all fJonts and 
of all uniforms, who in dying gave themselves for thl glorious 
ideals of the Fatherland" (1970: 8, 9) • I 
(13) Briggs has subsequently changed his views and supports the 
Congregational Church rejection of church participation on the 
Board. It may be that some of the chaplains have also changed 
their views since, but the highest-ranking of them, Brig. van den 
Aardweg, has not, as is evident from the quotations above. 
( 14) This suspicion follows from the famous Mi lg ram experiments 
which showed that most people tend to obey legitimate authority, 
to the point of inflicting great and unnecessary pain upon others, 
even if no effort is made to enforce obedience (see the full 
account in Gergen et al., 1974:329ff). The same psychological 
tendency to conform was found ~y Janis in the political processes 
which led up to international fiascos like the Bay of Pigs 
incident. Janis concluded that a phenomenon of "groupthink" was 
frequently operative. By this he meant that "powerful social 
pressures are brol.J:3 ht to bear by members of a cohesive group 
whenever a dissident begins to voice his objections to a group 
consensus" (1971:43). "Groupthink", he said, was characterized 
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by self-censorship of views that deviate from the group consensus: 
the construction of stereotypes of "enemy" groups: and the 
collective construction of rationalizations in order to discount 




CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Lifton's research reveals that Vietnam War veterans deeply 
resent the kind of consolation that was offered them by dhaplains. 
Recalling interviews he had with veterans, Lifton commenJs, 
"With bitter enthusiasm, they gave endless examples of 
chaplains blessing the troops, their mission, their guns, 
their killing. As one of the men put it, "Whatever we were 
doing murder atrocities ••• God was always on our 
side". 
"The vets were trying to say that the only thing worse than 
being ordered by military authorities to participate in 
absurd evil is to have that evil rationalized and justified 
by "guardians of the spirit". Chap! a ins and psychiatrists 
thus fulfill the function of helping men adjust to 
committing war er imes, while lending their spiritual 
authority to the overall project. 
"Chaplains and psychiatrists then formed "unholy alliances" 
not only with the military command but with the more 
corruptible elements of the soldier's individual psyche. We 
may then speak of the existence of a counterfeit universe, 
in which all-pervasive, spiritually reinforced inner 
corruption becomes the price of survival" (1972:68f). 
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(2) "Seen individualistically and in terms of the troops, the 
problems involved become those of sexual licence, drinking and 
dope, personal faith and family relations. This mentality places 
. d 11 .. the chaplain on the side of the command an uses r7 1g1on to 
control the perennial problems generated by military life itself. 
At the same time, this inhibits the chaplain from focusing 
religion and ethics on the system, the military institution 
proper, which is a large scale social and political system raising 
moral problems on another dimension" (MMP: 74f). 
( 3) J. ' Glenn Gray notes in his beautiful and moving book, "The 
Warrior~, that "the most potent quieters of conscience are 
evidently the presence of others who are doing the same things and 
the consciousness of acting under the orders of people "higher up" 
who will answer for one's deeds" (1959: 1 75). Similarly Keijzer 
observes that the reliance on superior orders reduces stress in 
combat operations (1978:47; see also the discussions about 
military obedience in Chapter 2 and on the defence of superior 
' orders in Appendix C). As a senior officer, it is possible for 
the chaplain to act as a "quieter of conscience". As long as the 
chaplain does not experience moral anguish, why should a humble 
troop do so? Gray then reminds the reader that "it is a crucial 
moment in a soldier's life when he is ordered to perform a deed 
that he finds completely at variance with his own notions of right 
and good ••• It means to set oneself against others and with one 
stroke lose their comforting presence Suddenly the soldier 
feels himself abandoned and cast off from all security" 
(1959:184f). It might be argued that the consolation that the 
chaplain should offer in this instance is that of helping the 
soldier to come to terms with the personal costs implicit in his 
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moral objections, and to help him to register his objections in 
the most effective fashion. 
(4) "With full membership in the military, the chaplain offers his 
own ecclesiastical endorsement of the military enterprise. All 
the symbols involved speak of his full participation -- with the 
exception of a small cross. The image of the chaplain, let alone 
some of his required duties, says that the military and its 
mission are acceptable in the eyes of the church he represents. 
He is living testimony to his church's agreement that it is 
possible to be both a Christian and a soldier, that military life 
is compatible with the obligations of Christian faith ·and 
practice. 
( MMP: 9 2) • 
The chaplain says that much by his presence alone" 
(5) "Expecting a sympathetic clergyman, the youth meets a military 
officer: and seeking an advocat~, he or she finds a supporter of 
the system itself" (MMP:43). 
(6) An ecunenical effort at renegotiation was initiated in early 
1984 by the Archbishop of cape Town (CPSA) and Rev. Peter Storey 
(MCSA) among others. However, as of July 1984, this group had 
neither publicized its findings nor met formally with the SADF. 
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